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Abstract 
This thesis explores the linkages between corporate governance and corporate finance, 
making use of a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010. We 
investigate three main themes.   
First, we examine the impact of managerial ownership and other corporate 
governance variables on firms‟ exporting decisions, which are characterized by 
considerable risk and information asymmetries. We document that both export 
propensity and intensity increase with managerial ownership up to a point of around 
23%-27%, and decrease thereafter. We also find a negative association between state 
ownership and export intensity. Furthermore, we observe that the larger the board size, 
the lower the firm‟s export propensity and intensity, and that firms with a higher 
proportion of independent directors in the board are generally less likely to export. 
These findings are driven by privately controlled firms during the post-2006 split share 
structure reform period.  
Second, we examine the relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate investment decisions. We find that investment decisions are systematically 
related to managerial ownership in two ways. Firstly, managerial ownership exerts a 
positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions, by aligning management‟s 
incentives with the interests of shareholders.  Secondly, we document that, by acting as 
a form of collateral to lenders, managerial ownership helps to reduce the degree of 
financial constraints faced by firms.  
Third, we examine the impact of ownership and corporate governance on agency 
costs. We measure the latter in two ways: using the sales to assets ratio, and the general 
administration and selling expenses scaled by assets. We find that, especially in the 
post-2006 split share structure reform period, increased managerial ownership and debt 
financing work as effective corporate governance mechanisms, by mitigating agency 
problems. We also find evidence that while legal person shareholding helps to mitigate 
agency costs for privately controlled firms in the post-reform period, large boards of 
directors are associated with higher agency costs in government controlled firms.  
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that the Chinese government‟s 
recent policies aimed at reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial 
ownership in  listed firms have helped to reduce agency and asymmetric information 
problems, thereby enabling firms to  enhance investment efficiency and international  
activities. Our study recommends that greater attention should therefore be paid to 
compensation contracts of the management team and to board characteristics, and that 
state ownership should be further reduced. This would help further enhance resource 
allocation efficiency and sustain high levels of economic growth.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Research background  
The agency perspective of corporations was first introduced by Berle and Means (1932), 
who observe a separation between ownership and control in large US corporations. The 
separation of ownership and control in large corporations with diffuse ownership makes 
it difficult for shareholders to monitor management‟s decisions. This gives managers 
the freedom to pursue their own objectives at shareholders‟ expense (Berle and Means, 
1932). Building on Berle and Means‟s argument, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
systematically apply the principal agent perspective to model the potential agency costs 
resulting from agency problems in corporations. The agency problem arises from the 
agency relationship whereby one party (the principal) appoints another party (manager) 
to act on his/her behalf in the corporation. By providing a new paradigm of the firm as a 
“nexus of contracts” mainly between the principal and his/her agents, agency theory 
advances our understanding of the firm beyond that offered by the “legal entity” 
concept in law, or the “factor of production” concept in economics (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency cost theory adds therefore a 
new dimension to the theory of firm.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency costs as the sum of (1) the 
monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditure by the agent, and 
(3) the residual loss. Given the considerable losses to the economy as a whole that 
follow from agency costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
agency theory is considered as a dominating theoretical and empirically valid 
perspective in the governance of corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Eisenhardt, 
1989).   
More recent years have witnessed an explosion of research on corporate 
governance issues in emerging markets such as China and Asian and East European 
countries. These studies (e.g., Faccio et al., 2001; Allen, 2005; Morck et al., 2005; 
Young et al. 2008) suggest that, in addition to the traditional principal agent problems 
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which can also be observed in the developed markets, in emerging markets where 
ownership is concentrated and legal protection for minority shareholders is rather weak, 
majority shareholders tend to expropriate minority shareholders through various means 
like tunnelling, insider trading, dividend policy and leverage. This principal–principal 
perspective of agency problem affects decisions made by managers and consequently 
corporate performance (Faccio at al., 2001; Morck et al., 2005)  
 There is no single and generally accepted definition of corporate governance and 
existing definitions vary widely. A claimholders/financiers-focused definition is given 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They put it as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, p.737). A similar focus can be seen in Denis and McConnell (2003, p.2) 
who define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms-both institutional and 
market-based that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that make 
decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make decisions that 
maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of capital)”. A 
somewhat broader definition is provided by the Cadbury Committee (1992) which 
defines it as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”.  Similarly, 
Zingales (1998, p.499) broadly defines a governance system as “the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the 
firm”.   
It is very clear from the above variety of definitions that corporate governance 
plays a central role in the direction and control of the corporations in order to ensure the 
interest of shareholders and other stakeholders are met through efficient and effective 
use of resources. A central theme of corporate governance research revolves around the 
establishment of mechanisms aimed at attenuating the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and managers, as well as between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders, thereby mitigating agency costs. This is the predominant issue underlying 
corporate governance theories. To solve the agency problems various governance 
mechanisms have been devised such as providing equity ownership and compensation 
to managers, monitoring by the board of directors/large shareholders, the use of debt 
financing, the discipline by capital markets and the managerial labour market, the 
market for corporate control  and so on.  
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As part of the wider economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, in the 1980s, 
the Chinese government adopted various measures aimed at reforming state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). These mainly include managerial autonomy, a management 
responsibility system, and corporatization and partial privatization of former SOEs 
(Aivazian et al., 2005; Su, 2005). The latter two measures of SOE reforms mainly hinge 
on the Western-style modern corporate system, which is essentially characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control. This suggests that modern Chinese firms are 
inevitably subject to the issues of incentive incompatibility and information asymmetry, 
which often arise between managers and owners. Lin et al. (1998) suggest that as a 
consequence of this, China‟s SOEs may face agency problems, such as moral hazard 
and managerial slacks and discretion. Therefore, giving appropriate incentives to the 
management becomes critical in firms in order to mitigate heightened agency problem 
and to motivate managers to pursue profit maximization objectives (Chow, 1997; Xu et 
al., 2005).  
Furthermore, the Chinese government traditionally wanted to retain some 
control in the companies, in part through partial retained ownership. This led to further 
conflicts between politicians/controlling shareholders and firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994; Young et a., 2008). Yet, government ownership and control weaken the 
effectiveness of other government mechanisms aimed at providing incentives for 
managers (Kato and Long, 2006a,b, c and 2011; Tian and Estrin, 2007).  Despite these 
problems, the Chinese government has taken several steps to improve the corporate 
governance of firms in recent years. 
In this study, we propose to investigate the effects of managerial ownership and 
other internal governance mechanisms on various aspects of Chinese listed firms‟ 
behaviour. Among other things, this enables us to shed light on the linkages between 
corporate governance and corporate finance. Specifically, making use of a large panel 
of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, we investigate three main themes. 
Our first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examines the impact of managerial ownership 
and other corporate governance variables on firms‟ exporting decisions, which are 
characterized by considerable risk and information asymmetries. The investigation in 
our second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) focuses on how managerial ownership affects 
corporate investment decisions directly by mitigating agency conflicts between 
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managers and owners, and indirectly by affecting the financing constraints faced by 
firms. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) is devoted to analyse the impact of 
managerial ownership and corporate governance on the agency costs faced by firms, 
which we measure in two ways: using the sales to assets ratio, and the general 
administration and selling expenses scaled by assets. 
 
1.2. Motivation of the study 
The Chinese corporate governance system has evolved significantly over the last three 
decades, and especially in the last decade. However, very limited systemic academic 
research has been conducted to assess its effectiveness in recent years. This provides a 
great opportunity for us to fill this gap and contribute to the understanding of the 
effectiveness of the Chinese corporate governance system. We next discuss the 
motivations behind each of the empirical chapters carried out in this thesis. 
Participation in export markets is often viewed as helpful for economic growth, 
especially in emerging economies, as evidenced by a large number of cross-country 
studies at the aggregate level, which report a positive relationship between international 
trade and economic growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999). Since its accession to the WTO 
in 2001, China‟s export performance has been phenomenal: in 2010, it has become the 
largest exporter in the world (CIA, 2010), while the technological sophistication of its 
exports has also increased substantially. At the same time, as we discuss in Chapters 2 
and 3, the Chinese governance system has significantly improved. In the light of these 
developments, it is increasingly interesting to see how internationalization and internal 
governance mechanisms, which are two constantly evolving phenomena, interact with 
each other in the Chinese context. This is the main objective of our first empirical study 
(Chapter 3) in this thesis. Further, the same chapter is motivated by the fact that there is 
no study that has examined the impact of corporate governance on internationalisation 
after the 2005 split share reform in China. 
Efficient corporate investment decisions are of key importance not only for the 
firms themselves but for the economy as a whole. At the microeconomic level, 
investment/capital expenditures affect a firm‟s production decisions, strategic plans, and 
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performance (Bromiley, 1986; Nicholson, 1992; McConnell and Muscarella, 1985). At 
the macroeconomic level, firms‟ investment/capital expenditures have a significant 
effect on economic growth, and business cycles (Dornbusch, and Fischer, 1987; 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). Consequently, a vast body of 
research has attempted to identify the determinants of corporate investment. The classic 
work trace back to Meyer and Kuh (1957). Following the seminal work of Fazzari et al. 
(1988), a large body of literature has established cash flow as an important determinant 
of investment. Yet, although a number of theoretical papers suggest that managerial 
incentives have implications for investment, only a limited number of studies from 
developed countries have provided evidence on the impact of managerial ownership on 
investment, either directly or indirectly through its effects on financing constraints. In 
addition, these two effects are usually investigated separately. In the context of China, 
although several studies have recently examined the direct and indirect impact of state 
ownership on investment, to the best of our knowledge, no single study has focused on 
the potential impact of managerial ownership on fixed investment decisions. We believe 
this represents a significant gap in the literature, in the light of the fact that managerial 
ownership has emerged as an important governance mechanism in recent years. The 
main motivation of our second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) is therefore to fill this gap 
by examining both the direct and indirect impact of managerial ownership on fixed 
investment decisions.  Another motivation for the same empirical study is the 
controversy over the over- or under-investment behavior of Chinese listed firms which 
we address in details in this Chapter. 
 China‟s modern corporations suffer from sever agency problem stemming from 
conflicts of interest between mangers and shareholders, as well as between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Lin et al. 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c). 
Agency costs arising from the agency conflicts in the corporations not only generate 
losses for the owners of the firms, but also significant losses for the economy (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Following Ang et al.‟s (2000) 
empirical contribution to the analysis of agency costs, a handful of studies have 
developed empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership and governance 
structure and agency costs in developed countries (e.g., Singh and Davidson, 2003; 
Fleming et al., 2005; Florakis, 2008; McKnight and Weir, 2009). Focusing on Chinese 
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listed firms prior to 2000, Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. (2008) examine the 
effects of ownership and other internal governance mechanisms including debt 
financing, and conclude that these governance mechanisms are not effective in 
mitigating agency costs. Yet, considering recent developments in the governance of 
listed firms as well as banks a (as we discuss in the Chapter 2), it is interesting to 
analyze the extent to which ownership and governance mechanisms  affect agency costs 
in the most recent period, and particularly after the 2005 split share structure reform . It 
is also interesting to how they affect agency costs differently in private-controlled firms 
and state-controlled firms. These considerations motivate our third empirical study 
(Chapter 5). 
 
1.3. Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. By examining the 
impact of managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables on firms‟ 
exporting decisions, the first empirical study in this thesis (Chapter 3) primarily 
contributes to the trade literature by including governance components as new elements 
of firm heterogeneity, with the aim of better explaining the determinants of both export 
propensity and intensity. Recent developments in international trade literature have 
advanced our understanding by incorporating sunk-costs, heterogeneity in productivity, 
and financial factors to explain variations in firms‟ export market participation decisions. 
Yet, they have ignored the potential impact of governance factors. Although a limited 
number of studies has examined the relationship between corporate governance factors 
and export behavior, these studies are generally based on small samples and often make 
use of a static modelling framework. Further, they do not examine all the corporate 
governance components in a unified framework. By integrating the corporate 
governance and trade literatures, this study documents for the first-time a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and exporting decisions in the context of 
China.  
Our second empirical study (Chapter 4) examines the relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate investment decisions. Firstly, this study advances 
existing literature by providing evidence on both the direct and indirect effects of 
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managerial ownership on corporate investment decisions, whereby the latter operates 
through a reduction in financing constraints. Prior literature on countries other than 
China has focused on one or the other effect, but never on both effects simultaneously. 
Secondly, in the context of China, there is no single study that examines the impact of 
managerial ownership on corporate investment or on the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow. Using a recent data set, this study identifies managerial ownership as a 
mechanism through which Chinese listed firms can alleviate agency and asymmetric 
information problems, and concludes therefore that managerial ownership is an 
important determinant of investment decisions even in a transition and emerging 
economy such as China.  
Our third empirical study (Chapter 5) contributes to the existing literature by 
providing the first evidence from China on the direct relationship between managerial 
ownership and agency costs. Although previous studies have looked at the effects of 
other ownership variables on the agency costs faced by Chinese firms (Firth et al., 2008; 
Tian and Estrin, 2007), to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on the direct 
effect of managerial ownership on agency costs in China. This study also addresses 
endogeneity problem through the use of a system GMM estimator in the empirical 
analysis.  
Taken as a whole, our research contributes to the literature along three additional 
dimensions. First, it contributes to the growing literature on the effects of managerial 
incentives, and in particular managerial ownership, in the context of transition 
economies (Kato and Long, 2011) 
Second, it distinguishes itself from previous studies by differentiating the effects 
of managerial ownership on firms‟ exporting and investment decisions, as well as 
agency costs, between the pre- and post- reform period, and thus contributes to the 
research on the effects of the split share structure reform in China. Recent empirical 
studies examine the direct effects of the reform itself on firms‟ behavior (Lin 2009;  
Chen et al., 2012), ignoring how corporate governance mechanism can differently affect 
firm behavior in the post reform period. The empirical studies in this thesis show that 
the increased managerial ownership which followed the reform is associated with 
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reduced agency costs, reduced financial constraints, more efficient investment decisions 
and increased exporting activities.  
Finally, our research differentiates for the first time, the impact of managerial 
ownership on firm behavior (including investment and exporting decisions as well as 
agency costs and financing constraints faced by firms) between privately- and state-
controlled firms. All three empirical studies in this thesis unanimously provide evidence 
that privately-controlled firms are associated with fewer agency costs, fewer financial 
constraints, more efficient investment decisions, and increased international expansion 
activities in terms of export sales. These results are consistent with the argument that 
private ownership is superior to state ownership (Alchian, 1965; Shleifer, 1998; Green, 
2004; Chen et al., 2010). Our research therefore also contributes to the literature that 
favors privatisation (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for a survey). 
Overall, our research examines the effects of managerial ownership and other 
governance mechanisms on various aspects of corporate behaviour. It also provides an 
opportunity for the comparison of the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms 
between the pre-reform and post reform periods, as well as between state- and privately-
controlled firms. By integrating and leveraging the corporate governance, corporate 
finance, and trade literatures, this research contributes to further our knowledge about 
the effectiveness of managerial ownership and other internal corporate governance 
mechanisms of Chinese listed firms. The outcomes of this research will help policy 
designers and government agencies, economists, as well as local and foreign investors 
to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis mainly consists of three empirical studies on the impact of the corporate 
governance on various aspects of Chinese listed firms‟ behavior. It is structured in six 
chapters. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a general 
overview of the institutional reforms in China. It first provides a historical background 
of corporations and financial markets in China. It then describes the ownership structure 
of the corporations and other internal governance mechanisms. The same chapter also 
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describe the development of the private sector and the evolution of the banking system 
in China. Chapter 3 presents the first empirical study, which examine the impact of 
managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables on firms‟ exporting 
decisions. The same chapter also provides brief descriptions of the present state of 
international expansion, and the managerial incentive system in China. Chapter 4 
represents the second empirical study, which examines the relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate investment decisions. Chapter 5 presents the third 
empirical study that examine the impact of managerial ownership and corporate 
governance on agency costs, which are measured using the sales to assets ratio, and the 
general administration and selling expenses scaled by assets. Finally, Chapter 6 presents 
the concluding remarks of this thesis, identifies some potential research limitations, and 
suggests potential avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Institutional reforms and corporate governance system in China 
 
2.1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that China‟s economic success is the result of its economic 
reform initiated in 1978, which is gradually transforming the central-command 
economic system into a market-based economy. In the initial stage of the transition, the 
government paid little attention to providing institutional infrastructures that were 
necessary for the capital market to function properly.
1
 Although the transition 
necessitated the establishment of an almost entirely new set of institutions, China‟s 
political system inhibited the development of legal institutions and the evolution of 
local governmental authorities. Nevertheless, its desire to integrate globally has resulted 
in the gradual development of legal institutions, the decentralization of political 
institutions, the liberalization of the financial system, and the rapid growth of the private 
sector and development of financial markets. In this section, we briefly describe the 
important institutional developments that are underpinning the growth of the corporate 
sector in China. 
As part of the wider economic reform, in the 1980s, the Chinese government 
adopted various measures aimed at reforming SOEs. Unlike most former centrally 
planned economies, China has adopted a gradual and piecemeal approach instead of the 
overnight privatization of SOEs. These measures included increasing managers‟ 
decision making autonomy, introducing financial incentives, and bringing in 
performance contracts between the government and SOEs, which were mainly aimed at 
giving more latitude to SOE management in managing their firms and at aligning the 
goals of SOE management with those of the government (Naughton, 1995; Shirley and 
Xu, 2001; Su 2005). These reforms measures were successful to a certain extent by 
                                                        
1 Hereby, we denote with institutions those formal constraints such as rules, laws, and regulations, as well 
as informal constrains such as norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct, and 
enforcement mechanisms, which structure human interaction to reduce uncertainty and provide incentives 
(North, 1990, 1994). Without institutions, markets neither develop nor function properly. 
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reducing the role of governmental intervention in the management of SOEs and by 
improving their productivity (Groves et al., 1994; Li, 1997).  Nonetheless, the rights and 
responsibilities of SOE stakeholders and management were still ill-defined. 
Furthermore, as the reform efforts implemented thus far had not resulted in sufficient 
improvements in SOE performance, the government could not finance all SOEs itself 
(Aivazian et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2009). Therefore, it sought to corporatize and 
partially privatize former SOEs while retaining its status as the controlling shareholder 
(Walter and Howie, 2003). 
 
2.2. Corporate governance system in China 
In this section, we discuss the evolution of corporate governance of Chinese listed 
corporations, with particular emphasis on corporate ownership structure.  
2.2.1. Evolution of corporations and financial markets  
The history of modern corporations in China is very short compared to other developing 
countries. Starting from 1984, stock companies have appeared in China, but formal 
trading did not start until the early 1990s. Beijing Tianquao Co, Ltd which was 
established in 1984 became the first joint stock corporation in China.  In the same year, 
Shangai Feil Acoustics Co., Ltd was the first Chinese corporation that publicly offered 
shares to the market (CSRC, 2006).  
The establishment of the two stock markets in Shanghai in 1990 and in 
Shenzhen in 1991 with the objective of promoting the reform of SOEs was one of the 
most significant economic reforms in China. The government has thereby been 
successful in encouraging enterprises, especially SOEs to raise funds by issuing stocks 
and corporate bonds (Chi and Young, 2007). Moreover, the government has been 
seeking to improve the operating performance, and the corporate governance of SOEs 
through continuous economic and share-ownership reforms. Consequently, Chinese 
capital markets have seen a rapid development in terms of the number of listed 
companies, trading volume, and total market capitalization. Yet, the number of 
privately-owned listed companies was negligible until 1998, but boomed thereafter.  
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At the end of 2010, a total of 2063 companies were listed on the two Chinese stock 
exchanges. The total market capitalization of these companies was 26.54 trillion of 
RMB. The combined market capitalization of these two stock exchanges in 2010 
accounted for about 66.694 % of China‟s GDP (CSRC, 2010). Now China is the 
world‟s third largest stock market after the US and Japan in terms of combined market 
capitalization. Furthermore, China‟s securities market is open to foreign investors. 
While International investors were for the first time allowed to invest in China‟s B share 
market in 1992, after ten years, foreign institutions have been allowed to invest directly 
into China‟s A share market via the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
scheme.
2
 As can been seen in Table 2.1, with the opening of Chinese economy for 
foreign investors, there has been a steady growth in number of QFIIs and approved 
investment quotas in USD billion. We can also observe that the total assets held by the 
QFIIs have steadily increased from 2004 to 2010 except in 2008. Furthermore, among 
QFIIs commercial banks accounted for about 29% in 2007 and 20 % in 2010
3
. 
 
Table 2.1 Qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in China 2004-2010 
Year QFII licensed 
foreign 
institutions 
Approved 
investment 
quotas in USD 
billion 
Total QFII 
assets 
Securities 
held by QFII 
Percentage of 
securities to 
total assets 
2004 27 3.7 24 16.2 66.6 
2005 34 5.6 39 34.7 90 
2006 44 7.3 196 137 70 
2007 52 9.995 258.8 175.5 61.4 
2008 76 13.405 178.78 104.78 58.6% 
2009 94 16.67 289.9 237 81.8% 
2010 106 19.72 297.1 265.8 89.5% 
Source: CSRC annual reports 2004-2010 
Furthermore, since 2001, eligible foreign companies can offer and list shares in 
China‟s markets. A further significant development was that since 2002 foreign 
companies are also allowed to take over Chinese listed companies. International 
investors‟ participation has helped to promote Chinese capital markets. At the same 
time, it has brought into the capital market long-term funds, which are helpful for the 
                                                        
2 This was a program that permitted, on a selective basis, certain licensed global institutional investors to 
participate in China‟s mainland stock exchanges by buying and selling yuan-denominated “A” shares. 
Foreign access to these shares is limited by specified quotas that determine the amount of money that the 
licensed foreign investors are permitted to invest in China's capital markets. 
3 Other main QFIIs include investment management firms, brokers (securities companies) and 
investment banks, insurance companies.. 
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growth of Chinese corporations, as well as advanced investment philosophies and good 
expertise (CSRC, 2006). 
2.2.2. The company Law and the Chinese Securities Regulations Commission 
The institutional framework for corporate governance in China mainly draws 
from both the 1994 Company Law of the People‟s Republic of China and the Chinese 
Securities Regulations Commission (CSRC). The 1994 Company Law improved 
property rights by establishing the firm as a legal entity that owns assets. Furthermore, 
the company law facilitated the restructuring of traditional large and medium sized 
SOEs as legal entities, and the establishment of a modern corporate system by 
standardizing the organization and the behavior of the companies. It defines the 
functions and responsibilities of shareholders, board of directors, and board of 
supervisors. In 2006, a fundamental review of Chinese company law was enacted, 
creating two types of limited companies: the limited liability companies (LLC private 
companies) and the joint stock company (JSC public companies). This brought the legal 
context much in line with the company law of other countries. The Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law was introduced only in November 1988 for an initial trial period. In 
April 1991, the Civil Procedural Law, which established the bankruptcy procedure for 
companies, was enacted. Yet, due to that fact that most of the firms were owned by the 
government or government agents which have social and political objectives such as 
maintaining employment,  the number of bankruptcies was very low compared to 
international standards (Cao (1998). A new corporate bankruptcy law was enacted in 
2007, which applied to SOEs, foreign investment enterprises, and domestic companies. 
Tomasic and Zhang (2012) suggest that China‟s bankruptcy judges are extremely 
cautious in the implementation of the new law‟s reorganization provisions due to the 
political considerations.  
The establishment of the two stock exchanges was an important milestone 
toward the development and implementation of the rule of law and in securing property 
rights for private enterprises. Yet, in the early 1990s, local leaders retained a significant 
influence over the listing process and the enforcement of secondary market regulation, 
but in the late 1990s, the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was able to 
consolidate its influence. The stock market regained the confidence of public investors 
and has enjoyed rapid expansion since then. From time to time, the CSRC, along with 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
other authorities, has issued supplemental regulations, administrative rules, guidelines 
and codes (e.g. the Provisional Regulations on Public Offering and Trading, and the 
Measures on the Administration of Futures Exchanges). The main objective of the 
CSRC is to protect investors. In 2001, the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) formulated some basic norms of corporate governance, aiming at protecting 
minority shareholders from controlling shareholders‟ expropriation. The guideline also 
discourages the combination of the positions of chairperson of the board of directors 
and general manager (CEO duality). In 2002, a Code of corporate governance for listed 
companies was formulated for the first time by the CSRC. This prescribed basic 
principles for the protection of investors‟ rights, as well as basic rules and standards for 
directors, supervisors, and senior management. The code was intended to be the major 
measuring standard for the evaluation of listed companies‟ corporate governance 
structure. 
2.2.3. Ownership structure 
Until 2005, Chinese corporations could issue non-tradable and tradable shares. Thus, 
the equity structure of most listed companies was segmented, being characterized by the 
co-existing of exchange-tradable shares held mainly by public investors, and largely 
stated-owned non- tradable shares, which could only be transferred through negotiation 
among designated parties. This structure stemmed mainly from a lack of consensus 
among policy-makers on the corporate shareholding structure in the early years, a lack 
of clarity over the role and functions of the securities market, and a lack of awareness of 
how to manage state assets through capital markets. Chinese corporations typically 
issue non-tradable shares to SOEs, and other state owned legal persons and tradable 
shares to public investors.  
Chinese listed firms have traditionally issued four types of tradable shares; each 
with its own unique characteristics. China‟s mainland companies issue A-share and B-
share in Shanghai and Shenzhen. A-shares are denominated in local currency (RMB) 
mainly for the domestic investors. B-shares which are traded in U.S. dollars are mainly 
for overseas investors. Mainland companies issue H-share in Hong Kong, and N-shares 
(American Depository Receipts - ADRs) in the US. Before the 2005 reform, only one 
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third of total shares issued by the companies were tradable. The rest were non-tradable, 
which significantly affected the liquidity of the China‟s stock markets. 
2.2.4. The 2005 split share structure reform 
In 2005, the CSRC launched trial reforms of non-tradable shares (referred to hereafter 
as the reform), with the objective of releasing the market from the historical hangover 
that afflicted it, and better protecting the investors. Following the positive results of the 
trial, a full-scale reform campaign was soon carried out among listed companies. 
Specifically, the non-tradable shares were floated through the open markets. The 
reform aimed to gradually eliminate the difference between the two types of shares and 
to balance the interest between the two categories of shareholders in a market-oriented 
way. In order to make government-owned shares legally tradable, state shareholders 
were required to compensate tradable shareholders through a share conversion process. 
This was achieved through fair negotiations between holders of non-tradable shares and 
tradable shares. The compensation was decided at shareholders‟ meetings, without any 
government intervention. The reform effectively diluted the government-owned share 
portion, attenuating government-related agency costs. 
As of December 31, 2007,1,298 listed companies, which represented 98% of the 
total listed companies subject to the reforms, had either initiated or completed the 
process of non-tradable share reform.  Additionally, all new IPOs taking place since 
mid-2006 no longer have non-tradable shares. 
The non-tradable share reform successfully resolved problems such as the dual-
pricing of shares of the same listed company. It restored the pricing functions of the 
capital market, greatly improved market efficiency and paved the way for further 
improvements in the corporate governance and development of the capital market.  
Another important outcome related to the 2005 reform is that listed companies 
have been allowed to incentivize their managers with shares and stock options. In 
January 2006, the CSRC issued “The Administrative Rules of Equity Compensation of 
Listed Companies”, which allow the companies that have successfully completed their 
split-share-reforms to adopt equity based compensation plans for their managers. 
According to these measures, equity incentives include restricted stocks and stock 
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option plans. Yet, independent directors were excluded from any stock incentive 
scheme, as they were tasked with providing independent opinions on the fairness and 
impact of proposed stock incentive schemes. This also provided a strong incentive for 
the top managers of listed companies to complete the reform at the earliest possible in 
order to participate in the new incentive scheme. It is expected that in addition to 
increasing the income standards of the management, granting them  stocks or equity 
options helps align their interest with those of the shareholders and with the long-term 
development of the enterprise. Yet, state ownership and control in former SOEs hinders 
the use of modern governance mechanisms such as managerial ownership (Conyon and 
He, 2011; Kato and Long, 2011). However, after three decades of reform, managerial 
ownership has emerged as one of important governance mechanisms in Chinese listed 
companies at least in non-state firms (Conyon and He, 2011; Walder, 2011).  
 
Table 2.2 reports the evolution of the ownership structure, board structure of 
Chinese listed firms over the period 2003–2010.We observe a persistent decrease in 
state ownership and legal person ownership throughout the sample period. In particular, 
state ownership which accounted on average for one third of total shares decreased from 
35.9% in 2003 to 8.3% in 2010. We can observe similar trend for legal person 
ownership which decreased from 21.9% in 2003 to 0.086% in 2010. In contrast, shares 
owned by top management increased from 0.4% in 2003 to 0.8% in 2010. 
 
Table 2.2 Evolution of the ownership structure, board structure 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State ownership 0.359 0.344 0.333 0.284 0.248 0.210 0.114 0.083 
Legal person ownership 0.219 0.224 0.215 0.186 0.156 0.129 0.094 0.086 
Managerial ownership 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.019 0.030 0.036 0.048 0.080 
Foreign ownership 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.038 0.029 0.035 
Board size 9.814 9.658 9.580 9.405 9.343 9.203 9.089 9.027 
Proportion of independent directors 0.327 0.342 0.347 0.351 0.356 0.357 0.359 0.360 
Note: See appendix A3.1 for definition of variables 
 
2.2.5. Board of directors 
In accordance with company law, Chinese firms operate under a two-tier board 
structure, with a board of directors (management board) and a board of supervisors 
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(with employees and others like the German model). The board of directors is 
responsible for the strategic operations of the firm.  
One of the important legal rights of shareholders is the right to elect the board of 
directors, which have certain rights and duties in regard to the incumbent management. 
In the United States, the boards of directors, which rely heavily on directors from 
outside a firm, have enormous power in appropriating and dismissing top executives 
and in determining their compensation. In Japan, creditor financial institutions, which 
are often large shareholders as well, often dispatch directors to monitor managerial 
decision makings. China‟s commercial law also identifies the board of directors as the 
top level decision-making body of a company. Directors are appointed at general 
shareholders‟ meetings. In practice, however, the authority and prestige of China‟s 
boards were comparatively low relative to those in other countries. This is because the 
majority of listed firms were controlled by the state and thus almost 90% of the board 
members of these firms were government officials who lacked the necessary knowledge 
or experience (Su, 2005).  
In 2002, the CSRC issued Guidelines for introducing independent directors in 
the boards of listed companies. In particular, each listed company was required to have 
at least two independent directors, and by June 2003 at least one-third of the board had 
to be made up by independent directors (including at least one professional in 
accounting). Independent directors could be nominated by the board of directors, the 
board of supervisors, or any shareholder holding 5 percent of the shares. According to 
the Guidelines, the independent directors were expected to play a better monitoring role 
than non-executive directors, being more “independent”. They were not allowed to 
“hold posts in the company other than the position of director” and were asked to 
“maintain no relations with the listed company and its major shareholders that might 
prevent them from making objective judgment independently.” Independent directors 
were required to provide independent opinions on substantial decisions, such as the 
nomination, appointment or removal of directors, the appointment or removal of senior 
managers, the compensation of directors and senior managers, substantial connected 
transactions (with a value higher than RMB3 million or 5% of latest audited net asset 
value), and other issues deemed substantial.  
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As can be seen in Table 2.2, we observe a slight decrease in the number of board 
of directors listed firms over the period 2003–2010 with the number of board of 
directors declined from 9.814 in 2003 to 9.027 in 2010. By contrast, we observe a 
steady increase in the proportion of independent directors of companies which increased 
from 0.327% in 2003 to 0.36% in 2010.  Yet, in practice, many independent directors in 
China are, however, appointed by controlling shareholders and their independence from 
the management is not certain (Clarke, 2003; Su, 2005). 
2.2.6. Board of supervisors 
The main functions of the supervisors are to oversee finances, ensure diligent actions of 
the directors and senior management, and report any impropriety, abuse of discretionary 
power, or action that affects the firm. The Company Law does not specify the 
proportion of representatives of shareholders or employees on the board of supervisors, 
except that at least a third should be worker representatives. Moreover, whilst the 
supervisory board in the German model sits between the shareholders and the 
management board and can appoint board of directors, in the Chinese model, the 
supervisory board does not have the power to hire and fire directors.  Consequently, the 
supervisory power of Chinese supervisory boards is relatively soft and seeks to act 
through influence. Commentators point out that Chinese supervisory boards are often 
ineffective, and have little influence on firms‟ activities, since their members have low 
education and professional experience and their meetings are not well attended (Dahya 
et al., 2003; Tong, 2003; Tricker, 2009).  
 
2.3. Comparisons of the Chinese corporate governance system with that of 
developed countries 
There is divergence of corporate governance systems around the world. In the 
developed world, one of the most prominent distinctions has been made between the 
Anglo-American market based corporate governance model (also known as principal-
agent model or shareholder model) which characterizes the US and UK, and the 
network based models (stakeholder), which operates in Germany and Japan (Ahmadjian 
and Robbins, 2005). The main features of the former are diffuse ownership, a separation 
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of ownership and control, and external market-based financing and discipline, while the 
latter features concentrated ownership, insider control, and coordinated networks of 
firms and financial institutions. More specifically, the government is not very involved 
in the corporate governance system in the US. By contrast, banks and workers play a 
crucial role in Germany‟s governance system. They provide a substantial amount of 
loans to corporations, own their shares, and intervene in their corporate governance 
through the appointment of directors or the general monitoring of their performance.  
Additionally, in China, state ownership uniquely provides another corporate 
governance model with its traditional ideology of employees being masters of the 
enterprises. In particular, many listed companies in China are still heavily influenced by 
the government, which controls them directly through share ownership, or indirectly by 
allocating capital to them at favorable rates through state-owned banks. Thus, to some 
extent, the Chinese government supplements the market-based economy. 
 
2.4. Growth of the Chinese private sector 
One of the most significant changes in China‟s economy brought about by the market-
oriented reforms is the emergence of a significant private sector. Consequently, the 
country has gradually shifted away from the complete reliance on state-owned and 
collective enterprises, towards a mixed economy. Private enterprises now play a major 
role in promoting exports, growth, innovation, and employment in China. The 
development of the private sector was considered as an important element of the unique 
Chinese „„dual-track” approach to economic reform. In addition to officially 
recognizing private enterprises in 1988, in the 1990s, government policies began to 
encourage the transformation of SOEs and collectives firms into private enterprises 
(Hasan et al., 2009). The Government has also granted approval for banks to lend to 
private businesses, thus promoting the growth of numerous small- and medium-sized 
firms. Further, the Chinese private sector was formally accepted as an integral part of 
the economy in 1999 by an amendment to the constitution. As in the Western countries, 
the private sector is considered as the major engine of China‟s rapid growth (Allen et 
al., 2005). In 2004, the National Congress approved a constitutional amendment to 
protect private property rights, granting “private property” an equal legal status to 
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“public property”. As documented in Firth et al. (2009), based on data from the National 
Bureau of Statistics, the private sector accounted for roughly 50% of GNP in 2005, and 
was expected to rise to at least 75% by 2010. 
As for the listed companies, during the last decade there have been significant 
changes in ownership structure. In particular, in our data sample, we observe that the 
proportion of privately controlled listed firms has increased from 26.76% in 2005 to 
around 40% in 2010, whilst the proportion of state-controlled firms has declined from 
70.32% to 56.73% over the same time period.
4
 As discussed in Conyon and He (2012), 
this trend can be explained by the growing numbers of firms coming to the exchange as 
privately controlled firms, and by the 2005 split share reform, which converted 
previously non tradable state and legal person shares to tradable shares. This clearly 
shows that with the deepening of China‟s market reforms, privately controlled firms are 
becoming more and more common. 
2.5. China’s banking system and bond market 
Unlike in developed countries, in China alternative governance mechanisms, such as 
reputation and personal relationship (also known as Quanxi
5
 in China) plays crucial role 
in the financing of firms, especially in the development of entrepreneurial firms. As 
Allen et al. (2005) discuss, out of three sectors in China, namely, State Sector (SOEs), 
Listed Sector and Unlisted private Sector, the former two sectors use the formal 
financing channels, such as bank financing and equity and bond markets for financing 
investment, while a large number of private firms with arguably poor applicable legal 
and financial sectors use the Quanxi system to finance the investment activities which 
contribute to the most of the growth of China‟s economy. Yet, recent studies suggest 
that following the liberalization of China‟s financial system and the improvement in the 
corporate governance of the banking sector, Chinese banks play an important role in 
monitoring corporate activities and improving the efficiency of corporations. In this 
study, since our focus is on the listed firms it is important to have an insight about the 
                                                        
4
 Using a similar measure of corporate control as ours, i.e. the identity of the ultimate owner (which is 
provided in the dataset), Walder (2011) report that the private control of listed corporations in China 
increased from 6.5% in 1999 to 35% in 2007. 
5 Guanxi (literally means relationship or connection) “(in China) the system of social networks and 
influential relationships which facilitate business and other dealings” (online oxford dictionary). 
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Chinese banking system, and recent reforms so as to clearly understand their 
implications for the firms‟ corporate governance and financing of investment. 
Before 1978, China‟s financial system was a mono-bank system with only one 
bank–the People‟s Bank of China (PBOC), which played both the role of central bank 
and commercial bank. Beginning in the late 1970s, there was a structural but gradual 
change in the banking sector. In 1978, in line with economic reforms, the PBOC was 
split into four state-owned banks (known as the Big Four), with a multi-layered system 
that separates central banking functions and commercial lending. These were: the 
PBOC which has become China‟s central bank; the Bank of China (BOC) which 
specialized in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; the People‟s 
Construction Bank of China (PCBC) which specialized in transactions related to fixed 
investment; and the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) which specialized in all banking 
business in rural area. Additionally, in 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) was established to take over all commercial transactions (deposit-taking 
and lending business) of the PBOC. ICB quickly became China‟s largest bank 
accounting for half of all bank lending and it is still the leading bank in China (Cull and 
Xu, 2003).  
Since 1984, the Chinese banking system has been undergoing a series of further 
reforms, with the objective of making the Big Four as real enterprises. Since 1985, these 
banks have been permitted to engage in business outside of their designated economic 
sector.  
Furthermore, in 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks were established to 
take over the policy lending functions from the four state owned banks6. From that point 
onwards, the Big Four were known as commercial banks and were expected to operate 
in accordance with market principles. The state-owned commercial banks have also 
been subject to reform in terms of managerial and mechanistic aspects. For example, the 
importance of risk management has been reinforced and their managers are held 
responsible for their lending decisions. Other subsequent developments made during the 
1990s, include the transformation of urban credit cooperatives into commercial banks, 
                                                        
6 These are the State Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export 
and Import Bank of China. 
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permitting non-state commercial banks, and introducing standard accounting and 
prudential norms. Furthermore, because of the large volume of policy loans and weak 
internal controls, by the late 1990s, the accumulated large non-performing loans (NPLs) 
of the Big Four state owned commercial banks and their insolvency had become 
important issue for the government. In 1998, the government therefore injected RMB 27 
billion of capital into the four state-owned banks and transferred the NPLs to four newly 
established asset management companies. 
To enhance the efficiency of the banking sector by increasing competition 
among banks, in 1986, the Chinese government began to establish new banks, known as 
joint-equity banks and city banks.7  By the end of 2004, five of the 11 domestic joint-
equity banks were publicly listed on China‟s stock exchanges. However, because the 
largest shareholders in most of joint-equity banks are usually SOEs, they are indirectly 
controlled by the government.8 
Until 2004, the Big Four were SOEs solely owned by the Chinese government. 
Yet, in 2005, the government started to privatize these banks through the recruitment of 
strategic investors (by providing minority foreign ownership stakes) and by listing them 
on the stock exchange. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the 
Central Huijin Investment Company were set up in 2002 in order to provide closer 
scrutiny and better monitoring of banking activities, and to facilitate restructuring, 
reform, and initial public offerings of state-owned banks, respectively 
Another important aspect of the Chinese banking system is the entry of foreign 
banks which predominantly takes place through setting up branches directly. Prior to 
1993, foreign banks were only allowed to establish branches in certain cities to conduct 
foreign-currency business with foreign firms and citizens. From 1993 onwards, 
however, the government started lifting restrictions on foreign bank lending and 
allowed foreign banks in China to conduct both foreign- and local-currency business 
with foreign firms and citizens, and to conduct foreign-currency business with domestic 
firms. There were 190 foreign bank branches in China in 2001 (Lin, 2011).  
                                                        
7
 The first joint-equity bank was the Bank of Communication. 
8
 The China Minsheng Bank was the only joint-equity private bank wholly owned by private shareholders 
in China. 
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Following its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001, China has further opened up its banking sector to foreign banks in full scale in the 
following five-year period. Foreign banks in 13 cities were allowed to conduct local-
currency business with domestic firms from 2003 onwards. Large foreign banks were 
allowed to acquire significant stake and become strategic partners of major state-owned 
banks.9
 
 By 2006, there were over 300 foreign bank branches in China. 
Despite many policy and regulatory changes have been initiated from early part 
of the 1980, empirical researches carried out in the first half of the 2000s such as by 
Bandt and Li (2003) and Cull and Xu (2003) show that the Chinese banking system 
discriminates against private firms and private enterprises are generally significantly 
less likely to obtain loans and receive smaller loans and are subject to higher loan 
standards. Bandt and Li (2003) further argue that the Chinese government‟s majority 
ownership of banks inevitably lead to less efficient resource allocation and specially 
capital allocation is biased in favor of SOEs. Since bank managers benefit only 
marginally from higher bank profitability, they prefer to lend to state-related firms 
because they enjoy the perks of their relationships with local government officials, who, 
for example, can use their political power to help arrange a job for a bank manager‟s 
relative, or facilitate their entry into the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
Yet, more recent research argues that participation of foreign capital and 
management in state banks, listing of state banks and many other city commercial banks 
on stock exchanges from mid-2000, has exerted external market pressure on banks to 
follow commercial judgment and prudence in their lending practices (Jia, 2009 and Lin, 
2011).10
 Qin (2007) argues that China‟s accession to WTO has made its foreign trade 
and investment regime much more liberalized and less opaque than a decade ago, 
specially by institutionalizing the process of China's domestic reform externally through 
the force of WTO obligations. Consistent with these developments, Firth et al. (2009) 
                                                        
9 For example, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) acquired a 19.9% stake of the 
Bank of Communication. The Bank of America and the Royal Bank of Scotland have become strategic 
partners of the China Construction Bank and the Bank of China, respectively 
10 We can observe similar development in other areas, for example, Chen et al. (2010) who investigate 
the relation between client importance and audit quality, suggest that auditors in China are more likely to 
compromise audit quality for economically important clients when the institutions for investor protection 
are weak. However, with the institutional improvements in China, auditors become more concerned about 
litigation risks and regulatory sanctions instead of their economic incentives.  
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provide evidence that Chinese banks provide loans to financially healthier and better-
governed firms. Ayyagari et al. (2008) suggest that unlike financing from alternative 
channels, financing from China‟s formal financial system (e.g., bank financing) is 
associated with faster firm growth. Generally, recent studies based on China‟s financial 
system conclude that Chinese banks exercise commercial judgment and prudence in 
their lending and are becoming more efficient in allocating credit to private firms. Thus, 
Chinese banks‟ traditional lending bias in favor of state-owned enterprises is less likely 
to prevail. 
In China, the corporate bonds market lags behind the development of the equity 
market. Although bonds were first issued in 1986, the corporate bond market has only 
begun to expand after 2000, when new rules governing issuance were implemented. 
Local firms, besides the giant SOEs, are also encouraged to issue corporate bonds and 
market forces increasingly determine the spread on bonds. Yet, China‟s bond market is 
still very small compared to its huge banking scoter.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that China‟s efforts to improve  the corporate sector through 
its own unique gradual and piecemeal approach has been successful in terms of 
introducing a formal governance structure for the sector, liberalizing its financial sector, 
improving governance of state owned banks, and most importantly, developing the 
private sector as the back bone of the economy. Furthermore, there have been 
significant improvements in the political and legal environment. The Chinese political 
system is becoming increasingly structured with regularized decision-making subject to 
the rule of law (Hasan et al., 2009). The legal environment has also improved, with the 
laws being enacted nationally and locally to protect property rights. Despite the 
widespread adoption of western corporate governance practices, their effectiveness has 
yet to be fully evaluated. In pursuit of this objective, in the subsequent three empirical 
chapters, we assess impact of corporate governance mechanisms on various firm 
behaviors. 
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Chapter 3 
Managerial Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Firms’ Exporting 
Decisions: Evidence from Chinese listed companies 
 
3.1. Introduction 
For many decades, the internationalization of firms‟ operations has been a widely 
researched phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. 
Internationalization encompasses a wide variety of activities including exporting, 
foreign direct investment, global outsourcing, and licensing. Recently, there has been a 
rapid growth in the internationalization of firms in transition economies such as China, 
India, Russia, and East European countries. Exporting has been the dominant mode of 
foreign market participation, and a number of firm-level studies provide evidence that 
participation in export markets improves firms‟ economic performance, financial health, 
and long-run survival prospects (Greenaway et al., 2007; Park et al., 2010).  
Encouraging the internationalization of domestic firms has been a prominent 
policy choice in many countries, especially developing and transition economies (Buck 
et al., 2000). This has been done particularly via exports, following the example of the 
export-led growth achievement of the Asian tigers such as Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan (World Bank, 1993)
11
. Participation in export markets is often viewed as helpful 
for economic growth, especially in emerging economies, as evidenced by a large 
number of cross-country studies at the aggregate level, which report a positive 
relationship between international trade and economic growth (Edwards, 1993; Frankel 
and Romer, 1999). The desire to promote international sales is not limited to transition 
and emerging economies. Bernard and Jensen (2004) note that all fifty U.S states have 
offices to assist firms‟ overseas sales, and document a considerable rise in the resources 
committed to export promotion in the US.  
                                                        
11
 Only very recently have firms endeavored in outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) via 
acquisitions or greenfield investment, as these forms of internationalization require a considerably greater 
resource commitment and risk taking than exporting (Morck et al., 2008). For instance, although China is 
the world‟s largest exporter, its OFDI is still tiny and a limited number of firms are involved in it (Morck 
et al., 2008). 
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Considering that expansion to international markets offers many advantages to 
firms, one can ask why not all firms engage in international trade. One possible reason 
is that venturing into international markets for the first time involves large initial fixed 
and sunk start-up costs, and a considerable risk and uncertainty (Roberts and Tybout, 
1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Caggese and Cuñat, 2013). Recent developments in 
international trade theory have used a combination of these fixed and once-and-for-all 
start-up costs and heterogeneity in productivity to explain variations in firms‟ export 
market participation decisions (Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 
2004)
12
. In a similar vein, following the pioneering empirical work of Greenaway et al. 
(2007), a number of recent papers study how financial factors influence exporting 
decisions (Berman and Héricout, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Caggese and Cuñat, 
2013).  
Yet, the trade literature has neglected the effects of managerial incentives and 
other corporate governance mechanisms, which have been shown to significantly affect 
other aspects of firm behavior in the corporate finance literature. A large body of 
theoretical and empirical studies investigate the effects of managerial incentives and 
governance mechanisms on firm performance and various types of corporate decisions 
including investment in physical assets and research and development (R&D). For 
example, Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) interest alignment hypothesis suggests that 
managerial ownership aligns the incentives of managers with the interests of 
shareholders and provides top management with incentives to undertake risky 
investments and make decisions in the best interest of shareholders
13
. A counter-
argument is proposed by Amihud and Lev (1981) and May (1995) who show that when 
managers‟ shareholding is sufficiently large, they become entrenched, and tend to adopt 
investment and financing policy choices which reduce firms‟ idiosyncratic risk at the 
expense of shareholders‟ interests. In addition to managerial incentives, other corporate 
governance related variables such as state or foreign ownership, or board structure have 
                                                        
12
 See Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for a detailed review. 
13
 Several papers have shown that corporate risk-taking is generally positively related to performance, 
thereby enhancing shareholder value (see for instance, John et al., 2008). Looking specifically at the 
decision to enter export markets, which can be seen as a risky investment (Verhoeven, 1988), there is a 
huge literature which has shown that exporting is positively linked to corporate performance in general 
and productivity in particular (Park et al., 2010). 
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been shown to significantly affect firm performance (see Brown et al., 2011, for a 
survey). 
In this paper, we connect the international trade literature on the determinants of 
firms‟ exporting activities, with the corporate finance literature which has shown the 
importance of managerial ownership and other corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm behavior. The primary governance attribute we consider is managerial ownership. 
Additionally, we examine the effects of other forms of corporate ownership such as 
state, legal person, and foreign shareholding, as well as the characteristics of the board 
of directors on firms‟ internationalization decisions. We build on existing literature 
(Filatotchev et al., 2001 and 2007; Lu et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2010), which has typically 
analyzed the effects of a single or few specific corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm exporting behavior, by considering the simultaneous effect of several mechanisms. 
This approach mitigates omitted variable bias and enables us to control for possible 
interactions between mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on both export propensity and 
intensity, which in our view, gives readers a thorough overview of the extent to which 
managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables affect firms‟ overall 
export strategy 
Our study is based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2004-
2010, which we differentiate into state- and privately-controlled. We believe that China 
represents an interesting case study for the analysis of the links between corporate 
exporting decisions and corporate governance mechanisms for the following two 
reasons. First, its accession to the WTO in late 2001 opened up tremendous business 
opportunities for Chinese firms worldwide. A large number of Chinese firms have 
consequently internationalized their operations, and the country has now become the 
first exporter in the world. Second, China‟s corporate governance has been evolving and 
improving rapidly so as to cope with its fast economic growth and the desire to integrate 
with the global economy. For instance, after June 2003, companies were required to 
appoint one third of independent directors to their boards. In addition, following the 
2005-2006 split share structure reform, agency problems were significantly reduced, 
and restrictions on managerial stock ownership were removed (Li et al., 2011). To the 
best of our knowledge, ours is the first study looking at the links between corporate 
governance and firm exporting decisions in China, focusing on the differences between 
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the pre- and post-reform period. Additionally, we are also the first to investigate 
differences in these links between state-controlled and privately-controlled firms, 
Using a dynamic modelling framework to control for the persistence in 
exporting (due to sunk costs), and controlling for firm heterogeneity and endogeneity, 
we document a strong non-monotonic relationship between managerial shareholding 
and export propensity and intensity. This implies that as managerial ownership 
increases, managers are provided with the incentive to align their interest with that of 
shareholders, which reduces agency costs and contributes towards shareholder value 
maximization. Yet, after a threshold level is reached, managers become risk adverse and 
entrenchment effects become prominent, affecting firms‟ behavior in a manner that is 
not conducive for international expansion. In addition, we find a negative association 
between state ownership and export intensity. Finally, we observe that the larger the 
board size, the lower the firm‟s export propensity and intensity, and that firms with a 
higher proportion of independent directors in the board are generally less likely to 
export. These findings are mainly driven by privately-controlled firms during the post-
2006 period and suggest that in the Chinese context, in order to promote the 
international presence of Chinese firms, company shares should be included in the 
compensation package of managers, state ownership should be further reduced, and 
firms should be encouraged to have smaller boards and to pay particular attention to the 
quality of the independent directors in their boards. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
description of the institutional environment in China. In Section 3.3, we present some 
theoretical background on the links between managerial ownership and other corporate 
governance variables, on the one hand, and internationalization decisions, on the other; 
review the related existing empirical evidence; and develop our hypotheses. Section 3.4 
discusses our baseline specification and estimation methodology. Section 3.5 describes 
the data and provides descriptive statistics. We discuss our empirical results in Section 
3.6. Section 3.7 concludes. 
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3. 2. Institutional environment in China 
3.2.1. Internationalization 
Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China‟s export performance has been 
phenomenal. In 2007, the Chinese government has set up the China Investment 
Corporation (CIC), with the aim of actively encouraging Chinese firms to expand 
operations abroad (Brainard and Fenby, 2007). China‟s economic expansion overseas is 
occurring at different levels of engagement using various modes of internationalization. 
Exporting is by far the most significant aspect of internationalization in terms of 
economic value (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). In particular, China‟s total exports 
increased tremendously during the last three decades: from US$8 billion (around 1 
percent of world exports) in 1978-89 to US$1,442 billion (13.4 percent) in 2005-06 
(Athukorala, 2009). In 2006, China became the world‟s second largest exporter after 
Germany, and in 2010, the largest exporter (CIA, 2010). In 2007, its exports to GDP 
ratio was at 37.5 per cent, more than three times higher than the average level of around 
10 per cent characterizing the other major economies such as the US, Japan, India, and 
Brazil (Athukorala, 2009). The technological sophistication of Chinese exports has also 
increased substantially and these exports now show significant overlap with the 
products of OECD countries (Schott, 2008). China is therefore clearly an ideal 
laboratory to explore the internationalization behavior of firms. 
3.2.2. Managerial incentives 
Despite these achievements, the corporate governance systems of Chinese listed firms 
and the institutions that support them have long been criticised for their ineffectiveness 
(Clarke, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). In particular, despite the numerous ownership 
reforms that took place during the last decades, the Chinese government not only 
dominates over economic affairs, but also retains a substantial portion of ownership in a 
large number of listed corporations.  
Given that most of the assets in China are owned by the state, historically, the 
government adopted various incentive systems to make the management of these assets 
more efficient. In addition to the partial privatization and corporatization of former 
SOEs, these mainly include managerial autonomy and a management responsibility 
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system (Su, 2005). During the 1980s, the Chinese government introduced managerial 
autonomy by decentralizing managerial decision rights of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) from the central government down to the firm level. In addition, as discussed in 
Bai and Xu (2005), as part of the economic reform process in the 1980s, the Chinese 
central government delegated some of its decision rights (including exporting) to SOE 
managers, in order to motivate them to become more efficient. This exercise was 
motivated by the central government‟s willingness to promote markets and to gradually 
phase out its central planning function (Fan et al., 2007).  Groves et al. (1994) provide 
evidence that managerial autonomy improved corporate productivity
14
.  
Subsequently, other forms of managerial incentives such as CEO pay-
performance sensitivities and CEO turnover-performance sensitivities were introduced. 
Yet, large government ownership and control have been found to weaken the positive 
effects of these managerial incentives (Kato and Long, 2006 a, b, c; Conyon and He, 
2011)
15
. 
More recently, following the 2005-2006 split share structure reform, which 
removed restrictions on managerial stock ownership, the literature has considered 
managerial ownership as another type of managerial incentive. A number of studies 
document that, with the deepening of market-oriented reforms, the introduction of 
foreign investment in China, and the global pay benchmark, managers‟ ownership 
shares in publicly listed corporations have considerably increased in recent years
16
. For 
example, average managerial ownership rose from less than 1% before 2000 (Tian and 
Estrin, 2008) to around 8% in 2010
17
. Furthermore, Conyon and He (2011, 2012) report 
that the worth of CEO share ownership is much higher than their executive pay (greater 
                                                        
14
 By contrast, Lin et al. (1988) argue that, although a series of reforms initiated by the government have 
increased managerial autonomy and intensified competition, due to policy burdens and soft budget 
constraints, instead of enhancing economic efficiency, they have worsened agency problems in SOEs.  
15 
Research focused on Chinese listed firms reaches similar conclusions using managerial tournament 
theory (Chen et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011). Specifically, these studies provide evidence suggesting 
that the winner‟s price (executive pay) and the pay gap between the highest executive positions (i.e. the 
first- and second- tier executives) improve firm performance due to enhanced managerial efforts, but that 
the performance effects of managerial incentives derived from these corporate tournaments is weakened 
by state ownership and control (Chen et al., 2011; Kato and Long, 2011).  
16
 Although these changes were gradual and evolutionary compared with those experienced in other 
transition countries, Walder (2011, p. 23) refers to this as a Chinese version of “managerial revolution”. It 
should be noted, however, that the rise in managerial ownership has been slower in China compared to 
market economies (Walder, 2011; Chen et al., 2011; Conyon and He, 2012) 
17 
The latter figure is based on the data used in our empirical analysis. 
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than 400 times in 2010). Since the state imposes a ceiling on how much SOE managers 
can be paid, some managers may choose to shirk instead of being productive, while 
other productive managers may enjoy on-the job consumption or perquisites (Fan et al., 
2011). By contrast, equity ownership directly links managers‟ efforts to their wealth, 
giving them strong incentives to work hard
18
.  
In addition, considering that Chinese firms are characterized by severe agency 
problems due to the separation of ownership and control (Qian, 1996; Xu et al., 2005)
19
, 
equity ownership provides an important mechanism to align the top management‟s 
interests with those of shareholders and to focus managers‟ efforts on value increasing 
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Lin et al. (2009) show a large and significant effect of insiders‟ equity 
ownership on the efficiency of Chinese corporations. Along similar lines, Chow (1997) 
observes that whatever the type of managerial incentive system adopted by the 
government, there is a positive association between the profit of the enterprise and the 
economic benefits to the management. Therefore, he rightly stresses that “providing 
incentives for the management of publicly owned assets is a key to China‟s success” 
(Chow, 1997, p. 321). 
In the light of these developments, it is increasingly interesting to see how 
internationalization and managerial ownership, which are two constantly evolving 
phenomena, interact with each other in the Chinese context. This is the main objective 
of our study. 
 
                                                        
18
 This effect is likely to be more significant for Chinese managers than for their counterparts in the 
Western countries, since their personal wealth is much lower (Walder, 2011). 
19  Even though ownership concentration is high in China, there often exists a separation between 
ownership and control. This can be explained by the dominance of pyramidal ownership structures among 
Chinese listed companies. In these circumstances, agency problems often take the form of tunneling, 
whereby the listed companies transfer resources through related party transactions to benefit the 
controlling shareholders at the cost of smaller investors (Jiang et al., 2010). Agency costs may also arise 
because managers at SOEs are mainly appointed by the government, and tend to have political and social 
objectives rather than focus on profit maximization (Bai and Xu, 2005).  
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3.3. Literature review and hypotheses 
In this section, we review the literature on the agency theory of managerial decision-
making and its impact on firms‟ export market participation decisions, and develop 
testable hypotheses.  
As we discussed in the introduction, the international trade literature has made 
significant progress in explaining firms‟ export market participation decisions. Sunk 
costs such as gathering information on foreign markets, developing marketing channels, 
adapting products and packaging to foreign taste, and learning to deal with new 
bureaucratic procedures play an important role in determining these decisions 
(Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). As such, only large and productive firms can achieve a 
net present value of profits from exports sufficiently large to offset the entry sunk costs. 
Other studies have also shown how financial factors affect firm export market 
participation decisions (see, for instance, Greenaway et al., 2007). 
Yet, the literature on firm heterogeneity and exporting has neglected the 
importance of managerial ownership and other corporate governance characteristics, 
which have been found to be pervasive in other aspects of firm behavior, such as 
financing and investment in fixed capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; and 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Entering foreign markets incurs 
large ex-ante fixed sunk costs, which can be seen as a form of investment in intangible 
assets, as modelled in Melitz (2003). This investment involves risk and uncertainty 
(Dixit, 1989; Roberts and Tybout, 1997), including a potential bankruptcy risk (Caggese 
and Cuñat, 2013)
20
. It also reflects complexity and information asymmetry between 
owners and managers (Morck and Yeung, 1991), and between firms and lenders such as 
banks (Caggese and Cuñat, 2013). Given the association between the decision to enter 
export markets and an investment decision, it can be argued that managerial incentives, 
                                                        
20
 Bankruptcy risks are associated with possible non-payment, late payment, or fraud by foreign buyers. 
These risks may stem from the difficulty in verifying buyers‟ creditworthiness and reputation when 
buyers reside in distant countries. They could also derive from buyers‟ poor financial conditions, 
insolvency, or bankruptcy, and/or from their unwillingness to keep their contractual payment obligations. 
Firms who start exporting also face several challenges in terms of language, legal threats, conforming to 
foreign regulations, and cultural differences. In addition, there are risks in terms of legal security, 
reliability of trade partners, and exchange rates (Verhoeven, 1988). Transportation risks, which involve 
the risks of transferring goods from one country to another, also need to be taken into account. They may 
include theft and/or damage of goods during transportation. Finally, there may be risks caused by natural 
catastrophes, coup d'état, terrorism, civil war, revolution, insurrection, and so on in the buyer‟s country. 
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and, more in general, corporate governance mechanisms, which have been found to 
have significant effects on corporate investment, may have important bearings on this 
decision as well. This suggests that differences in corporate governance may explain 
observed differences in firms‟ export behavior: it is possible that only firms with robust 
governance structures are able to engage in international activities. Alternatively, 
suboptimal governance structures may prevent top managers from participating in 
export markets. Thus, by exploring how governance issues in general and managerial 
ownership in particular affect exporting decisions, a new dimension corporate 
governance is added to the firm heterogeneity theory of international trade.  
Only a limited number of studies have analyzed the relationship between 
corporate governance and firms‟ internationalization decisions. A study by Buck et al. 
(2000) based on listed firms of former Soviet Union countries including Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus find that managerial ownership has a non-monotonic relationship 
(inverted U shape) with exporting, reflecting the incentive and entrenchment effects of 
managerial shares in the context of the propensity to export. That is managerial 
entrenchment effects may at first oppose and finally overwhelm incentive effects at 
higher levels of managerial ownership in relation to exporting decisions. They also 
show that outside individual and institutional shareholding are insignificantly associated 
with exporting propensity, since outside individuals and institutions in the countries 
analyzed do not have sufficient shares to influence the decisions of the firms or provide 
a discipline on managerial decisions.  
Using a survey data over the period 1995-1997, Filatotchev et al. (2001) 
investigate the impact of governance structures of privatized firms on export intensity 
for 152 privatized firms in the transition economies of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
They show that while managerial ownership and increasing managerial board power is 
negatively associated with exporting activities, despite majority managerial control, the 
presence of foreign investor and outside board representation is positively associated 
with export-oriented product development and export intensity. This shows that because 
of the rapid transformation of ownership from state to insiders (particularly managers) 
in these countries, entrenched managers may hamper the international expansion at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Filatotchev et al., 2001). That is, entrenched large 
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shareholders (managers) reap private benefits by avoiding risky projects at the expense 
of minority shareholders.  
Filatotchev et al. (2007) employ Bayesian structural equation modeling to 
examine the relationship among corporate governance, managers‟ independence from 
owners in terms of strategic decision making, exporting, and corporate performance.  
They use data collected through survey from 157 large companies in Poland and 
Hungary. They find that managers‟ independence is positively associated with firms‟ 
financial performance and exporting. The extent of managers‟ independence is 
negatively associated with ownership concentration, but positively associated with the 
percentage of foreign directors on the firm‟s board. They interpret these results as 
indicating that concentrated owners tend to constrain managerial autonomy at the cost 
of the firm‟s internationalization and performance. However, participation of foreign 
shareholders in the board enhances the firm‟s export orientation and performance by 
encouraging managers‟ decision-making autonomy. This study emphasizes the 
importance of manager‟s independence in the export market participation decisions in 
transition economies. 
Hobdari et al. (2009) use 8489 firm year observations of non-listed firms in two 
transition economies: Estonia and Slovenia to investigate how different types of owners 
influence the extent of firms‟ internationalization decisions. They measure the degree of 
internationalization by the share of firm exports in total sales. They find that while firms 
under the control of insider owners are generally more internationalized, consistent with 
the interest alignment hypothesis, State control hampers international activities.  
George et al. (2010) argue and find that the ownership structures of SMEs 
influences their proclivity to take risks and thus expand the scale and scope of their 
internationalization efforts. Using data from 889 Swedish SMEs, they show that internal 
owners (CEOs and other senior executives) tend to be risk averse and as the managerial 
ownership increases, both the scale and scope of internationalization decline. 
Furthermore, Calabro et al. (2009) and Calabro and Mussolino (2013) show that 
board characteristics have an important impact on the internationalization decisions of 
family businesses in Norway.  
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To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies have focused on links 
between internationalization and corporate governance in the Chinese context. Among 
these, Lu et al. (2009) use data on listed companies over the period 2002 to 2005 and 
find that CEO share ownership and the ratio of outside directors in the board are 
positively associated with firms‟ exporting decisions, whilst ownership concentration is 
negatively associated with it. Fu et al. (2010) use data on Chinese non-listed 
manufacturing firms over the period 1999 to 2003 and show that wholly foreign owned 
firms and joint-ventures with foreign control have higher export propensity and 
intensity than domestic firms or joint-ventures with domestic control. Yi (2014) and Yi 
and Wang (2012) use data on approximately 30,000 firms operating in the Zhejiang 
province over the period 2001-2003 and find that especially for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, foreign ownership is positively associated with firms‟ export decisions, 
while state ownership appears to make exporting less likely. We build on these studies 
by making use of a larger and more representative dataset for a much more recent post-
split share structure reform time period, by analyzing the effects of a broader range of 
corporate governance variables on firms‟ export propensity and intensity, and by 
differentiating firms into state-controlled and privately-controlled. We next turn to how 
specific internal governance mechanisms can be used to provide managers with the 
incentives necessary to make investment decisions, including the decision to enter 
export markets.  
3.3.1. Managerial ownership  
In a situation where managerial actions and/or the details of the investment 
opportunities are not perfectly observable by shareholders, there will be an incomplete 
contracting against managerial policy choices. One way to solve this problem is to give 
managers incentives in the form of equity stakes in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This helps to resolve managers‟ moral hazard problems by aligning their 
incentives with the interests of the shareholders. We refer to this as the interest 
alignment effect. Consistent with this prediction, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) argue 
that managers‟ holdings of common stock and options in the firm reduce incentive 
problems by motivating managers to make variance-increasing investment decisions. 
Along similar lines, Denis et al. (1997) find that managerial equity ownership is 
positively associated with value increasing corporate decisions. More recently, Coles et 
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al., (2006) provide evidence that managerial holdings of shares and stock options 
provide managers with incentives to implement riskier policy choices, including more 
investment in R&D. Although these studies are based on US data, their findings are 
likely to apply to the Chinese case as well. This is confirmed by Lin et al. (2009), who 
show that the level of firm efficiency in China is positively associated with insiders‟ 
ownership. Similarly, using data from 970 Chinese listed firms over the period of 2007-
2008, Liu et al. (2012) argue that managerial ownership is positively related to the 
performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
A counter-argument is provided by Amihud and Lev (1981) and May (1995) 
who show that when managers‟ shareholding is sufficiently large, they will become 
entrenched and engage in risk-reduction activities, adopting investment and financing 
policy choices which reduce firms‟ idiosyncratic risk at the expense of shareholders‟ 
interests. Similarly, John et al. (2008) argue that managers with large insider ownership 
stakes in firms may opt for conservative investment policies, even to the extent of 
passing up risky projects with high positive net present value at the detriment of 
shareholders. Furthermore, according to La Porta et al. (1999), when managerial 
ownership reaches a threshold, further increasing it is likely to make managers 
entrenched, which may lead them to abuse power and exploit small shareholders instead 
of undertaking value-enhancing investment projects. We refer to this as the 
entrenchment effect.  
In a seminal work based on US data, Morck et al. (1988) provide the first 
empirical evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between managerial shareholding 
and performance. Using a piecewise linear model, they find that until inside ownership 
reaches 5%, increasing ownership results in higher firm value (i.e. Tobin‟s Q increases); 
between 5% and 25%, increasing ownership negatively affects firm value; and finally 
firm value rises with inside ownership thereafter (but the effects are small). The 
rationale suggested by Morck et al. (1988) for this non-monotonic relationship is as 
follows. Managers have a natural tendency to indulge their preferences to the detriment 
of other shareholders. Consistent with Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) alignment 
hypothesis, at lower levels of managerial ownership, further increases in managers‟ 
ownership align their interest with that of other shareholders, and thus, they work hard 
to maximize firm value, benefitting all shareholders (shared benefits). Yet, increasing 
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managers‟ stock ownership not only gives them a residual claim on profit, but also 
increases their voting power, insulating them from other disciplinary forces, and making 
them more entrenched. This provides managers with incentives to use corporate assets 
for their own (private) benefits. Similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine the 
relationship between insider ownership and performance measured by Tobin‟s Q using 
a quadratic model for insider ownership, and find an inverted U-shaped relation for 
insider ownership. Most recently, Kim and Lu (2011) report evidence suggesting a 
hump-shaped relation between managerial ownership and R&D expenditure of US 
firms. Along similar lines, some recent studies show that in the Chinese context, 
managerial ownership is positively associated with corporate performance. Yet, very 
high levels of ownership show negative performance effects (Li et al., 2007b, and Hu 
and Zhou, 2008).  
Moving the above literature forward, we investigate the extent to which 
managerial ownership affects Chinese listed firms‟ export market participation 
decisions. We expect the alignment and entrenchment effects to apply to these decisions 
in the same way as they have been found to apply to firm performance, in general, and 
other risky corporate activities such as R&D expenditure, in particular. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H1: There is a non-monotonic (inverted U-shaped) relationship between 
managerial ownership and firms’ export propensity and intensity. Specifically, 
at low levels of managerial ownership, increases of the latter will rise export 
propensity and intensity, thanks to the alignment between managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests. Yet, at high levels of managerial ownership, further 
increases of the latter will lower export propensity and intensity, due to the 
managerial entrenchment effect. 
3.3.2. Other ownership types  
We next examine the extent to which other ownership types, in addition to managerial 
ownership, affect export propensity and intensity. In particular, we focus in turn on the 
effects of state, legal person, and foreign ownership. 
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3.3.2.1. State ownership 
Research from both developed countries and developing countries (including China) 
often shows that state ownership contributes to operational inefficiency and poor 
performance in firms (Megginson et al., 1994; Shleifer, 1998; Dewenter and Malatesta, 
2001; Kato & Long, 2006a, b, c). This can be due to the following reasons: (i) poor 
motivation of the top management team, (ii) excess labor and wages, (iii) appointment 
of people with political influence to senior positions by government without considering 
their expertise, (iv) pursuit of multi-goals, namely social and political goals, and (v) 
higher transaction costs, (vi) divergence between cash flow rights and control rights for 
the controlling shareholder: while government agents/bureaucrats have control over 
SOEs, the cash flow rights of SOEs belong to the state or the Treasury.  
In the Chinese context, substantial state ownership is observed in transformed 
SOEs, which are generally inefficient and reluctant to undertake risky value-enhancing 
investments such as venturing into international markets. The reluctance of SOEs to 
export can be explained as follows. First, SOE managers in Chinese listed corporations 
face complex agency problems, soft budget constraints, corruption, and have weaker 
incentives than their counterparts at privately-controlled firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; 
Wei et al., 2005; Yi and Wang, 2012)
 21
. This explains why innovation activities, which 
are typically risky and value-enhancing, are significantly lower in SOEs than in non-
SOEs (Guariglia and Liu, 2014), and why SOEs‟ participation in export markets is 
limited.  
Second, Chinese SOEs are generally expected to pursue several political and 
social objectives (Bai and Xu, 2005), which often do not go hand in hand with profit 
maximization, and hence, make these companies less competitive in export markets. 
Third, state-owned firms typically have lower productivity than firms owned by other 
agents, which provides an additional barrier to export entry (Yi and Wang, 2012). 
Finally, considering that the state holds shares in strategically important resources and 
energy industries, such as petroleum, nuclear fuel, raw chemical material, mining and 
supply of electric and heat power, gas and water, which are less export-oriented 
                                                        
21 This happens because managers at SOEs are generally not rewarded on the basis of performance. 
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industries in China (Lee, 2009), it is reasonable to expect that firms with considerable 
state-owned shares are less likely to export
22
. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between state ownership and firms’ export 
propensity and intensity. 
3.3.2.2. Legal person ownership 
Legal person shareholders in China are represented by domestic institutions such as  
mutual funds, government agents, or insurance companies. Several studies suggest that 
these shareholders have the opportunity, necessary capacity, and incentives (due to their 
large stake in a firm) to monitor managers‟ activities in order to enhance firm 
performance (Cornett, et al, 2007), and are likely to support risky policy choices 
including internationalization (George and Prabhu, 2000). Institutional investors can 
also influence a firm‟s strategic behavior through persuasion and private or public 
activism (Tihanyi et al., 2003). In general, institutional shareholders also tend to have a 
longer tenure, which leads them to adopt longer investment horizons. This can mitigate 
the incentives for myopic investment decisions and thus lead to greater investment 
efficiency. 
In the case of Chinese firms, some studies show that legal person shareholding is 
positively associated with firm performance since institutional shareholders have 
diverse professional backgrounds and are usually the largest shareholder of the firm 
(Sun and Tong, 2003). Among these, using a sample of 1211 listed firms over the 
period of 2001-2005, Yuan et al. (2008) document a positive impact of mutual funds‟ 
ownership on corporate performance. In contrast, other researchers point out that mutual 
funds and insurance companies are often owned wholly or partially by different levels 
of government, which may lead to agency problems, which in turn may imply that 
fewer risky and value-enhancing investment choices are made
23
. Among these, Wei et 
al. (2005) reports a negative relationship between legal person shareholding and firm 
                                                        
22
 It should be noted, however, that, as discussed in Morck et al. (2008), a few large SOEs with lucrative 
state-enforced monopolies in natural resources or infrastructure sectors are actively involved in overseas 
mergers and acquisitions and outward foreign direct investment, specially seeking to acquire strategic 
resources. Yet, these types of companies are very few and the majority of SOEs are inefficiently run, 
highly unprofitable, and mainly engaged in domestic markets (Sun and Tong, 2003, Wei et al., 2005).  
23
 Specifically, legal persons may expropriate assets or cash flows from the listed firms, harming the 
interest of minority shareholders. 
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value measured using Tobin‟s Q. Given the contrasting findings in the literature, we 
make no ex-ante prediction on the effects of legal persons‟ shareholding on firms‟ 
internationalization decisions.  
3.3.2.3. Foreign ownership 
The literature has traditionally argued that in emerging economies, the participation of 
foreign capital in domestic firms increases the probability of internationalizing their 
operations. Five main mechanisms can explain this conjecture. First, firms with foreign 
investors are more likely to adopt international standards of governance and business 
practices, which facilitate entry into international markets (Jackson and Strange, 2008). 
Second, these firms generally possess intangible firm-specific assets, such as advanced 
technology, marketing skills, brand name, and market networks, which provide them 
with a competitive advantage in the international market. Third, because they typically 
have well-diversified portfolios and superior monitoring abilities, foreign institutional 
investors are more likely to encourage firms in emerging markets to invest in risky 
ventures such as internationalization (Filatotchev, 2007). Fourth, foreign shareholders 
are more likely to pressure firms to employ better qualified CEOs/managers with 
international experience, who may favor exporting activities. Finally, multinational 
enterprises often take emerging economies like China, as the export platform to serve 
their home market or other markets (Fu et al., 2010).  
In the Chinese context, Fu et al. (2010) use data on Chinese non-listed 
manufacturing firms over the period 1999 to 2003, to show that wholly foreign owned 
firms and joint-ventures with foreign control have a higher propensity to export and a 
higher export intensity than domestic firms or joint-ventures with domestic control. In 
line with their findings, we hypothesize that: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firms’ 
export propensity and intensity. 
3.3.3. Board of directors characteristics and exporting decisions 
Traditional theoretical arguments (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993), 
recent advances in the development of formal economic theories of boards of directors 
(Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008), and numerous empirical studies assert that 
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boards of directors should help to resolve governance issues inherent in the 
management of a firm. Boards of directors are in fact entrusted with the power to hire, 
fire, evaluate, and compensate top management teams and monitor their non-
shareholder wealth maximizing behavior. Thus, it is expected that board of directors 
mitigate agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control, 
enhancing the performance of the firms and, consequently, shareholders‟ wealth. In this 
spirit, in most countries, corporate laws require that firms should be governed by a 
board of directors. The question of how size and composition of the board are effective 
in curbing managerial opportunistic behavior and, thus, improving corporate 
performance dominates empirical studies in a substantial part of the corporate 
governance literature. However, this empirical research provides mixed results. 
3.3.3.1. Board size  
Research indicates that the size of the board is an important governance mechanism as it 
affects its ability to be an effective monitor and guide. Monks and Minow (2004) 
suggest that since larger boards are able to commit more time and effort to overseeing 
management, board monitoring can improve the quality of managerial decision-making 
and lead to better firm performance. Adams and Mehran (2003) provide evidence 
suggesting that larger boards increase monitoring effectiveness and provide for greater 
board expertise. Recently, Coles et al. (2008) argue that complex firms (as proxied by 
size and business diversification) can benefit by having larger number of directors on 
their boards, since large and complex firms need directors‟ advise, counsel and 
expertise. They provide empirical support for their argument in that, in the case of 
complex firms, Tobin‟s Q increases with board size. Yet, it is negatively related with 
board size in small firms.  
By contrast, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) theoretically argue that 
larger boards are less effective in group decision-making and strategy formulation, and 
contribute to the entrenchment of CEOs. The reason for this is that large boards hardly 
reach consensus on their decisions, and agency problems such as directors‟ free-riding 
may increase within large boards. Prior studies also suggest that larger boards may lead 
to a low level of individual motivation and thus adversely affect their members‟ 
commitment and effective participation in decision making (Dalton et al., 1999). 
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Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) support this argument by providing 
empirical evidence that firm performance is enhanced by smaller boards.  
We believe this last set of arguments is likely to apply to the Chinese case. In 
line with this conjecture, Li et al. (2007a) and Conyon and He (2012) show evidence 
that in the Chinese context, larger boards are inconsequential or less effective in specific 
actions such as the determination of CEO compensation. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) 
argue that large boards risk being dominated by powerful shareholders. They provide 
empirical evidence that although board size does not influence related party 
transactions, it is associated with larger labor redundancies in Chinese listed SOEs. 
They conclude that large boards might favor the expropriation of minority investors. 
The increased agency problems associated with large boards (e.g. managers‟ 
entrenchment, directors‟ free riding, tunneling) are therefore likely to have a negative 
impact on Chinese firms‟ export propensity and intensity. We therefore hypothesize 
that:   
H4: There is a negative relationship between the size of the board of directors 
and firms’ export propensity and intensity. 
3.3.3.2. Board independence 
Because of their independence and concern to maintain their reputation in the external 
labor market , non-executive directors will effectively monitor the actions of the 
executive directors and managers so as to ensure that they are pursuing policies 
congruent with interests of shareholders and complement expert knowledge of top 
management (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992). Researchers 
suggest that because of their education and broad knowledge, experience, reputation and 
networks with other institutions, outside directors may play an information and service 
role, as well as a resource role, and also assist in making important strategic decisions 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra, 2003). 
However, since a conductive institutional environment for the effective 
functioning of outside directors has not yet been well established in China, some 
researchers cast doubt on the qualities and independence of outside directors. They also 
argue that outside directors are appointed merely to meet the requirements of the 
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regulations and for the prestige of their value and, consequently, do not play their role 
as effectively as their counterparts in developed countries (Tenev and Chunlin,2002; 
Clarke, 2003; Lau et al., 2007). They also point out that in China, independent directors 
are either lacking necessary financial and practical business knowledge or too busy to 
care about problems of listed companies and, consequently, find it difficult to provide a 
significant contribution to, and exert any substantial influence on the important 
decisions other than ornamenting the board. We therefore pose the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: There is no association/a negative association between the proportion of 
independent directors in the board and firms’ export propensity and intensity. 
3.4 Our contribution 
Our main aim in this paper is to study the effect of managerial ownership on export 
propensity and intensity of Chinese listed companies, allowing for the relationship to be 
non-linear, controlling for a wide range of other corporate governance variables, using a 
more representative data sample and a more recent time period than previous studies, 
and differentiating firms into state- and privately-controlled. Our paper contributes to 
the trade literature by including governance components as new elements of firm 
heterogeneity, with the aim of better explaining the determinants of both export 
propensity and intensity. It also contributes to the growing literature on managerial 
incentives, and in particular managerial ownership, in the context of transition 
economies (Kato and Long, 2011). Furthermore, our study provides empirical evidence 
on the outcome of the recent split share structure reform, through which non-tradable 
shares were floated in the open markets, and following which restrictions on managerial 
stock ownership were removed.  
  
3.4. Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
3.4.1. Baseline specification 
Our baseline model links internationalization decisions with corporate governance 
factors and firm characteristics, as follows:  
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EXPDUMit or EXPINTit =  β0 +  β1 (EXPDUMi(t-1) or EXPINTi(t-1)) +  β2DOS i(t-1) + β3DOS
2
 i(t-1)  +β4SOSi(t-1) +   
+β5LPSi(t-1) +  β6FOWNSi(t-1)  +  β7INDIRi(t-1) +β8 BODSIZE(t-1)) + β9FIRSIZEi(t-1) + β10FAGEit +  
+β11PRODi(t-1) + β12CIRi(t-1) + β13LEVi(t-1)+ β14MBRi(t-1) +β15LIQTYi(t-1) + vi  +  vt   + vj   +  vr  +   it     (3.1)                           
where i indexes firms, t years. Table A3.1 in the Appendix provides definitions and 
expected signs for all variables used in this paper. When examining the probability of 
exporting, the dependent variable is export propensity (EXPDUM), i.e a binary variable 
taking the value of one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. When we consider 
export intensity, on the other hand, the dependent variable (EXPINT) is a censored 
variable, which is zero if the firm does not export, and takes the actual value of the ratio 
of exports to total sales, otherwise.  
Since previous studies provide strong evidence that exporting activity is 
characterized by high persistency due to the sunk start-up cost a firm needs to pay to 
enter export markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004), we 
include the lagged dependent variable among our explanatory variables. Its coefficient 
can be interpreted as a measure for the path dependency of exporting activities.  
The other independent variables in Equation (3.1) include proxies aimed at 
testing the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and other control variables 
proved by previous studies to be influential determinants of firms‟ exporting decisions.  
Focusing on corporate governance mechanisms, we include managerial 
shareholding (DOS) and its square
24
. We also include legal person shareholding (LPS), 
foreign shareholding (FOWNS)
25
, and state shareholding (SOS)
26
. Furthermore, we 
include board size (BOARDSIZE) and the proportion of independent directors in the 
                                                        
24
 All shareholding variables are calculated as the percentage of shares owned by various agents. For 
instance, following the finance literature (Anderson et al., 2000; Yuan et al., 2008), we define managerial 
shareholding (DOS) as the percentage of shares owned by managers, directors, and supervisors (including 
members of the supervisory board). It is noteworthy that most of the studies based on U.S. data also 
investigate the effects of high powered incentives such as holding of common stocks and options on 
investment decisions. Given that in China stock options are still an underdeveloped incentive mechanism 
for managers, we consider stock holdings and not stock options as the main incentive mechanisms for 
managers. 
25
 Following Yuan et al. (2008), foreign ownership includes non-tradable foreign-founder shares, tradable 
B-shares, and tradable H-shares. 
26 We also estimated alternative specifications, which included the squares of state, legal person, and 
foreign ownership, but these terms were never statistically significant. The results are not reported for 
brevity, but available upon request. 
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board (INDIR). We include these corporate governance variables first one by one, then 
in groups, and finally all together. 
In line with previous studies, Equation (3.1) also includes several additional 
variables to control for a set of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to be 
correlated with firms‟ internationalization decisions. These include firm size (FIRSIZE), 
labor productivity (PROD), the capital intensity ratio (CIR), firm age (FAGE), the 
leverage ratio (LEV), the liquidity ratio (LIQTY), and the market-to-book ratio (MBR).  
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total real sales at the firm 
level. A positive relationship between firm size and foreign activities such as exporting 
is often considered as a stylized fact, as several studies found that both the probability 
of exporting and export intensity rise with firm size (see, for instance, Greenaway et al., 
2007; and Wagner, 2010). A larger size reflects firms‟ ability to attract and deploy 
resources (such as finance, expertise, and so on) needed to international operations; 
economies of scale in production; and also a higher capacity for taking risks (e.g. 
investment in R&D and development of new products) due to internal diversification. 
Consequently, large firms produce at lower average cost and may display higher 
productivity than smaller firms, and are, as such, more likely to export. Firm age is 
expected to have a positive association with export propensity and intensity, given that 
older firms are likely to suffer less from asymmetric information problems, which may 
make it easier for them to obtain the financing necessary to venture abroad. Labor 
productivity is measured as the ratio of real sales to the number of employees. A higher 
productivity reflects firms‟ success in generating the profits necessary to recover the 
sunk costs that need to be faced when entering export markets. Consequently, we expect 
more productive firms to be more likely to export (Bernard and Jensen 2004). Capital 
intensity is calculated as the ratio of real fixed assets to the number of employees. More 
capital intensive firms are expected to be more likely to engage in export activity. 
Leverage, which is defined as the total debt to total assets ratio, is used to capture the 
effect of capital structure. As in Greenaway et al. (2007), we expect a negative 
relationship between leverage and export market participation decisions, as high 
leverage is generally associated with unhealthy balance sheets. Liquidity is given by the 
ratio of current assets minus current liabilities to total assets. Firms with higher liquidity 
have been proved in previous literature to have a higher probability to export and a 
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higher export intensity (Greenaway et al., 2007). Growth opportunities are proxied by 
the market-to-book ratio. If managers‟ decisions to invest in export activities reflect a 
real growth opportunity, we would expect a positive relationship between the market-to-
book ratio and international expansion decisions. 
The error term in Equation (3.1) is made up of five components. vi is a firm-
specific effect; vt, a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time 
dummies capturing business cycle effects
27
; vj, an industry-specific effect, which we 
take into account by including industry dummies; and vr, a region-specific effect, which 
we control for by including a full-set of regional dummies. Finally, it is an 
idiosyncratic component. 
3.4.2. Estimation methodology 
3.4.2.1. Random effect probit and tobit models 
To examine the extent to which corporate governance factors determine export 
propensity and intensity, we use two estimation methods. The first is a random-effects 
probit model used to estimate the probability of exporting. The second is a random-
effects tobit model used for export intensity (measured as the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales). Since the export ratio is a censored variable, characterized by a large 
number of zeroes, the tobit model is appropriate. We use random-effects probit and tobit 
models to control for unobserved heterogeneity: unobserved attributes, such as 
managers‟ skills, and attitudes towards risk are in fact likely to affect both the 
probability of exporting and the amounts exported.  
3.4.2.2. Endogeneity 
Our estimates may be affected by reverse causality. The relationship between 
governance mechanisms and exporting may in fact be dynamic, in the sense that on the 
                                                        
27 Li et al (2012) show that China‟s export declined during the recent global financial crises period 
(2007-2009). Our dataset includes the Global Financial Crisis years. The effects of the Crisis are taken 
into account in our analysis through the inclusion of time dummies, which account for all business cycle 
effects. For instance, the fact that exports were reduced during the Crisis would be picked by the time 
dummies. Furthermore, since governance variables are mostly persistent overtime and can well be 
described as cross sectional or between-firms‟ phenomena (Zhou, 2001), we do not expect the effects of 
corporate governance variables on exports to change over the crisis years. We believe therefore that the 
different results obtained for the pre- and post-2006 period are more likely to be due to the split-share 
structure reform than to the financial crisis.   
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one hand, robust governance systems may facilitate exporting decisions. Yet, on the 
other hand, a firm‟s increased participation in international markets may require 
additional equity ownership to be awarded to managers to compensate their efforts in 
dealing with the additional complexities, information asymmetries, and agency 
problems arising from entering into international markets (Rose and Shepard, 1997). 
Similarly, stronger governance structures may become necessary to ensure firm survival 
in the more competitive global environment. Furthermore, the Chinese stock market has 
been buoyant from its establishment since a limited number of companies were allowed 
to list in the stock markets and the supply of shares was much less than the demand 
from the large number of potential investors.  Therefore, one may argue that the gains 
from managerial share ownership often depend to a large extent upon the overall 
movement of the stock market and hence that managerial share ownership does not 
necessarily provide the right incentives which align managers‟ and shareholders‟ 
interest  That is, managerial share ownership is endogenously determined and may not 
provide the right incentive to managers to undertake risky investments such as paying 
the sunk costs necessary to start exporting activities. However, in fact in China 
managerial ownership is a new phenomenon. Since the managerial incentive system 
was rather weak in the early stage of the development of corporations, the Chinese 
government encouraged the listed firms to provide incentive to managers by issuing 
equity shares in their firms from 2006 (CSRC, 2006 and Martin and He, 2011). 
Furthermore, we address the potential endogeneity issue by using the system GMM 
estimator. Our results indicate that even after controlling for endogeneity, managerial 
ownership in Chinese listed firms provides managers with the necessary incentives to 
make risky and efficient investment decisions. 
 It is therefore crucial to control for “dynamic endogeneity” in our study. 
We address the potential endogeneity issue in two main ways. First, we include 
one-period lag of all corporate governance and other explanatory variables, with the 
exception of firm age and dummy variables, in all our specifications. A similar 
approach is also used in many previous studies (see, among others, Roberts and Tybout, 
1997; and Coles et al., 2006).  
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Second, following Bernard and Jensen, (2004) and Greenaway et al. (2007), we 
use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in addition to the random-
effects probit and tobit estimators. However, unlike these authors, we use the system 
GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) instead of the 
first-difference estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The system GMM estimator 
estimates the relevant equation both in levels and in first-differences. First-differencing 
is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We use all right-hand side variables 
(except age and the dummies) lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-
differenced equation, and first-differences of these same variables lagged once as 
instruments in the level equation. The system GMM estimator addresses the potential 
weak instrument problem. It should be noted, however, that being a linear probability 
model, the system GMM estimator is problematic in our particular case, as it fails to 
properly capture the curvature of the regression function in the proximity of 0 and 1. 
 
3.5. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.5.1. Sample and dataset 
The data used in this study are obtained from two Chinese databases namely, the China 
Stock Market Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin for the period of 2004-
2010
28
. The sample is composed of publicly listed firms traded on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. As listed companies are typically seen as the best 
performers in the Chinese economy, we believe that looking at their export behavior 
represents an interesting research question. Additionally, as our objective is to assess 
the extent to which corporate governance variables affect firms‟ export behavior, the 
analysis can only be performed on listed companies, as information on corporate 
governance characteristics is only available for these firms.  
Financial and utility industries are excluded. To reduce the influence of potential 
outliers, we exclude observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression 
variables. Since we lag all our independent variables once, we end up with a panel of 
                                                        
28
 We separately purchased export data by listed firms from GCCET LTD. The data file includes export 
value as well export sales ratios for all exporting firms. We then merged these export data with our main 
CSMAR database, which contains governance and other firm characteristic. 
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6315 firm-year observations on 1420 companies over the period 2005-2010 for our 
empirical analysis. The panel has an unbalanced structure, with an average of 6 
observations per firm. 
3.5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis for our 
pooled sample. We observe that, on average, over one third of the listed firms (38.0%) 
are involved in exporting activities. The average export to total sales ratio is 8.7 %. 
However, the average exporting intensity amongst exporters is 22.8 % (as shown in 
Table 3.4). 
The pooled mean (median) value of managerial ownership is 3.1% (0%). The 
state and legal persons hold 25.6% (25%) and 16.7% (5.2%) of the shares, respectively. 
Foreign shareholders, on average, hold 4 % (0%) of total issued shares. The average 
board size is 9.4 (9.0) with a proportion of independent outside directors of 35.2% 
(33.3%).  
With respect to the control variables included in our baseline model, the average 
(median) firm size is about 1 billion RMB (0.43) and the average firm age measured by 
number of years from the establishment of firm is 11.52 (11)
29
. Productivity, measured 
as real sales per employee, is 0.55 million RMB (0.24). Capital intensity, proxied by the 
ratio of real fixed assets to the number of employees of the firm, is given by 0.19 
(0.095) million RMB fixed assets per employee. The average debt to asset ratio and the 
market-to-book ratio are 50.5% (51.2%) and 1.52 (1.22), respectively. Finally, the 
average liquidity, measured as net working capital over total assets, is 11.1% (10.6%). 
These summary statistics indicate that the sample employed in this study is 
comparable to others used in prior research on corporate governance and on corporate 
internationalization decisions. For example, the average export-sales ratio in our sample 
is similar to the averages (7%) reported by Lu et al. (2009) for the period 2002-2005. 
Similarly, the average foreign ownership is comparable to the average (4%) reported in 
Yuan et al. (2008) for the years 2001-2005. This also indicates that the level of foreign 
                                                        
29
 It should be noted that although firm size is measured as the logarithm of total real sales in the 
regression analysis, the figures reported in the descriptive statistics Tables are not in logarithms as actual 
values are easier to interpret. 
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ownership has not changed significantly during the last decade. In addition, corporate 
governance and other firm characteristics are similar to those reported in recent studies 
on corporate governance in China, such as Conyon and He (2012) among others. 
Table 3.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. It is 
worth noting that both managerial and foreign shareholdings show a positive and 
statistically significant correlation with firms‟ exporting activities, as suggested by our 
hypotheses H1 and H3. The results also highlight that state shareholding exhibits a 
negative and significant correlation with export propensity. This is consistent with the 
prediction of hypothesis H2. Legal person shareholding exhibits a negative and 
significant correlation with both export propensity and intensity. In line with hypothesis 
H4, board size has a significant negative relationship with international market 
expansion. Finally, the proportion of outside directors does not have any significant 
association with export propensity and intensity, which is consistent with hypothesis 
H5.   
Turning to control variables, as expected, firm size has a significant positive 
correlation with internationalization. It is interesting to note that productivity has a 
negative but statistically insignificant correlation with exporting decisions, while the 
capital intensity ratio shows a significant negative correlation. These findings are 
opposite to what has been observed in developed countries and other emerging markets 
(Wakeling, 1998). However, Lu et al. (2009) also show a negative relationship between 
exporting and the capital labor ratio for Chinese firms. Furthermore, the leverage ratio 
exhibits a significant negative correlation with international sales expansion, while 
liquidity is positively related to both export intensity and propensity. Table 3.2 also 
suggests that given that the observed correlation coefficients are relatively low, 
multicollinearity should not be a serious problem in our study
30
. 
  
                                                        
30
 There is, however, one exception: we observe in fact a high correlation between managerial ownership 
and its square (0.86). For this reason, following Kennedy (2008), we calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF), which is a standard test for multicollinearity. We note that the VIF does not exceed the 
threshold of 10, which suggests that the observed high correlation coefficient between managerial 
shareholding and its square should not cause problems in our regressions. 
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3.6. Evaluation of the results 
3.6.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of observations across various categories of managerial 
ownership. We observe that out of a total of 6315 observations, 4829 are characterized 
by managerial ownership lower than 0.1%. 533 observations have managerial 
ownership between 0.1% and 5%; 239, between 5% and 25%; and 714, above 25%. The 
Table also shows that both export propensity and intensity tend to increase with 
managerial ownership up to a 25% threshold, and decline thereafter. This is in line with 
our hypothesis H1, which posits an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial 
ownership and export intensity and propensity.  
In Table 3.4, we report univariate mean comparisons of governance and firm 
characteristics between non-exporters and exporters. The statistics in the table show 
that, in line with our hypotheses H1 and H3, the fractions of managerial and foreign 
ownership are significantly higher for exporters. In addition, consistent with our 
hypothesis H2, non-exporting firms have higher average state and legal person 
shareholding than exporting firms, the differences being significant. As predicted by our 
hypothesis H4, we observe that board size is higher for non-exporters. In line with 
hypothesis H5, we do not observe much difference in terms of proportion of outside 
directors between exporters and non-exporters.  
Moving to firm characteristics, we observe that non-exporting firms display 
significantly higher capital intensity and lower market-to-book ratios than their 
exporting counterparts. In terms of productivity, there is no significant difference 
between exporters and non-exporters. These findings suggest that the self-selection 
hypothesis that the most efficient (productive) firms self-select into the export market 
(Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw et al., 2000) may not be true for Chinese exporters
31
. 
The results also show that exporters are slightly larger and younger than non-exporters. 
The larger liquidity ratio and lower leverage ratio in the exporting firms suggests that, in 
                                                        
31
 This can be explained considering that several exporters in China are engaged in processing trade: they 
import parts and input labor to assemble final products, which they then export (Dai et al., 2014). These 
exporters are therefore not necessarily more productive than non-exporters. In addition, according to the 
trade theory of comparative advantage, labor-intensive firms in China are more likely to become 
exporters (Lu et al., 2009). This explains why average capital intensity appears to be higher for non-
exporters. 
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line with Greenaway et al. (2007) for UK firms, financially constrained firms are less 
likely to participate in export markets. 
This univariate analysis highlights some differences between non-exporters and 
exporters. The observed differences in the governance factors provide some preliminary 
evidence supporting our hypotheses. A potential problem in the univariate analysis is 
that since observations within a firm are unlikely to be independent, the statistical 
significance is overstated (Anderson et. al., 2000). Another important problem is that 
the univariate tests do not control for several factors that may systematically affect the 
variables of interest. These factors include geographic location, industry membership, 
business cycle effects and so on (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). We address these 
issues in the multivariate analysis that follows in the next section.  
3.6.2. Multivariate analysis 
3.6.2.1. The decision to export, corporate governance, and firm characteristics 
Table 3.5 presents random-effects probit estimation results of our baseline model (3.1), 
where the dependent variable is the export dummy, equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 0 
otherwise. To facilitate economic interpretation, we report marginal effects for those 
explanatory variables which display statistically significant coefficients.  
In column 1 of Table 3.5, we first estimate a naïve model in which the export 
propensity is regressed on managerial ownership, managerial ownership squared and a 
set of control variables including lagged export propensity, firm size, age, productivity, 
capital intensity, leverage, market-to-book ratio, liquidity and regional, industry, and 
year dummies. In subsequent columns, we then include other ownership and board 
structure variables one by one and in groups, to reach our baseline model in column 7. 
Firstly, the coefficients on managerial ownership and its square are consistently highly 
significant (at the 1% level) throughout all of the models. The former is positive, and 
the latter, negative. In line with hypothesis H1, these findings suggest there is strong 
evidence of a curvilinear relationship between managerial equity ownership and the 
probability of participating in export markets. Specifically, the probability of exporting 
first increases, then decreases as managerial ownership rises. At lower levels of 
managerial ownership, the positive effect of ownership strongly dominates any negative 
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effects, consistent with Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) incentive alignment hypothesis. 
The average turning point in managerial ownership ranges between 23% and 27%
32
. 
Focusing on the marginal effects reported in column 1, for management shareholding 
lower than the turning point, a 10 percentage point increase in ownership increases the 
probability of exporting by 0.39 percentage point. However, for management 
shareholding above the turning point, a 10 percentage point increase in ownership 
decreases the probability of exporting by 0.73 percentage point. This finding is 
consistent with Kim and Lu (2011), who find a hump-shaped relationship between 
managerial ownership and US firms‟ Tobin‟s Q and R&D expenditures.   
In columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 3.5, state ownership, legal person ownership, 
and foreign ownership are introduced respectively in to the models as additional 
independent variables. The results show that none of these additional ownership 
variables influences firms‟ decisions to enter foreign markets. Even when all additional 
ownership variables are included together in column 5, none of them is significant at the 
conventional significant levels. Our hypotheses H2 and H3 are therefore not 
supported
33
. 
In column 6, board size and the proportion of independent directors are included 
together with the managerial ownership variables. Both these additional variables 
exhibit negative and significant coefficients, supporting therefore our hypotheses H4 
and H5. Our results are consistent with Clarke (2003) and Lau et al. (2007), who show 
that outside directors in the Chinese market do not contribute to strategic decisions and 
are just appointed to meet regulatory and legal requirements.  
Column 7 of Table 3.5 shows estimates for our baseline model (3.1), which 
includes all the independent and control variables. Even after introducing all other 
ownership and governance variables, the coefficient on the managerial ownership 
variable remains positive and precisely determined, and the coefficient on its squared 
                                                        
32 The turning points are calculated setting the first derivative of Equation (1) with respect to DOS equal 
to 0, and solving for DOS. 
33 Although earlier research found a positive effect of foreign ownership on firms‟ exporting activities, 
the fact that in most of our specifications, foreign ownership has an insignificant coefficient can be 
explained considering that foreign ownership is very small in our sample of Chinese listed companies 
(see Table 3.1). This suggests that foreign ownership is not very common among listed Chinese 
companies, which could explain why it does not significantly affect firms‟ decisions to enter export 
markets. 
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value, negative and significant.  Board size and the proportion of independent directors 
in the board retain their negative signs. 
As for the effects of the control variables, the results show that in all 
specifications, the coefficient on lagged export status is positive and significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that Chinese exporting decisions are highly persistent, probably 
due to the high sunk costs, which need to be paid upfront to enter export markets. 
Additionally, larger firms are more likely to be exporters. This is consistent with the 
prediction that large firms have more resources, may experience economies of scale, 
and have access to external finance which facilitate exporting decisions. The coefficient 
of firm age is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. This is not 
consistent with our initial prediction, but can be explained considering that those state-
owned enterprises with a long history of operations, which were then converted into 
listed companies might be less efficient, less dynamic, and hence, less likely to become 
exporters. This result also provides support for the born-global firm hypothesis, which 
suggests that it is young firms which are more likely to rapidly internationalize. 
        The coefficient associated with labor productivity is never statistically significant, 
which is inconsistent with the common wisdom that more productive firms are likely to 
enter foreign markets (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999 and 2004). Similarly, the 
coefficient on the capital intensity ratio is negative, but not statistically significant
34
. 
The market-to-book ratio does not have a statistically significant association with 
exporting decisions, which is probably due to the fact that in the Chinese context, it is 
an imperfect measure of investment opportunities (Allen et al., 2005; Wang et al., 
2009). This may be due to the fact that stock market-based measures of growth 
opportunities are not reliable in the Chinese financial markets (Wang et al., 2009). In 
line with Greenaway at al. (2007), liquidity always attracts a positive and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that having more internal finance at hand facilitates firms‟ entry 
in export markets and enables them to export more. Finally, contrary to Greenaway et 
al. (2007), leverage displays an insignificant coefficient in columns 1 to 5, and a 
positive and significant coefficient in columns 6 and 7. The insignificant coefficients 
can be explained considering that our panel is made up of listed companies, all of which 
are relatively large and financially healthy. Hence, leverage should not make a big 
                                                        
34 See footnote 27 above for an explanation for these findings. 
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difference for these firms. The positive coefficients can be explained in the light of the 
fact that firms with high leverage have more resources at hand, which they can use to 
pay for the sunk costs that need to be faced in order to enter export markets. In addition, 
having obtained debt in previous years, these firms may be considered more 
creditworthy by banks, and may consequently obtain more loans in the present, which 
they can use to finance the sunk costs. Thus, they are more likely to become exporters. 
It should be noted, however, that in columns 6 and 7, the coefficients on leverage are 
only marginally significant.  
So far, the results show that managerial ownership has an important influence on 
the export markets participation decisions of Chinese listed corporations. However, 
except for managerial ownership, we generally do not find significant effects for any 
other ownership variables. In addition, both board size and the proportion of 
independent directors in the board negatively affect firms‟ internationalization 
decisions. 
3.6.2.2 Export intensity, corporate governance, and firm characteristics 
We now turn to export intensity measured as export sales over total sales, another 
measure of international involvement of firms. We investigate how managerial 
ownership and other governance mechanisms affect the volume of exports after entering 
the export markets. To this end, we replicate the same model specifications 1 to 7 used 
in Table 3.5, using a random-effects tobit model. Table 3.6 reports the results. 
Consistent with our previous findings, managerial ownership and its square attract a 
positive and a negative coefficient, respectively, in all models. Focusing on column 1, 
the marginal effects suggest that export intensity increases with managerial ownership 
up to a threshold of 26.85%, and then declines. More specifically, if managerial 
shareholding is less than this threshold, a 10 percentage point increase in ownership 
increases export intensity by 0.08 percentage point, whilst if managerial ownership is 
greater than the threshold, a 10 percentage point increase in ownership decreases export 
intensity by 0.15 percentage point.  
Focusing on columns 2 to 7, we observe that other ownership variables do not 
influence export intensity, with the exception of state ownership, which, in accordance 
with our hypothesis H2, exhibits a negative coefficient in columns 5 and 7, and legal 
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person shareholding, which also displays a negative coefficient in those same columns. 
Moving on to board characteristics, we observe that in line with our hypothesis H4, 
board size is negatively related to export intensity, whilst the percentage of independent 
directors has a statistically insignificant coefficient. Furthermore, we observe that, once 
again, past exporting experience has strong large effects on firms‟ export intensity.  
The coefficients on the other control variables indicate that, as in the probit 
regressions, young, large firms, with a higher liquidity are more likely to exhibit higher 
export intensity. Finally, we can see that in most specifications, compared to firms in 
the Central region (which represent the excluded category), firms in the Coastal region 
are more likely to export more, whereas firms in the Western region are less likely to do 
so. 
3.6.3. Robustness tests 
In this sub-section we verify whether our results are robust to using alternative 
estimation methods and specifications.  
3.6.3.1. Using alternative estimation methods 
First, columns 1 and 8 of Table 3.7 report system GMM estimates of our export 
propensity and intensity regressions. We use the system GMM estimator to control for 
the possible endogeneity of the regressors.  We use all right-hand side variables 
except age and the dummies, lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-
differenced equation, and first-differences of these same variables lagged once as 
instruments in the level equation. It should be noted, however, that being a linear 
probability model, the system GMM estimator is problematic in our particular case as it 
fails to properly capture the curvature of the regression function in the proximity of 0 
and 1. The results show that once again, managerial ownership and it square still display 
a positive and negative coefficient, respectively, and are both precisely determined. This 
confirms that managerial ownership and export propensity and intensity are linked by 
an inverted U-shaped relationship, with turning point of 27.47% in the former case and 
24.24% in the latter.  
        Furthermore, following Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), in columns 2 and 9 of 
Table 3.7, we report estimates of our models for export propensity and intensity 
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respectively, obtained using a piecewise regression. To this end, we allow for one 
change in the slope coefficient of managerial ownership at 25% (first quartile), which is 
close to the turning point identified in the regressions reported in Tables 5  and 6. With 
reference to Equation (3.1), we replace the managerial ownership variable and its square 
with the following two variables: the first (DOS025) is equal to the actual managerial 
ownership if this number is less than 0.25, and to 0.25 otherwise. The second (DOS25) 
is equal to (managerial ownership – 0.25) if managerial ownership is greater than 0.25, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. The results show that the first variable exhibits a positive and 
significant coefficient, whilst the second displays a negative and precisely determined 
coefficient. These findings suggest that at levels of managerial ownership lower than 
25%, the likelihood and intensity of exporting increase with managerial ownership, 
whilst a negative relationship between managerial ownership and exporting appears 
beyond the 25% threshold of managerial ownership. These new results confirm 
therefore our main findings and are in line with our hypothesis H1
35
. 
Our results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are also robust to using a pooled probit, pooled 
fractional probit (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996), and pooled tobit estimators with 
cluster- robust standard errors. In addition, our results are robust to using OLS and the 
“orthogonal deviations” variant of the GMM estimator, in which the fixed effects are 
eliminated by subtracting the forward means of each regression variable (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995)
 36
. All these results, which are not reported for brevity, but available upon 
request, confirm the curvilinear dependence of exporting decisions on managerial 
ownership predicted by our hypothesis H1. 
                                                        
35
 As in Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), we have also estimated regressions using two break points (at 
5% and 25 % respectively) and found a positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
exporting within the range of 0-25% and a negative relationship thereafter. This finding is consistent with 
the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4. We have also undertaken an additional robustness test 
replacing managerial ownership and its square with dummies for managerial ownership less than 5%; 
between 5% and 10%; between 10% and 20%; between 20% and 30%; and higher than 30%. We found 
that that increasing managerial ownership from 0% to 10% enhances both export propensity and intensity. 
Yet increasing managerial ownership more has no effect on both dimensions of exporting, up to a 
threshold of around 30%, after which further increases in managerial ownership are detrimental to export 
propensity and intensity. These results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
36
 The results for export intensity were also robust to estimating a system-GMM model augmented with 
the inverse Mills ratio on the subsample of exporters (see Minetti and Zhu, 2011, for a similar approach). 
These results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
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3.6.3.2 Using dummy variable for managerial ownership and foreign ownership 
In columns 3 and 10 of Table 3.7, we provide estimates of our export propensity and 
export intensity regressions, which include a dummy equal to one if managerial 
ownership is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise; and a dummy equal to 1 if foreign 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. These dummies replace the continuous 
managerial and foreign ownership variables, which both exhibit medians equal to 0. The 
results show that the coefficient on the managerial ownership dummy is positive and 
precisely determined, whilst the coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy is also 
positive, but not statistically significant. This suggests that managerial ownership plays 
a more significant role than foreign ownership on firms‟ internationalization decisions. 
3.6.3.3 Estimating separate regressions for state- and privately-controlled firms 
We next aim at verifying the extent to which our results hold for the subsamples of 
state- and privately-controlled firms. This exercise is motivated considering that top 
executives in the state sector are often appointed by party and government agencies and 
are typically party secretaries, government officials or veteran socialist managers 
(Walder, 2011). Additionally, appointments to top managerial posts in these companies 
are generally controlled by the state, and managerial autonomy is limited (Walder, 
2011). As such, managers in state-controlled companies might have limited power in 
regards to the firms‟ internationalization decisions37.  
  In contrast, top executives in the privately-controlled sector may have begun 
their careers in the state sector, but are no longer appointed by the state. The managers 
of these firms also have greater autonomy from state agencies than their counterparts in 
state-controlled companies. Furthermore, their executives enjoy much higher levels of 
compensation and are more likely to hold significant ownership stakes (Walder, 2011). 
These developments clearly demonstrate that managers are likely to play a major role in 
these companies, and since these managers are the ones who ultimately decide whether 
or not the firm will enter export markets, any types of managerial incentives are likely 
                                                        
37
 It should also be noted that managerial ownership in state-controlled firms is very low: According to 
our data, it is in fact equal to 0.22% for state-controlled firms, and to 8.1% for privately-controlled firms. 
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to affect firms‟ internationalization decisions38.  
          In the light of these considerations, in columns 4/5 and 11/12 of Table 3.7, we 
provide separate estimates of Equation (3.1) for state-controlled and privately-
controlled firms. The results show that managerial ownership only affects the exporting 
decisions of non-state firms. These results are consistent with a number of studies, 
which provide empirical evidence for the differential effects of other forms of 
managerial incentives such as the sensitivities of top management compensation and 
turnover to firm performance and promotion tournaments among state-controlled and 
privately-controlled Chinese listed firms (Kato and Long, 2006a, b, c, and 2011). 
Specifically, these studies suggest that managerial incentives derived from these 
incentive mechanisms are weakened by state ownership and control. We also observe 
that whilst board size has a negative and significant effect on the export propensity and 
intensity of both state- and privately controlled firms, the proportion of independent 
directors in the board is negatively related to the export decisions of privately-controlled 
firms only.  
3.6.3.4 Estimating separate regressions for the pre- and post-2006 period 
 It is important to take into account differences in our results before and after the 2005-
2006 split share structure reform, following which non-tradable shares were floated 
through the open markets, for the following reasons. First, agency costs were 
significantly reduced following the reform (Li et al., 2011). Second, from 2006 
onwards, corporations were allowed to incentivize their top management with stocks. 
As a consequence of this, average managerial ownership rose from 1.1% in 2004 to 
8.2% in 2010, managers‟ interests became aligned with stock return performance, and 
their conflicts of interest with outsider investors were reduced.  
To take this into account, in columns 6/7 and 13/14 of Table 3.7, we provide 
separate estimates of Equation (3.1) for the pre- and post-2006 period. The results show 
that managerial ownership and its square are only significant in the post-reform period. 
This suggests that, by removing restrictions on managerial stock ownership, the reform 
played an indirect role in enhancing Chinese firms‟ internationalization activities. 
                                                        
38
 In line with this argument, Todo et al. (2012) show that privatized Chinese companies are more likely 
to engage in exports than SOEs. 
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Furthermore, with the exception of board size which has a negative and marginally 
significant effect on export propensity in the pre-reform period, all other corporate 
governance variables only affect firms‟ exporting decisions in the post-crisis period. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
In this paper we use a dataset made up of 1240 Chinese listed companies over the 
period 2004-2010 to examine the effects of managerial ownership, other ownership 
types, and board characteristics on firms‟ exporting decisions, distinguishing firms into 
state- and privately-controlled. This is the first study conducted on the topic on a dataset 
including the post-split share structure reform period in China, the first to analyze 
differences between state-owned and other companies, and the first study to include all 
relevant corporate governance variables in a unified framework.  
 We find that increasing managerial ownership is linked with a higher probability 
to enter export markets, and higher export intensity. Yet, after a threshold level of 
ownership of 23%-27% is reached, managers‟ entrenchment tendencies become 
prominent, discouraging internationalization activities. We also observe that state 
ownership is negatively associated with export intensity; that the larger the board size, 
the lower the firm‟s export propensity and intensity; and that firms with a higher 
proportion of independent directors in the board are generally less likely to export. 
Finally, larger, younger firms with higher liquidity are more likely to export and are 
also more likely to display higher export intensity. Our findings, which are robust to 
using different estimation methods, and mainly driven by non-state firms in the post-
reform period. 
Our paper contributes to the international trade literature by taking into account 
corporate governance components as new elements of firm heterogeneity, with the aim 
of better explaining the determinants of both the export propensity and intensity. It also 
contributes to the corporate finance literature, which has looked at the effects of 
managerial ownership and corporate governance mechanisms on various aspects of 
corporate behavior, neglecting, however, firms‟ exporting decisions. 
Our findings have policy implications. In order to promote the international 
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presence of Chinese firms, the government should encourage a rise in managerial 
ownership up to its optimal level, through a revision of the compensation contracts of 
management teams, aimed at including company shares. Furthermore, given the 
concave relationship between managerial ownership and risk taking activities such as 
international expansion, excessive managerial ownership should be avoided. In 
addition, in order to raise export propensity and intensity, companies should be 
encouraged to have smaller boards and to pay particular attention to the quality of the 
independent directors in their boards. Finally, state ownership should be further 
reduced. 
Our study suffers from a number of limitations. Firstly, since a limited number 
of firms have been involved in Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) during our 
sample period (Morck et al., 2008), we only use exports as a measure of firms‟ degree 
of internationalization. In the future, we aim at complementing our study by also 
employing other measures of internationalization, such as OFDI. 
Secondly, we do not focus on the qualities of the CEOs/top management team, 
such as their international experience and education. Yet, these may have an important 
bearing on firms‟ efforts in venturing abroad. As these data are not available in standard 
databases, a questionnaire-based survey would have to be conducted in order to 
complement this study. This is on the agenda for future research.  
           Finally, in future research, we plan to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
effects of managerial ownership and other forms of corporate governance on a range of 
different corporate activities in China, other emerging economies, and developed 
countries.  
Appendix 
 
Table A3.1 in the Appendix provides variable names, definitions, and expected signs. 
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 Appendix : Table A3.1  Variables’ names, definitions, and expected signs  
Variables  Name Definition Expected 
sign 
Dependent Variables    
Export propensity EXPDUM Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports, and 
0 otherwise 
 
Export intensity 
 
EXPINT Ratio of exports to total sales 
 
 
Corporate governance variables    
Managerial share ownership DOS Percentage of shares owned by managers, directors 
and supervisors 
+ (H1) 
 DOS2 Squared term of managerial share ownership - (H1) 
 DOS 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if DOS>0, and 0 
otherwise 
 
  
DOS025 
 
Variable equal to DOS if DOS<0.25, and equal to 
0.25 if DOS0.25 
 
 DOS25 
 
Variable equal to DOS-0.25 if DOS>0.25, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
State-owned shares 
 
SOS 
 
Percentage of shares owned by the central 
government, local governments, or any entity 
representing the central or local governments.  
- (H2) 
Legal person shares LPS Percentage of shares owned by non-individual legal 
entities or institutions 
? 
Foreign share ownership FOWNS Percentage of shares owned by foreign investors + (H3) 
 FOWNS 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if FOWNS>0, and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
Board size 
 
BODSIZE 
 
Total number of directors on the board of directors 
 
- (H4) 
Independent directors INDIR Proportion of independent directors on the board of 
directors. 
-/no (H5) 
 
Control Variables 
  
 
Firm size  FIRSIZE Natural logarithm of the firm‟s total real sales + 
Firm age FAGE Logarithm of the number of years since the 
establishment of the firm 
+ 
Labor productivity  PROD Ratio of real sales to the number of employees + 
Capital intensity CIR Ratio of real fixed assets to the number of 
employees 
+ 
Leverage ratio LEV Ratio of total debt to total assets - 
Market  to book  ratio MBR Ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and 
the book value of debt to the book value of total 
assets 
- 
Liquidity ratio LIQTY Ratio of the difference between current assets and 
current liabilities to total assets  
+ 
Regional dummies  Dummies indicating whether the firm is located in 
the Coastal, Western, or Central region of China 
 
Year dummies  Year dummies for the years 2005 to 2010.  
Industry dummies  Dummies for the following four industrial groups 
based on the CSMAR B classification: Properties, 
Conglomerates, Industry, Commerce. Utilities and 
financial industries are excluded. 
 
 
Note: Real variables are derived from nominal ones using China‟s GDP deflator.  
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of governance and firm characteristics for the pooled  
sample of companies 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Export dummy (EXPDUM) 
6315 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Export intensity (EXPINT) 6315 0.087 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.869 
 
Governance  Characteristics    
 
  
Managerial shareholding (DOS) 6315 0.031 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.748 
Legal person shareholding (LPS) 6315 0.167 0.207 0.052 0.000 0.869 
State shareholding (SOS) 6315 0.256 0.238 0.250 0.000 0.812 
Foreign shareholding (FOWNS) 6315 0.040 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.736 
Board size (BODSIZE) 6315 9.392 1.947 9.000 3.000 19.000 
Independent directors (INDIR) 6315 0.352 0.045 0.333 0.000 0.667 
 
Firm Characteristics    
 
  
Firm size  (billion RMB)(FIRSIZE) 6315 1.007 1.828 0.433 0.000 21.023 
Firm age (FAGE) 6315 11.520 4.006 11.000 2.000 26.000 
Productivity (million RMB) (PROD) 6315 0.551 2.005 0.243 0.000 134.479 
Capital intensity (million  RMB) (CIR) 6315 0.190 0.736 0.095 0.000 37.074 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 6315 0.505 0.204 0.512 0.013 5.494 
Market –to- book  ratio (MBR) 6315 1.516 0.854 1.218 0.477 11.222 
Liquidity ratio (LIQTY) 6315 0.111 0.247 0.106 -3.437 0.915 
 
Notes:  This table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in our study. All variables 
are defined in Table A3.1 in the Appendix.  
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Table 3.2 Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 EXPDUM 1.00                
2 EXPINT 0.63* 1.00               
3 DOSi(t-1) 0.10* 0.10* 1.00              
4 DOS
2
i(t-1) 0.07* 0.07* 0.86* 1.00             
5 LPSi(t-1) -0.08* -0.08* -0.28* -0.23* 1.00            
6 SOSi(t-1) -0.05* 0.00 -0.01 -0.05* -0.56* 1.00           
7 FOWNSi(t-1) 0.08* 0.10* -0.07* -0.05* -0.01 -0.05* 1.00          
8 INDIRi(t-1) 0.00 -0.00 0.08* 0.07* -0.11* 0.02 0.01 1.00         
9 BODSIZE(t-1) -0.03* -0.04* -0.09* -0.09* 0.14* -0.08* 0.07* -0.24* 1.00        
10 FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.11* 0.03* -0.12* -0.10* 0.15* -0.21* 0.14* -0.02 0.21* 1.00       
11 AGEit -0.07* -0.09* -0.34* -0.30* -0.14* -0.06* 0.06* 0.00 -0.03* 0.10* 1.00      
12 PRODi(t-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* -0.03* 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.14* 0.06* 1.00     
13 CIRi(t-1) -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* 0.04* -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04* 0.06* 0.52* 1.00    
14 LEVi(t-1) -0.04* -0.07* -0.17* -0.14* 0.04* -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05* 0.21* 0.21* 0.06* 0.10* 1.00   
15 MBRi(t-1) 0.05* 0.02 0.07* 0.05* -0.24* -0.09* -0.08* 0.05* -0.08* -0.15* 0.11* -0.02 -0.02 -0.16* 1.00  
16 LIQTYi(t-1) 0.06* 0.07* 0.24* 0.21* -0.09* 0.06* -0.02 0.04* -0.07* -0.12* -0.24* 0.05* -0.13* -0.64* 0.14* 1.00 
 
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. * denotes significance at the 5% level. See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables.
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         Table 3.3 Average export propensity and intensity for different degrees of 
managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership Observations Export propensity Export intensity 
DOS < .001 4829 0.35 0.08 
0.001 =<  DOS  < .05 533 0.42 0.12 
0.05 =<  DOS  < .25 239 0.60 0.17 
DOS  > .25 714 0.47 0.10 
  6315 
  Source: Authors‟ calculations based on the dataset used in the revised paper. DOS represents 
managerial shareholding. See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for the precise definitions of this 
variable. 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Mean comparison of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics for non-exporters and exporters 
Variables 
Non-exporters Exporters Mean differences 
(t-statistic) 
Count Mean S.E. Count Mean  S.E. 
Export  Dummy 3915 0.000 0.000 2400 1.000 0.000 
 
 
Exports/Total sales 3915 0.000 0.000 2400 0.228 0.224 -0.228
***
 (-63.63) 
 
Governance  characteristics        
 
Managerial shareholding (DOS) 3915 0.022 0.094 2400 0.045 0.124 -0.023
***
 (-8.22) 
Legal person shares (LPS) 3915 0.174 0.210 2400 0.155 0.202 0.019
***
 (3.62) 
State shares (SOS) 3915 0.272 0.240 2400 0.231 0.234 0.040
***
 (6.54) 
Foreign shares (FOWNS) 3915 0.033 0.098 2400 0.051 0.124 -0.018
***
 (-6.38) 
Board size (BODSIZE) 3915 9.442 2.022 2400 9.310 1.814 0.132
**
 (2.62) 
Independent directors (INDIR) 3915 0.352 0.046 2400 0.352 0.042 -0.000 (-0.30) 
 
Firm characteristics        
 
Firm size  (billion RMB) (FIRSIZE) 3915 0.942 1.733 2400 1.115 1.970 -0.173*** (-8.43) 
Firm age (FAGE) 3915 2.397 0.376 2400 2.341 0.400 0.056*** (5.59) 
Productivity (million RMB) (PROD) 3915 0.575 1.195 2400 0.513 2.872 6.189 (1.19) 
Capital intensity (million 
RMB)(CIR) 
3915 0.213 0.847 2400 0.153 0.506 5.989** (3.14) 
Leverage ratio (LEV) 3915 0.512 0.195 2400 0.494 0.218 0.018*** (3.47) 
Market- to-book  ratio (MBR) 3915 1.479 0.851 2400 1.576 0.855 -0.096*** (-4.37) 
Liquidity ratio (LIQTY) 3915 0.100 0.253 2400 0.129 0.237 -0.029*** (-4.58) 
 
Notes: ***, **, and* denote, respectively, significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% for a two-
tailed two sample t-test. t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for 
definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.5 The decision to export, corporate governance, and firm characteristics  
 
 Dynamic random-effects probit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance variables       
DOSi(t-1) 2.139
*** 2.006*** 2.129*** 2.139*** 1.968** 2.159*** 2.011*** 
 (0.743) (0.761) (0.747) (0.744) (0.764) (0.750) (0.771) 
 [0.391] [0.348] [0.399] [0.396] [0.327] [0.399] [0.332] 
DOS2i(t-1) -3.758
*** -3.601*** -3.737*** -3.759*** -3.625*** -3.877*** -3.763*** 
 (1.376) (1.389) (1.386) (1.376) (1.390) (1.391) (1.406) 
 [-0.727] [-0.675] -0.743] [-0.733] [-0.693] -0.756] [-0.718] 
SOSi(t-1)  -0.091   -0.163  -0.150 
  (0.113)   (0.160)  (0.162) 
LPSi(t-1)   0.015  -0.108  -0.098 
   (0.121)  (0.171)  (0.172) 
FOWNSi(t-1)    0.006 -0.014  0.049 
    (0.222) (0.223)  (0.225) 
INDIRi(t-1)      -1.026
* -1.050* 
      (0.551) (0.552) 
      [-0.143] [-0.154] 
BODSIZE(t-1)      -0.412
*** -0.412*** 
      (0.123) (0.123) 
      [-0.060] [-0.060] 
Control variables        
EXPDUMi(t-1) 2.741
*** 2.739*** 2.741*** 2.741*** 2.738*** 2.748*** 2.744*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
 [1.822] [1.821] [1.822] [1.821] [1.818] [1.817] [1.812] 
FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.069
*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] 
AGEit -0.137
* -0.148** -0.137* -0.137* -0.155** -0.149** -0.166** 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.072) (0.075) 
 [-0.022] [-0.021] [-0.022] [-0.022] [-0.030] [-0.022] [-0.031] 
PRODi(t-1) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
CIRi(t-1) -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) 
LEVi(t-1) 0.201 0.201 0.200 0.201 0.209 0.293
* 0.301* 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.159) (0.159) 
      [0.028] [0.033] 
MBRi(t-1) -0.039 -0.042 -0.039 -0.039 -0.045 -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.298
** 0.299** 0.297** 0.298** 0.307** 0.323** 0.331** 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.144) 
 [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.062] [0.068] [0.063] [0.069] 
COASTAL dummy 0.059 0.056 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.064 0.062 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
WESTERN dummy -0.059 -0.057 -0.059 -0.059 -0.054 -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection points 26.89% 25.78% 26.85% 27.01% 23.59% 26.39% 23.12% 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 
Log-likelihood -1758.55 -1758.23 -1758.55 -1758.55 -1758.03 -1731.40 -1730.92 
Wald χ2 (P value) 3126.55 3126.67 3126.62 3126.53 3126.36 3079.50 3079.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable (EXPDUM) is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm exports, and 0 
otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those coefficients that are 
statistically significant. The Wald statistic is aimed at testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels respectively. See Table A3.1 
in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.6 Export intensity, corporate governance, and firm characteristics 
 Dynamic random-effects tobit models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Governance variables       
DOSi(t-1) 0.233
*** 0.207*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.194** 0.238*** 0.197*** 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.077) 
 [0.080] [0.071] [0.082] [0.081] [0.067] [0.082] [0.068] 
DOS2i(t-1) -0.432
*** -0.401*** -0.442*** -0.435*** -0.412*** -0.450*** -0.427*** 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.141) (0.140) (0.142) 
 [-0.149] [-0.138] [-0.152] [-0.150] [-0.142] [-0.155] [-0.147] 
SOSi(t-1)  -0.018   -0.043
***  -0.045*** 
  (0.012)   (0.017)  (0.017) 
     [-0.015]  [-0.034] 
LPSi(t-1)   -0.007  -0.039
**  -0.039** 
   (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
     [-0.013]  [-0.012] 
FOWNSi(t-1)    0.012 0.003  0.008 
    (0.022) (0.022)  (0.022) 
INDIRi(t-1)      -0.085 -0.092 
      (0.058) (0.058) 
BODSIZE(t-1)      -0.035
*** -0.036*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) 
      [-0.012] [-0.012] 
Control variables        
EXPINTi(t-1) 1.083
*** 1.081*** 1.083*** 1.082*** 1.080*** 1.081*** 1.078*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [0.373] [0.372] [0.373] [0.372] [0.372] [0.372] [0.372] 
FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.012
*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
AGEit -0.013
* -0.015** -0.013* -0.013* -0.018** -0.013* -0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
 [-0.004] [-0.005] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.006] [-0.005] [-0.006] 
PRODi(t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CIRi(t-1) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
* -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
LEVi(t-1) 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
MBRi(t-1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.037
** 0.037** 0.038** 0.037** 0.040*** 0.038** 0.041*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
COASTAL dummy 0.010* 0.009 0.010* 0.010 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
WESTERN dummy -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005]    
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection points 26.85% 25.72% 26.97% 27.0% 23.59% 26.45% 23.13% 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 6315 
Proportion > 0 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 37.99% 
Log-likelihood -300.58 -263.96 -236.35 -205.97 -272.25 -336.27 262.74 
Wald  χ2 (P value) 8535.29 8540.77 8535.16 8535.94 8548.34 8447.01 8460.69 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable (EXPINT) is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not export, 
and takes the value of the actual exports to total sales ratio, otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal 
effects are in square brackets for those coefficients that are statistically significant.  The Wald statistic is aimed at 
testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are jointly equal to zero. ***, **, and * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.7 Robustness tests 
                                                   Export   propensity Export intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)  (14)  
 
System 
GMM 
Piecewise Dummies Non-state State 
Post- 
reform 
Pre- 
reform 
System GMM Piecewise Dummies Non-state State 
Post- 
reform 
Pre- 
reform 
Governance variables               
DOSi(t-1) 1.483
**   2.059** -1.572 2.024** -0.042 0.271**   0.247*** -0.322 0.183** 0.237 
 (0.628)   (0.855) (4.807) (0.800) (3.255) (0.131)   (0.085) (0.416) (0.083) (0.215) 
    [0.403]  [0.320]     [0.092]  [0.068]  
DOS2i(t-1) -2.699
**   -3.935*** 12.942 -3.711** -1.848 -0.559*   -0.481*** 1.421 -0.393*** -0.666 
 (1.300)   (1.466) (27.352) (1.444) (6.734) (0.310)   (0.148) (1.690) (0.152) (0.445) 
    [-0.786]  [-0.688]     [-0.180]  [-0.145]  
DOS025i(t-1)  1.274
**       0.112**      
  (0.606)       (0.051)      
  [0.188]       [0.038]      
DOS25i(t-1)  -1.240
*       -0.167**      
  (0.648)       (0.066)      
  [-0.281]       [-0.057]      
DOS-Dummyi(t-1)   0.151
**       0.021**     
   (0.071)       (0.010)     
   [0.021]       [0.007]     
SOSi(t-1) 0.074 -0.159 -0.118 -0.447 -0.036 -0.186 -0.170 0.015 -0.046
*** -0.038** -0.064 -0.031 -0.047** -0.043 
 (0.071) (0.162) (0.156) (0.408) (0.218) (0.174) (0.513) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.042) (0.022) (0.019) (0.040) 
         [-0.016] [-0.013]   [-0.017]  
LPSi(t-1) 0.021 -0.102 -0.063 -0.167 -0.145 -0.072 -0.354 0.020 -0.039
** -0.031* -0.033 -0.032 -0.035* -0.052 
 (0.071) (0.172) (0.165) (0.242) (0.295) (0.186) (0.542) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020) (0.042) 
         [-0.014] [-0.011]   [-0.013]  
FOWNSi(t-1) 0.187 0.045  -0.005 0.094 0.013 0.086 -0.008 0.007  0.014 0.023 -0.010 0.050 
 (0.366) (0.225)  (0.416) (0.323) (0.256) (0.563) (0.134) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.030) (0.026) (0.042) 
FOWNS-Dummyi(t-1)   0.113       0.012     
   (0.138)       (0.014)     
INDIRi(t-1) 0.594 -1.044
* -1.045* -2.240** -0.307 -1.114* -1.488 -0.054 -0.091 -0.094 -0.266*** 0.012 -0.144** 0.014 
 (0.606) (0.552) (0.552) (0.925) (0.723) (0.643) (1.212) (0.182) (0.058) (0.058) (0.097) (0.073) (0.070) (0.103) 
  [-0.152] [-0.158] [-0.435]  [-0.253]     [-0.099]  [-0.053]  
BODSIZE(t-1) 0.109 -0.407
*** -0.399*** -0.509** -0.317** -0.394*** -0.539* -0.007 -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.039* -0.032** -0.043*** -0.011 
 (0.112) (0.123) (0.123) (0.220) (0.156) (0.143) (0.278) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) 
  [-0.059] [-0.058] [-0.064] [-0.054] [-0.076] [-0.016]  [-0.012] [-0.012] [-0.015] [-0.011] [-0.016]  
Control variables               
EXPDUMi(t-1) / EXPINTi(t-1) 0.716
*** 2.744*** 2.745*** 2.578*** 2.880*** 2.448*** 3.762*** 0.799*** 1.079*** 1.079*** 1.007*** 1.137*** 1.023*** 1.226*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.085) (0.070) (0.059) (0.136) (0.050) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) 
  [1.813] [1.814] [1.645] [1.921] [1.791] [1.840]  [0.372] [0.372] [0.376] [0.374] [0.378] [0.358] 
FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.011 0.079
*** 0.080*** 0.152*** 0.057** 0.098*** 0.004 -0.002 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.022) (0.038) (0.029) (0.025) (0.056) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
  [0.021] [0.022] [0.037] [0.016] [0.023]   [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
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AGEit -0.011 -0.170
** -0.149** -0.173 -0.124 -0.148* -0.385** -0.003 -0.019** -0.015* -0.020* -0.019* -0.020** -0.019 
 (0.028) (0.075) (0.075) (0.108) (0.110) (0.084) (0.183) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) 
  [-0.032] [-0.025]   [-0.035] [-0.029]  [-0.007] [-0.005] [-0.007] [-0.006] [-0.007]  
PRODi(t-1) 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.134
** 0.051** -0.001 0.024 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.017** 0.006*** 0.001 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.063) (0.025) (0.014) (0.083) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
    [-0.028]       [-0.006] [0.002]   
CIRi(t-1) -0.009 -0.023 -0.025 0.070 -0.408
*** -0.022 -0.439 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 0.007 -0.050*** -0.009 -0.051** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.050) (0.064) (0.155) (0.048) (0.299) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.025) 
     [-0.084]       [-0.016]  [-0.015] 
LEVi(t-1) 0.082 0.304
* 0.302* 0.624** -0.159 0.411** -0.136 0.002 0.020 0.019 0.030 -0.007 0.025 0.002 
 (0.089) (0.159) (0.159) (0.250) (0.230) (0.177) (0.419) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019) (0.035) 
  [0.033] [0.033] [0.049]  [0.043]         
MBRi(t-1) -0.001 -0.024 -0.021 0.023 -0.069 -0.024 0.153 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.019 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.047) (0.034) (0.267) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) 
LIQTYi(t-1) 0.039 0.337
** 0.315** 0.471** 0.155 0.475*** -0.329 0.007 0.041*** 0.038** 0.049** 0.020 0.048*** 0.024 
 (0.069) (0.144) (0.143) (0.233) (0.196) (0.161) (0.382) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.031) 
  [0.070] [0.064] [0.080]  [0.084]   [0.014] [0.013] [0.018]  [0.018]  
COASTAL dummy 0.003 0.063 0.059 0.104 0.027 0.058 0.088 0.005 0.010* 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.059) (0.059) (0.105) (0.074) (0.067) (0.143) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) 
         [0.004]      
WESTERN dummy -0.011 -0.030 -0.030 -0.103 -0.009 -0.054 0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.012 -0.019 -0.010 -0.014 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.077) (0.077) (0.145) (0.094) (0.088) (0.175) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Inflection point 27.47% N/A N/A 25.64% N/A 23.26% N/A 24.24% N/A N/A 25.56% N/A 23.45% N/A 
Observations 6315 6315 6315 2281 3941 4275 2040 6315 6315 6315 2281 3941 4275 2040 
Proportion > 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37.99% 37.99% 42.04% 35.70% 42.74% 28.04% 
Log-likelihood N/A -1732.07 -1732.87 -650.08 -1025.60 -1392.87 -280.44 N/A -226.08 -1732.87 26.60 461.2 1153.05 1654.23 
Wald  χ2 (P value) N/A 3081.27 3082.52 1108.77 1879.83 2013.49 806.80 N/A 8452.33 3082.52 3891.71 4577.62 5888.92 2576.07 
 N/A (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) N/A (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sagan test  (p values) 59.30(0.173)        40.95(0.429)       
AR1 (p values) -9.55(0.000)       -5.73(0.000)       
AR2 (p values) 0.71(0.477)       0.77(0.442)       
               
 
Notes: In columns 1 to 7, the dependent variable (EXPDUM) is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm exports, and 0 otherwise. In columns 8 to 14, the dependent variable 
(EXPINT) is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not export, and takes the value of the actual exports to total sales ratio, otherwise. Estimates in columns 1 and 8 are 
obtained using a system GMM estimator; those in columns 2 and 9, using a piecewise specification; those in columns 3 to 7, using a random-effects probit estimator; and those in columns 10 to 
14, using a random-effects tobit estimator. In the random-effects probit and tobit models, the Wald statistic is aimed at testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are jointly equal 
to zero. For the system GMM regressions reported in columns 1 and 8, AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side 
variables except firm age as potentially endogenous variables: levels of these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these 
same variables lagged once are used as additional instruments in the level equations. In columns 4/5 and 11/12, a firm is defined as state-owned if the state is identified as its ultimate owner. In 
columns 2-7 and 9-14, marginal effects are in square brackets for those coefficients that are statistically significant. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance levels 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Chapter 4 
Managerial ownership, investment, and liquidity constraints: 
Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The link between finance and investment represents a fundamental aspect of corporate 
finance and has long been a topic of intense interest and debate among academics and 
researchers. In this linkage, agency and asymmetric information problems and the 
mechanisms to mitigate them play a vital role.
39
 In a world of perfect capital markets, a 
firm‟s investment decisions are completely independent of its financial conditions (i.e. 
internal and external funds are perfect substitutes), but solely dependent on investment 
opportunities (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, in reality, the prevalence of a 
variety of market frictions affects corporate investment decisions. It is argued that 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders have a direct effect on investment 
decisions (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006).  
Additionally, firms‟ investment decisions are influenced by financial constraints 
due to capital market imperfections, which make external finance more expensive than 
internal finance (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Myers and Majluf 
1984).
 
 Recent events such as the credit crunch reinforce the fact that financial 
constraints arising from these market imperfections can be a severe deterrent to a firm‟s 
ability to undertake value-enhancing investment projects (Campello et al., 2010). Like 
Fazzari et al. (1988) and the vast literature that followed their study, in this paper, we 
consider the firm‟s investment sensitivity to cash flow as an indicator of the financial 
constraints the firm faces. A high sensitivity is therefore seen as an indicator of under-
                                                        
39 Efficient resource allocation has implications not only for the firm but for the economy as a whole. At 
the microeconomic level, investment/capital expenditures affect a firm‟s production decisions, strategic 
plans, and performance (Bromiley, 1986; Nicholson, 1992; McConnell and Muscarella, 1985). At the 
macroeconomic level, firms‟ investment/capital expenditures have a significant effect on economic 
growth, and propagation of business cycles (Dornbusch, and Fischer, 1987; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; 
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997).  
 
 
71 
 
 
investment40.   
Our study is related to the literature that studies the effect of managerial 
incentives on investment as well as to the literature that focus on the relationship 
between firms‟ managerial ownership and financial constraints on investment. 41 
Specially, these two strands of literature suggest that insider ownership not only affects 
investment decisions directly but also indirectly by influencing the degree of financial 
constraints faced by the firms.
 
Two theoretical perspectives namely the agency and 
asymmetric information theories are primarily used to explain the role of managerial 
ownership on investment decisions.   
Despite a large body of theoretical literature, even in the context of developed 
countries, relatively few studies have empirically examined the effects of managerial 
ownership on investment decisions, obtaining mixed findings. For example, Aggarwal 
and Samwick (2006) and Kang et al. (2006) have focused on the direct relationship 
between managerial ownership and investment, while Oliver and Rudebusch (1992), 
Hadlock (1998), and Goergen and Renneboog (2001) have focused on the indirect 
effects of managerial ownership on investment, through the financial constraints 
channel: to this end, they look at the link between managerial ownership and 
investment-cash flow sensitivities.  
In this study, we use a large panel of Chinese listed companies to examine both 
the direct and indirect effects of managerial ownership on corporate investment 
decisions. In China, given the  importance of efficient firm-level capital allocation 
decisions necessary to  foster on-going economic growth, the recent literature has paid  
great attention to corporate investment decision making and, in particular, to the 
relationship between firms‟ investment and financial constraints. In the early period of 
corporatization and partial privatization of former Chinese SOE‟s, the government and 
its agents were predominant shareholders of most corporations, and managers‟ 
ownership stakes in firms were very low.  Therefore, the main focus of previous studies 
has been on investigating whether state ownership and control have any effect on the 
                                                        
40 While most recent empirical studies interpret excess investment-cash flow sensitivities as an indicator 
of financial constraints, some argue that these sensitivities reflect free cash flow problems, which lead to 
over-investment for empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986; 1993). 
41 See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976); Leland and Pyle, (1977); Gertler and Hubbard (1988); 
Hubbard (1988); Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Oliner and Rudebusch (1992); Hadlock (1998); Aggarwal 
and Samwick (2006). 
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financial constraints and investment of firms.  For instance, focusing on a large number 
of non-listed firms, Poncet et al. (2010) and Guariglia, et al. (2011) find that investment 
by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is independent of internally generated funds, while 
the investment–cash flow sensitivity is positive and statistically significant for private 
firms. By contrast, research focusing on Chinese-listed firms has shown an opposite 
picture. Specifically, Lin and Bo (2012), Firth et al. (2012), and Tsai et al., (2014) 
provide evidence consistent with the notion that state-ownership does not necessarily 
reduce firms‟ financial constraints via soft budget constraints or easy access to finance. 
Firth et al. (2012) and Tsai et al., (2014) also demonstrate that state controlled firms 
face a higher degree of financing constraints than privately controlled firms. Firth et al. 
(2012) further show that the latter firms use more external finance than the former. 
Taken as a whole, a key implication of this evidence is that the financial constraint 
faced by state- and privately-controlled firms move in the opposite directions, with 
financial constraint becoming less important for the latter.   
At the same time, another stand of recent literature which examine managerial 
incentives in Chinese firms suggests that the managerial incentive system has improved 
in privately controlled firms, whilst state ownership and control typically weaken its 
effectiveness (Kato and Long (2006 a,b,c).  More specially, Conyon and He (2011) 
show an increase in the use of equity based incentives for managers in those listed 
companies that exhibit a lower level of government control.  
Combining these two sets of papers, we believe that the fact that investment by 
state-controlled listed firms faces more financing constraints than privately controlled 
firms may be therefore a symptom of a more serious agency problem, or in other words, 
of the absence of good corporate governance practices (i.e. poor incentive for managers) 
in these firms compared to their private counterparts. For example, recent empirical 
studies show that firms with concentrated state ownership exhibit high levels of 
information asymmetries (Gul et al., 2010). Furthermore, Chen et al. (2011) find 
evidence that government intervention in SOEs through either majority state ownership 
or the appointment of connected managers distorts investment behavior, making it 
deviate from value-maximizing levels.  By contrast, recent research provide evidence 
consistent with the notion that managerial ownership not only help to alleviate agency 
problem and improve corporate efficiency, investment in R&D, and performance of 
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firms (Lin et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012), but also acts as a kind of 
organizational collateral which helps firms to obtain bank financing (Firth et al., 2009). 
There could therefore be a link between the increased managerial ownership they 
witnessed and the reduced financial constraints faced by the privately controlled firms. 
More specially, growing management ownership stakes in Chinese listed firms could be 
a mechanism which reduces financial constraints and enhances investment efficiency. 
Thus, different degrees of managerial ownership might explain the differences in the 
magnitude of the financial constraints faced by Chinese private and state-controlled 
listed firms that prior literature has identified (Firth et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2014). Yet 
to the best of our knowledge, nobody has focused on the effects (direct or indirect) of 
managerial ownership on the investment of Chinese companies. This paper fills this gap 
in the literature.  
Our study therefore proposes to test the hypothesis that managerial ownership of 
Chinese listed companies not only reduces the managerial incentive problems in firms 
by aligning the incentives of managers with those of outside shareholders, but also helps 
to reduce information problems in an environment characterized by a high level of 
information asymmetries (Morck et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009; Gul et al., 2010).  
Using a large panel of Chinese-listed firms over the period 2003-2010, we find 
that investment decisions are systematically related to managerial ownership in two 
ways. Firstly, managerial ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate 
investment decisions, by aligning managers‟ incentives with the interests of 
shareholders. Secondly, we document that, by acting as a form of collateral to lenders, 
managerial ownership helps to reduce the degree of financial constraints faced by firms 
(which we measure by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow). These results are 
consistent with theoretical predictions according to which by lowering agency and 
information costs, insider ownership stakes in the firm reduce the cost of external 
finance, relax liquidity constraints, and promote optimal investment decisions. From a 
policy perspective, our findings suggest that the Chinese government‟s recent policies 
aimed at reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial ownership in  
listed firms have helped to reduce agency and asymmetric information problems in 
capital markets, thereby enabling firms to enhance investment efficiency. Our study 
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recommends therefore that greater attention should be paid to compensation contracts of 
management teams. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous 
literature on the link between market imperfections, financial constraints, investment 
decisions, and managerial ownership of corporations. Section 4.3 presents our 
hypotheses. The model specifications and estimation methodology are described in 
Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we describe our data and provide basic descriptive statistics. 
Section 4.5 discusses the empirical results of our investigation. Finally, in Section 4.6 
we offer concluding remarks and discuss policy implications for this chapter. 
 
4.2. Review of the literature  
4.2.1. Capital market imperfections and investment decisions  
In this section we provide a brief review of standard literature on financial constraints 
and investment decisions. The theoretical works of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984) provide the central analytical framework for the 
underinvestment problems stemming from liquidity constraints. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that contracting and managerial incentive problems raise the cost of 
obtaining external finance. The separation of ownership and control and asymmetric 
information between managers and outside investors provide incentives to the firm‟s 
managers to pursue their own interests at the expense of the firm‟s shareholders and 
bondholders, resulting in expropriation of investors‟ funds and misallocation of 
corporate resources. Therefore, considering that their interests may be endangered, 
outside shareholders attempt to control managers‟ behavior by using various 
governance mechanisms such as board of directors, audit committees, budget 
restrictions, and compensation systems designed to align the interest of managers with 
those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These 
actions result in increased costs for monitoring management, but also from the loss of 
profit opportunities due to reduced management flexibility (e.g. budget restrictions may 
prevent managers from responding to new demand for the products.). Therefore, outside 
investors require a higher return to compensate them for these monitoring costs and the 
potential moral hazard associated with managers‟ control over the allocation of 
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resources to investment. This leads to a cost premium on the use of outside equity 
finance.  
Furthermore, in an environment with weak legal investor protection, there is 
high potential for expropriation by insiders of outside investors (both shareholders and 
creditors). Investors are therefore less willing to invest in these firms because they face 
the risk that the returns on their investment and capital will never materialize (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Consequently, such firms become financially more constrained, due to the 
high premium on external finance imposed on them, or even the lack of access to 
external finance (Lin et al., 2011).  
Due to the conflict of interest between debtholders and equity holders, 
debtholders also face a moral hazard problem, in the sense that management may act on 
behalf of shareholders to erode the value of existing debt by undertaking excessively 
risky projects. In the face of this risk, creditors usually demand covenants that restrict 
management behavior in various ways (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 
1979).  
Whilst Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize management/agency cost without 
consideration of informational asymmetries, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors raises the cost of 
equity financing. That is, if managers are better informed than investors about a firm‟s 
prospects (i.e. the value of the firm‟s assets), then, due to adverse selection, the firm‟s 
risky securities (equities) will sometimes be underpriced, thereby raising the cost of 
external finance.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) further extend the rationale for 
underinvestment by showing how information asymmetries can cause credit rationing in 
the loan markets. Due to the fact that risk is unobservable, bondholders do not know, 
ex-ante, the quality/riskiness of the investments that managers and shareholders will 
choose. Thus they infer adverse selection and demand a higher risk premium, leading to 
the firm being faced with credit rationing. This credit rationing may force the firm to 
forego investment projects with positive net present value-NPV).  
In sum, theories suggest that in the presence of asymmetric information and 
agency problems, managers who find it more difficult to attract external finance due to 
either a high risk premium or credit rationing, need to finance investment with internal 
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funds. Thus, for firms facing agency and/or information problems, holding constant 
investment opportunities, internally generated resources will be an important 
determinant of investment (Hubbard, 1998).  
In their seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) (hereafter FHP) provide empirical 
tests for the impact of capital market imperfections on investment by linking the firm‟s 
internal resources to its investment. Focusing on a panel of 421 US manufacturing 
firms, they estimate investment equations as a function of Tobin‟s q and cash flow (a 
proxy for the firm‟s internal financial resources). FHP (1988) also use the level of 
dividend payout ratio to group their sample into financially constrained firms and 
unconstrained firms. The argument is that firms that nearly exhaust all their low-cost 
internal funds (i.e. the firms in the “low dividend payout” group) are expected to exhibit 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivities compared with firms that pay high dividends. 
In other words, low dividend payout firms are expected to be more financially 
constrained than their high-dividend payout counterparts. In line with their expectations, 
FHP (1988) find a positive relationship between investment and cash flow, which is 
higher for firms in the low-income payout category.  FHP (1988) conclude that the 
investment–cash-flow sensitivity should be interpreted as evidence for the existence of 
information-driven capital market imperfections. The rationale behind this interpretation 
is that capital market imperfections make internal finance cheaper than external finance 
and consequently, one would expect cash flow to play a stronger role on the investment 
of firms which are more likely to face financial constraints. Following FHP‟s (1988) 
paper, a vast number of empirical studies provide evidence for the existence of financial 
constraints in different country settings. 
However, FHP‟s (1988) work was challenged. Specially, Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) re-examine the subset of low-dividend firms used by FHP (1988) and criticize 
the usefulness of the sensitivities of investment to cash flow as measures of financing 
constraints. In particular, these authors reclassify the firms into several categories, 
ranging from least to most financially constrained, based on managers‟ statements on 
liquidity and other criteria, and show that it is the least constrained firms which exhibit 
the highest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. They therefore argue that firms 
having higher investment–cash flow sensitivities cannot be considered as being more 
financially constrained. However, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) show that outliers 
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may be driving Kaplan and Zingales‟ (1997) results. In particular, they show that when 
negative cash flow observations are excluded, more constrained firms exhibit higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity than less constrained firms.  
As a further development in this literature, subsequent studies including Hoshi et 
al. (1991), Hadlock and Jemes (2002), Love (2003) and McLean et al. (2012) among 
others, explore factors that reduce or intensify the investment sensitivity to cash flow.  
Using a panel of Japanese manufacturing firms, Hoshi et al. (1991) show that firms 
affiliated with business groups (keiretsu) in Japan have lower sensitivities of investment 
to liquidity measures than independent firms. They conclude that these firms face less 
financial constraints because of their close relationship with the main banks inside the 
keiretsu, which contribute to reducing moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
arising from asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Similarly, 
focusing on a panel of US firms, Hadlock and Jemes (2002) also provide empirical 
evidence supporting the notion that close relationship with banks help alleviate 
asymmetric information problem faced by firms.
 
 
Moving their focus beyond firm level factors, other authors investigate how 
country-level factors may affect the financial constraints faced by firms. For instance, 
Love (2003) reports that the level of financial development in countries reduces 
financing constraints, and thereby promotes efficient allocation of investment and 
fosters growth. McLean et al. (2012) show that strengthening investor protection 
weakens investment-cash flow sensitivities across countries, suggesting that financial 
constraints are less binding in countries with stronger investor protection.  
4.2.2. Financial constraints and investment decisions in China 
In this section, we focus on the current state of the research on financing constraints 
faced by Chinese firms. A limited number of studies have focused on the issue. Among 
these, Chow and Fung (1998, 2000) use a panel of 5825 manufacturing firms operating 
in Shanghai over the period 1989-1992 to examine the relationship between investment 
and cash flow. Based on the estimates of  a sales accelerator model of investment, the 
authors conclude that  the investment of these firms is constrained  by the availability of 
internal funds (i.e. cash flow), and that  the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 
higher for private firms, which do not have  access to funding from state-owned banks 
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or foreign sources. The authors further find that small firms have lower sensitivities of 
investment to cash flow than large firms. They attribute this observed difference to the 
fact that small firms are dominated by high growth enterprises, which actively use 
working capital to smooth their fixed investment.  
Héricourt and Poncet (2009) use survey data on 1,300 domestic firms in 18 
Chinese cities over the period 2000 to 2002 to examine the relationship between the 
debt-to-asset ratio and interest coverage on the one hand, and investment, on the other, 
in a dynamic framework. They find that while state-owned firms do not face financial 
constraints, domestic private firms‟ capital expenditure decisions are significantly 
affected by financial variables. This suggests that due to the lending bias against them, 
private firms are significantly credit constrained. Héricourt and Poncet (2009) also show 
that foreign direct inflows (FDI) in China help to moderately reduce the finance 
constraints faced by private domestic firms.  
Using a panel of more than 20,000 Chinese firms that are grouped according to 
different types of ownership over the period 1998–2005, Poncet et al. (2010) find that 
investments by both SOEs and foreign invested firms are independent on cash flow, 
while the investment–cash flow sensitivity is positive and significant for private firms. 
Based on their findings that unlike SOEs and foreign-invested firms, private firms in 
China face severe financial constraints on investment, Poncet et al. (2010) argue that a 
„political-pecking order‟ in credit allocation affects investment efficiency in China.  
Ding et al. (2013) also find that private firms in China are the most financially 
constrained. They reach this conclusion based on a panel of 116,000 unlisted Chinese 
firms of different ownership types over the period 2000-2007. The authors also argue 
that good working capital management helps the private firms alleviate the financing 
constrains that they face. Specifically, private firms with high working capital display 
high investment in working capital to cash flow sensitivities, but relatively low 
sensitivities of fixed investment to cash flow.  
Using a large sample of 79,841 unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000-
2007, Guariglia et al. (2011) study the extent to which firms‟ assets growth is affected 
by financial constraints. To this end, they focus on the sensitivities of assets growth to 
cash flow, which they interpret as an indicator of the importance of financing 
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constraints. In line with previous studies  (Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; Poncet et al., 
2010), they also find that state-owned enterprises as well as collectives firms are not 
affected by financial constraints, because they have access to loans from state-owned 
banks. Yet, private firms exhibit higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow, 
meaning that they are financially constrained. The authors further find that although 
they display high sensitivities of asset growth to cash flow compared to other types of 
firms, these private firms typically exhibit the highest asset growth rates. They explain 
this apparently contradictory finding by noting that even though private firms have only 
limited access to external finance, they are able to achieve phenomenal high growth 
using internal funds generated from retained profits, which contribute to relax the 
financing constraints that they face.  
While early research on financial constraints has mainly focused on non-listed 
firms, more recent research that has looked at Chinese listed firms has found an 
opposite picture. Using a panel of 1325 Chinese-listed firms over the period 1999–2008, 
Lin and Bo (2012) find that state-ownership does not necessarily help in reducing firms‟ 
financial constraints on investment. They therefore conclude that China‟s 
corporatization movement has been successful in eliminating the soft budget constraints 
once enjoyed by former state-owned enterprises.  
Focusing on data from 650 Chinese-listed manufacturing firms during the period 
1999–2008, Firth et al. (2012) find that government-controlled firms have greater 
investment–cash flow sensitivities than privately-controlled listed companies, especially 
when cash flow is negative. However, this finding holds only among firms that have 
few profitable investment opportunities. Furthermore, in their univariate analysis, they 
demonstrate that privately-controlled firms use more external finance than state-
controlled firms, and that for both firms, debt is a more common source of financing 
than equity.  
In a similar vein, using a panel of 1271 listed firms over the period of 1996–
2007, Chan et al. (2012) provide evidence on the effects of China‟s financial 
development on the sensitivities of firms‟ investment to their cash holdings. The authors 
show that large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face financial constraints as a result of 
the recent reforms in the banking system. This suggests that the financial reforms have 
gradually eliminated the preferential treatments given to large SOEs, subjecting these 
 
 
80 
 
 
firms‟ investment decisions to stricter market-based discipline. Yet, they do not find 
evidence that the financial reform has been successful in relaxing financing constraint 
experienced by small firms. 
Finally, by analyzing data for 422 Chinese listed family firms over the period 
2000 to 2007, Xu et al. (2013) investigate the effects of family firms‟ political 
connectedness on the financial constraints faced by these firms. They demonstrate that 
consistent with previous literature, Chinese listed family firms face difficulties in 
financing their investment. Using measures of financial constraints such as firm size and 
firm age
42
, they find that larger and older family firms have lower investment-cash flow. 
By contrast, they find that governance factors such as the proportion of independent 
directors in the board and the percentage of shares held by the immediate largest 
shareholder do not affect investment-cash flow sensitivities. The idea is that if firms 
face free cash flow problems (i.e. overinvestment in wasteful projects), then the above 
governance mechanisms should help to constraint managers‟ tendency to overinvest, 
and thus reduce investment-cash flow sensitivities. They therefore conclude that 
Chinese family firms/privately controlled firms face an underinvestment problem due to 
information asymmetries in capital markets, rather than overinvestment resulting from 
excessive free cash flow. Finally, the authors show that the political connectedness of 
family firms helps to mitigate the financial constraints, and contributes therefore to 
reducing the underinvestment problem.  
4.2.3. Managerial ownership, investment, and financial constraints 
In this section, we first focus on the literature that investigates the direct effects of 
managerial ownership on corporate investment decisions. We next analyze the literature 
that focuses on the indirect effects of managerial ownership on investment, by looking 
at its effects on the degree of financing constraints the firm faces, which we proxy by 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  
4.2.3.1. Direct effect of managerial ownership on investment 
Using the agency theory framework, we first look at how managerial ownership directly 
affects corporate investment decisions. In a market without agency conflicts, it is 
                                                        
42 Large and older firms are likely to face fewer information asymmetries, and thus lower financial 
constraints. 
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generally expected that managers make investment decisions that maximize the wealth 
of shareholders. In practice, however, self-interested managers‟ actions may lead to sub-
optimal investment decisions. The separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations and the resultant conflict of interests between managers and shareholders 
give managers incentives to shirk or to divert corporate resources to their own benefits 
at the expenses of investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976). While the former may lead to 
underinvestment problem, the latter takes the form of excessive consumption of 
perquisites and empire building (i.e., overinvestment).  
Focusing further on the shirking argument, Hicks (1935) suggests that the best 
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life, and poorly governed managers are more likely to 
prefer to avoid the difficult decisions and costly efforts associated with starting new line 
of business. Consistent with this argument, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that 
with the introduction of antitakeover laws in the US, which reduced the fear of hostile 
takeovers
43
, workers‟ wages has risen whereas overall productivity and profitability has 
declined. Therefore, they conclude that active empire building may not be the norm and 
that managers may instead prefer to enjoy a quiet life. Based on these insights, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) formally develop a model in which underinvestment is a 
result of shirking or managerial laziness. The authors show if managers incur private 
costs from the new investment (i.e. costly efforts in the form of overseeing 
responsibilities for that investment), then they will be willing to forego some positive 
net present value projects, resulting in an underinvestment problem.
44
 Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2006) predict therefore that investment should increase in managerial 
incentives (such as share ownership and stock options). 
In contrast, building on Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) argument for managers‟ 
consumption of excessive perks, Jensen (1986, 1993) develops the free cash flow 
hypothesis, according to which managers in large corporations have the discretionary 
power and the incentive to invest excess free-cash flow in negative net present value 
                                                        
43 This means that an important disciplining device typically used to constraint managers‟ opportunistic 
behavior has become less effective. The new law enabled in fact managers to enjoy a quiet life by 
increasing wages of employees and maintaining peace with their workers at the expenses of shareholders 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). 
44 Other investment models suggest that managers’ carrier concerns and reputational concerns can 
lead to under-investment (Holmstrom and Costa, 1986; Narayanan, 1985; Stein, 1989). See Stein, (2003) 
for a comprehensive survey of this literature. 
 
 
82 
 
 
projects that increase their personal utility at the expense of shareholders. Stulz (1990), 
Harris and Raviv (1990), Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1995) and Zwiebel (1996) all 
develop formal theoretical models of free cash flow problem, in which entrenched 
managers attempt to expropriate corporate assets for their own benefits.45  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs (including those discussed 
above) arising from agency conflicts can be mitigated by aligning more closely the 
incentives of the management with those of the shareholders. Therefore, they suggest 
managerial ownership as an important governance mechanism to reduce agency 
problems. When the equity stakes of managers increase, they internalize, at least 
partially, the costs and benefits of the decisions they make. For example, if they work 
hard and undertake new investments which require costly efforts, they can also share 
the benefit like other shareholders. Similarly, if they favor bad or negative NPV 
projects, they will also suffer a fall in their own wealth. While a range of alternative 
governance mechanisms such as monitoring by boards and large shareholders, debt, 
dividends, and hostile takeovers have been devised to mitigate agency problem, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) suggest that these alternative mechanisms are not effective in 
constraining managerial behavior. By contrast, Denis et al. (1997) argue that 
management ownership should be the primary mechanism to align the incentives of 
managers with that of owners and, hence, influence managerial behavior. It is therefore 
argued that managerial ownership encourages managers to make optimal investment 
decisions that maximize shareholders wealth. 
Bizjak et al. (1993) consider some of the implications of the above discussed 
under-investment theoretical framework for the design of optimal management 
compensation schemes. The authors suggest that for firms that are characterized by 
high/persistent informational asymmetries (about growth potential) between managers 
and shareholders, linking management compensation contracts to the long-term returns 
of the company‟s stocks provides incentive to insiders to make optimal investment 
decisions. Durnev and Kim (2005) report that in countries where legal investor 
protection are weak, incentive alignment effect of insider ownership is even stronger 
                                                        
45 
However, as discussed in Stein et al. (2003, p.119) these models do not imply that empire-building 
tendencies necessarily lead to an empirical prediction of overinvestment on average; they instead show 
that level of debt is endogenously determined, which attempts to balance ex-post over- and under-
investment distortions. 
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and helps to improve the firm‟s governance. In general, underinvestment models predict 
a positive relationship between managerial ownership and investment. By contrast, 
Jensen (1986; 1993) suggests that managerial ownership is an important mechanism 
that can mitigate free cash flow problem and thus, predicts a negative relationship 
between increasing managerial ownership and investment.
46
 Yet, in both cases 
managerial ownership enhances the investment inefficiency. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that investment is one of the most 
important channels through which ownership structure impacts on firm value. Yet, only 
a few studies have examined directly the effect of managerial ownership on investment. 
Among these, Cho (1998) uses cross-sectional data from a sample of 326 firms in 
Fortune 500 to examine the relation between inside ownership, investment,  and firm 
performance with a view to identify the channel by which inside shareholdings affects 
firm performance. His estimates show that managerial ownership does not affect 
investment decisions. Similarly, focusing on 802 UK industrial companies, Davies et al. 
(2005) do not find any significant association between managerial ownership and 
investment.  
By contrast, focusing on a large sample of US firms over the period of 1993 and 
2001, Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) provide evidence that managerial incentives 
(measured by stock and stock options) positively affect investment. In a similar vein, by 
using a sample of 9,379 firm year observations for 2261 US firms, Kang et al. (2006) 
show that long-term corporate investment is positively associated with the weight 
placed on CEOs‟ equity based compensation relative to total compensation. The authors 
conclude that managerial stock-based incentives are a significant determinant of 
corporate investment. Since managerial ownership is a recent phenomenon in the 
Chinese context, to the best of our knowledge, there is no systemic research that has 
directly examined the impact of managerial ownership on corporate investment in 
China. One of our objectives in this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. See 
Appendix A4.1 for summary of the literature. 
                                                        
46 The empirical studies which test the free cash flow hypothesis mainly focus on mergers and 
acquisition activities of the firms, which are beyond the focus of this paper. 
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4.2.3.1. Indirect effect of managerial ownership on investment 
We next consider how managerial ownership indirectly impacts investment decisions, 
by influencing the degree of financing constraints firms face. As we discussed earlier, in 
the presence of frictions such as agency and asymmetric information problems, or costly 
enforcement of contracts, there is a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally 
and the opportunity cost of internal funds, reflecting the costs of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Suppliers of finance (such as banks) lack in fact information about the 
quality of a firm‟s investment projects and the behavior of its management. This makes 
them require a premium on the financing they provide. In the worst case, they may 
refuse to provide any financing to those firms with significant agency and information 
problems (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).  
In this situation, two theoretical considerations suggest that managerial 
ownership can help to alleviate information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors. These are the bonding and signaling arguments for managerial ownership. 
First, the bonding argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when 
manager‟s ownership stakes in a firm increases, managers internalize large part of the 
costs of their decisions. Hence, increasing managerial ownership in the firm would 
suggest that managers commit to reduce waste, as well as the expropriation of firm 
resources (i.e. agency costs). Managerial shareholdings in the company therefore serves 
as a credible guarantee to obtain financing for their investment at lower cost from the 
suppliers of finance. 
Second, Leland and Pyle, (1977) consider the asymmetric information between 
managers and outside investors. They suggest that when insiders have information 
about the value of a firm‟s future investment opportunities which the outside investors 
do not have, the insiders‟ willingness to invest in their firms cam signal the quality of 
the firm‟s future investment projects. This enable outside investors to differentiate 
between profitable and unprofitable firms. As such, Leland and Pyle (1977) show that 
entrepreneurs/insiders‟ net worth/equity stakes affects firm value by reducing financing 
constraints (by reducing costs of external capital). While Leland and Pyle, (1977) relate 
this signaling effects of insider ownership ultimately to firm value, other authors exploit 
this idea and relate entrepreneurs/insiders‟ net worth/equity stakes to financial 
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constraints (Gertler (1988) and Gertler and Hubbard (1988).
 47
  
Using a sample of 500 S&P firms, Anderson et al. (2006) empirically test how 
creditors view insider‟s ownership stakes in the firms that seek bank financing for their 
investment. They find that creditors pay particular attention to managerial shareholdings 
in their lending decisions. Since creditors perceive that management‟s shareholdings 
influence their effort and opportunistic behavior by reducing agency conflicts, thus 
reducing credit risk, they require a lower rate of return (interest) from firms with higher 
managerial ownership.  
Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) provide the first direct empirical test on the impact 
of managerial ownership on investment-cash flow sensitivities for US firms.  The 
authors estimate an accelerator model combined with Q, where they include an 
interaction term between cash flow and insiders‟ ownership. They find no evidence to 
support the notion that managerial ownership can reduce financial constraints. 
Similarly, using an unbalanced panel of 697 firm-year observations for 132 firms listed 
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the period 1993-1998, Degryse and de Jong 
(2006) find an insignificant effect of managerial shareholding on investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. By contrast, utilizing an Euler equation model for a panel of 240 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1987 to 1993, Goergen 
and Renneboog‟s (2001) provide some evidence that insider ownership helps reduce the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  
As we have discussed above, most models of financial structure and investment 
suggest that information problems and financing constraints lead to underinvestment 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Whited, 1992;). Furthermore, most empirical 
studies interpret excess investment cash flow sensitivity as an evidence of financial 
constraints firm faces.  
By contrast, Jensen (1986, 1993) suggests that manager‟ preferences for empire-
building will lead managers to spend essentially all available funds on investment 
                                                        
47 These theoretical works are based on the fundamental insight from the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) 
and Spence (1973), and on the subsequent contributions of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) and Riley 
(1975), who show that equilibrium in markets with asymmetric information and signalling may have 
quite different properties from equilibrium either with no information transfer, or with direct and costless 
information transfer. 
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projects. Thus, according to their free cash flow hypothesis, positive and significant 
sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be seen as a symptom of overinvestment 
rather than of underinvestment. Their theory predicts again a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and investment-cash flow sensitivities. Using a large 
sample of the UK listed firms, Pawlina and Rennebook (2007) provide empirical 
support for this argument. See Appendix A4.2 for summary of the literature. 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the impact of managerial 
ownership on the financial constraints faced by Chinese firms. In this paper, we 
therefore propose to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
4.3.1. Effects of managerial ownership on investment. 
4.3.1.1. Direct effects 
The analysis of the impact of managerial ownership on investment is particularly 
relevant as China is characterized by insufficient but increasing managerial incentives 
(Chang and Wong, 2004; Xu et al., 2005; Kato Lang, 2006a,b,c; 2011), as well as by 
inefficient investment. A large literature argues in fact that China suffers from 
overinvestment problems (see Ding et al., 2014a, for a survey). This literature also point 
out that this problem affects primarily SOEs, and is caused by the soft budget 
constraints from which these firms benefit. Yet, more recent literature argues that recent 
reforms of corporate ownership and of the banking system have contributed to reducing 
the prevalence of soft budget constraints, and hence overinvestment. In particular, the 
abolition of the preferential treatment for SOEs, the enhancement of prudent lending, 
and the close monitoring of borrowers which have followed from these reforms (Firth et 
al., 2009; Jia, 2009; Chan et al., 2012; Lin and Bo, 2012; Tsai et al, 2014) have 
contributed to making investment in China more efficient. In line with this argument, 
Ding et al. (2014a) show that overinvestment in China has declined in recent years.  
Following a different perspective, other authors argue that investment 
inefficiency in China stems from under-investment. Qian (1996), Lin et al., (1998), and 
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Kato and Long, (2006c) point out that the lack of managerial autonomy and weak 
managerial incentives in SOEs lead to shirking (managerial moral hazard), which in 
turn leads to an underinvestment problem (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2006). Underinvestment may also stem from financing constraints, which 
are particularly relevant in the Chinese context (Ding et al., 2014b). Guariglia and Yang 
(2014) argue that both overinvestment and underinvestment coexist in the Chinese 
setting. 
Previous empirical studies based on Chinese listed firms provide evidence 
suggesting that while government control and interference on management‟s decisions 
negatively affects corporate performance, managerial ownership and decision autonomy 
improve firms‟ performance (Chang and Wong, 2004; Fan et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2009; 
Liu et al., 2012). In a similar vein, Lin et al. (2011) use World Bank survey of 1088 
private manufacturing firms over the period 2000–2002 to investigate firms‟ R&D 
investment. They find that those firms whose CEOs having significant shareholding in 
their firms, and firms who give performance-based compensations to their CEOs are 
more likely to not only to undertake R&D investment, but also to allocate more 
resources to R&D activities. They conclude that well-designed CEO incentive schemes 
are important to improve investment efficiency especially in corporate R&D. If the 
R&D investment of a firm is increasing in managerial incentives, clearly, this indicates 
that the firm is facing underinvestment problem due to insufficient incentives for 
managers (Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006). We believe that these arguments can be 
extended to corporate fixed investment. Yet, to the best of our knowledge no study has 
examined the direct impact of managerial ownership on investment in China. We 
hypothesize therefore that: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
investment. 
4.3.1.2. Indirect effects 
Early research suggests that because of the dominant state ownership of banks, Chinese 
banks are mainly involved in policy lending, do not use commercial criteria to decide 
which companies to lend to, and are biased against lending to the private sector (Cull 
and Xu, 2003, Allen et al., 2005). Yet, recent studies such as Cull and Xu (2005), Firth 
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et al. (2009) and Tsai et al. (2014) provide evidence consistent with the view that as a 
result of a series of financial reforms and of the improvement in the governance of the 
Chinese financial sector (such as participation of foreign ownership in the state owned 
banks and foreign participation in the management of Chinese banks), banks now use 
more and more commercial judgment and prudence in their lending decisions. Tsai et al. 
(2014) further show that the banking system reform helped not only to alleviate 
politically-oriented investment distortions (i.e. overinvestment) in SOEs, but also to 
alleviate under-investment problems in non-state-controlled listed firms because of 
increased availability of bank loans to private sector. 
Firth et al. (2009) further suggest that due to the high levels of information 
asymmetries in China, Chinese banks now pay more attention to the quality of corporate 
governance of their potential borrowers. They find evidence that top managers‟ equity 
ownership is positively associated with access to and size of bank loans. This is 
consistent with the prediction that incentive contracts and equity ownership not only 
help to alleviate moral hazard problems and reduce agency costs, but also serves as 
credible collateral to lenders and signal the quality of the firm in the capital markets  
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
Combining these observations suggests that growing managerial shareholdings 
in Chinese firms may help to alleviate the financing constraints they face. Assuming 
that financing constraints can be proxied by investment-cash flow sensitivities (Fazzari 
et al., 1988), we pose the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. 
4.3.2. Taking the 2005-2006 split share structure reform into account 
We next analyse the effects of the 2005-2006 split share structure reform following 
which non-tradable shares were floated through the open markets.  That is, we test the 
extent to which the impact of managerial ownership on investment and investment and 
investment–cash flow sensitivities differs between the pre-reform and post-reform 
period. Taking the reform into account is important as from 2006 onwards, restrictions 
on managerial stock ownership were removed. Consequently, as evidenced by our data, 
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average managerial ownership rose from 1.1% in 2004 to 8.2% in 2010. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H3: The effects of managerial ownership on investment and investment-cash 
flow sensitivities are stronger in the post- reform period. 
4.3.3. Differentiating firms into state- and privately-controlled 
We next investigate the extent to which the impact of managerial ownership on 
investment and on the investment-cash flow sensitivities differs across state- and 
privately-controlled firms. This exercise is motivated considering that top executives in 
the state sector are often appointed by party and government agencies and are typically 
party secretaries, government officials or veteran socialist managers (Walder, 2011). 
Additionally, appointments to top managerial posts in these companies are generally 
controlled by the state, and managerial autonomy is limited (Walder, 2011). In contrast, 
top executives in the privately-controlled sector may have begun their careers in the 
state sector, but are no longer appointed by the state. The managers of these firms also 
have greater autonomy from state agencies than their counterparts in state-controlled 
companies. Furthermore, their executives enjoy much higher levels of compensation 
and are more likely to hold significant ownership stakes (Walder, 2011).
 48
  
  Recent research on managerial incentives in Chinese listed firms reports 
evidence that managerial incentives such as the sensitivities of top management 
compensation and turnover to firm performance and promotion tournaments work as 
effective governance mechanisms to provide incentives to managers, whilst the 
effectiveness of these incentive devices are weakened by state ownership and control 
(Conyon and He, 2011 and 2012; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c and 2011).
 
 Additionally, 
Chen et al. (2011) show that sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities is 
reduced by state ownership and the presence politically connected CEOs. This suggests 
that managers‟ equity ownership stakes in privately controlled firms are likely to 
provide them with the necessary incentives to make investment decisions which reflect 
growth opportunities. If these facts are correctly perceived by the modern banks in 
China, we would also expect managerial equity ownership stakes in privately controlled 
                                                        
48
 It should also be noted that managerial ownership in state-controlled firms is very low: According to 
our data, it is in fact equal to 0.2% for state-controlled firms, while it amounts to 6.0% for privately-
controlled firms. 
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firms to alleviate the financial constraints faced by these firms. We therefore pose 
following hypotheses. 
H4: The effects of managerial ownership on investment and investment-cash 
flow sensitivities are larger and more prevalent in privately-controlled firms 
compared to their state-controlled counterparts.  
4.3.4. Our contribution  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, advancing 
existing literature, we provide evidence on both the direct and indirect (through a 
reduction in financing constraints) effects of managerial ownership on corporate 
investment decisions. Prior literature has focused on one or the other effect, but never 
on both effects simultaneously. For example, Cho (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2006), and Kang et al. (2006) focus on the direct effect, while Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1992), Hadlock (1998), and Goergen and Renneboog (2001) look at the indirect effect 
only.  
Second, the previous studies that have examined the impact of managerial 
ownership on investment exclusively use data from Western countries such as the US 
and the UK
49
. We contribute to the literature on the links between managerial 
ownership and investment behavior focusing on a different economic scenario, in 
particular China. Previous studies based on Chinese data focus on the impact of 
government ownership and control on the investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
investment decisions (Chen et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012; Lin and Bo, 2012). Yet, no 
study has focused on the potential impact of increasing managerial ownership on 
financing constrains faced by firms. By filling this gap, our study makes an important 
contribution to the literature. Particularly, using a recent data set, our study identifies 
managerial ownership as a mechanism through which Chinese listed firms can alleviate 
agency and asymmetric information problems, and concludes therefore that managerial 
ownership is an important determinant of investment decisions even in a transition and 
emerging economy such as China.  
                                                        
49
 As discussed in Kang et al. (2006), although a large number of theoretical papers examine the impact of 
agency conflicts and equity based compensation on managers‟ investment behavior, only a limited 
number of papers examine this issue empirically.  
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Third, we contribute to the research on the split share structure reform in China. 
Most recently, Lin (2009) and Chen et al., (2012) have examined the effects of the large 
non-tradable shareholders‟ incentive alignment resulting from the reform. Lin (2009) 
finds that the reduced agency conflicts stemming from the reform have diminished 
tunneling in the form related party transactions. Chen et al., (2012) report that the 
reform resulted in lower cash holdings and higher market valuations of cash holding as 
a consequence of the reduced free cash flow problem of controlling shareholders and 
the reduced financial constants faced by the firm. We show that the increased 
managerial ownership which followed the reform is associated with reduced financial 
constraints and more efficient investment decisions. 
Finally, we differentiate for the first time, the impact of managerial ownership 
on financial constraints and investment decisions between privately- and state-
controlled firms. By doing so, we are able to provide additional evidence on the impact 
of government ownership both on the managerial incentive (corporate governance) and 
on the interaction between managerial ownership and investment decisions. 
 
4.4 Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
In this section, we outline our empirical specification and estimation methodology, 
namely the system GMM estimator. 
4.4.1. Baseline specifications 
In the literature, three types of investment models have been used to test the effects of 
financial constraints on investment, namely (1) reduced form investment models, such 
as for example, the Q-model of investment (FHP, 1988), or the accelerator model 
(Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992); (2) the Euler equation model (Whited 1992; Bond and 
Meghir 1994); (3) the error correction model (Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008).  
A major criticism of the Q-model is the measurement error which typically 
characterizes Q. If investment opportunities are measured with error, cash flow may in 
fact not represents liquidity effects, but may act as a proxy either for an accelerator 
effect or for the quality of investment opportunities not captured by Q (Whited, 1992; 
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Erickson and Whited, 2000). This problem is more pronounced in emerging markets, 
which are characterized by market inefficiency. In these markets, it is argued that Q 
cannot meaningfully reflect firms‟ investment opportunities. By contrast, Whited (1992) 
argues that the Euler equation methodology avoids problems associated with estimating 
reduced-form investment equations by controlling for expectations about future 
profitability. According to Bond and Meghir (1994), the Euler equation approach is 
based on the dynamic optimization „„Euler condition‟‟ for imperfectly competitive firms 
that accumulate productive capital stock with a quadratic adjustment cost technology. 
Bond et al., (2003, p.153) note that „„under the maintained structure, the model captures 
the influence of current expectations of future profitability on current investment 
decisions; and it can therefore be argued that current or lagged financial variables 
should not enter this specification merely as proxies for expected future profitability.‟‟ 
Furthermore, as discussed in Lin et al. (2011), the Euler equation not only allows to 
exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity among different firms to test for the role of 
financial factors, but it also helps to point out the specific impact of financial factors on 
the intertemporal allocation of investment.
50
 We use the Euler equation as our main 
estimating equation in this paper, as it enables us to isolate the precise role of financial 
constraints in the investment process, and to provide a sharp test of the effects of 
managerial ownership on liquidity constraints and investment decisions.  
This structural approach has been used in previous literature to study the effects 
of ownership on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2001; Lin et al., 2011; and Lin and Bo, 2012). We will follow an approach similar to 
theirs, focusing on managerial ownership. In particular, we consider an augmented 
version of Bond and Meghir‟s (1994) standard investment Euler equation, which 
includes managerial ownership, as well as the interaction between managerial 
ownership and cash flow. We therefore estimate the following baseline model to test 
our hypotheses. 
(Iit /K it-1) = β0 + β1(Iit-1/K it-2) + β2(Iit-1/K it-2)
2
  + β3 (CFit-1/K it-1) + β4 DOSit-1 +   
                 β5 (CF it-1/K it-1* DOS it-1)  +  β6 SALGRTHit-1 +   β7(D it-1/K it-1)
2  
+                       
                β8 (∆WC it-1/K it-1) + β9FIRSIZEit-1 + β10SEIDit-1 +  vi  +  vt   + vj   +  vtj + it            (4.1) 
                                                        
50 The Euler equation considers the intertemporal allocation of investment because it is a relationship 
between ratios of  investment to capital stock (investment rates) in adjacent periods, derived from a 
dynamic value optimization problem in the presence of symmetric, quadratic adjustment costs (Bond et 
al., 2003). 
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where i indexes individual firms and t represents the current year. Investment, I, is 
defined as the change in net-fixed assets plus depreciation. K represents capital stock 
measured by total assets at the beginning of the period
51
. (I/K) denotes the rate of 
investment. Cash flow (CF), which is the sum of net profit and depreciation, is used as a 
proxy for internal funds. DOS denotes the percentage of shares owned by directors and 
officers.
52
 SALGRTH represents the real annual sales growth rate; Q is Tobin‟s q; (D/K) 
denotes the leverage ratio; (∆WC/K) represents changes in working capital as a 
proportion of the capital stock; SEID represents an equity financing dummy variable; 
and FIRSIZE represents firm size. We lag all the independent variables by one period to 
account for the fact that current investment decision-making is based on past 
information. Furthermore, to account for possible heteroscadasticity arising from 
differences in firm size, investment, cash flow, leverage, and changes in working capital 
are scaled by the firm‟s level of capital stock at the beginning of the period.  
In Euler investment model, it is assumed that capital adjustment costs are a 
quadratic function of the investment ratio (Bond and Meghir, 1994). Therefore, the 
investment rate lagged one period and its square are included as additional independent 
variables in our equation. The structural model implies that the coefficient on lagged 
investment ratio should be positive. Yet, if adjustment costs are very high, it would 
negatively affect investment, suggesting a negative coefficient on lagged investment 
ratio.  
The estimated coefficient on CF/K is interpreted as the investment–cash-flow 
sensitivity, which is widely used in the literature as a measure of financial constraints. 
Since the Euler-equation model is derived under the null hypothesis that firm 
investment spending is not affected by financial constraints (i.e. under the null of no 
financial constraints), there should be a negative or no relationship between investment 
                                                        
51 A similar approach is also used in Lin and Bo (2012) and McLean et al. (2012), among others. 
52 We also estimated alternative specifications, which included the squares of Managerial ownership as in 
Chapter 3, but these quadratic terms were never statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that 
unlike ordinary capital expenditure, entering foreign markets involves a high level of risk and uncertainty 
(Verhoeven, 1988). Thus with a higher level of equity ownership vested in the firm, managers‟ propensity 
to risk-aversion may prevents them from promoting and engaging in international activities, even when it 
is efficient and profitable for the firm. This may cause managerial ownership to non-linearly affect export 
market participation decisions, but not ordinary capital investments. 
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and cash flow. If the coefficient on CF/K is positive and statistically significant, this 
would then indicate the existence of financial constraints on investment.  
For the purpose of testing our hypotheses, we first focus on the coefficient of 
managerial ownership to see its direct impact on investment decisions.
 
As discussed 
above, if as predicted by Hypothesis 1, managerial ownership mitigates agency conflicts 
and provides managers with the necessary incentives to undertake investment, we 
would expect a positive association between managerial ownership and investment. 
Hence: 
If H1 is true; β4 ≥ 0. 
Next, we focus on the interaction between cash flow and managerial ownership to 
assess the indirect impact of managerial ownership on investment through the financial 
constraints channel. If, as predicted by our Hypothesis 2, firms become less financially 
constrained due to the reduced agency and asymmetry information problems stemming 
from increased managerial ownership, we would expect the coefficient on this 
interaction term to be negative and significant, whilst the coefficient associated with 
cash flow would remain positive. Hence:  
If H2 is true; β3 ≥ 0; β6 < 0.  
To account for the accelerator effects from sales, our Euler equation includes the 
real annual sales growth rate (SALGRTH). We use Tobin‟s q (Q) to represent the firm‟s 
future investment opportunities. We compute Q as the sum of the market value of 
equity, and the book value of long-term and short-term debt, divided by total assets. We 
control for the effect of debt by including the leverage ratio (D/K) measured by the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. Following Fazzari and Petersen (1993), we also include 
changes in working capital scaled by total assets (∆WC/K) to control for the substitution 
effect between working capital investment and fixed investment. As discussed in 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993), if firms use working capital to smooth fixed investment, 
we would expect a negative association between (∆WC/K) and fixed investment. We 
also use firm size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets, 
as a control variable. Having more resources and collateral, large firms are likely to face 
fewer information asymmetries and are therefore likely to invest more (Guariglia, 
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2008). Yet, smaller firms are more likely to be in the expansion stage and typically have 
high growth potential (Hovakimian, 2009).  
In addition, to account for the effect of external equity financing, we use an 
equity financing dummy variable, SEID, which takes the value of one if the firm has 
raised additional equity capital by making seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) during the 
sample period, and zero otherwise. If equity is utilised as an alternative source of 
external financing for investment, then we should observe a positive association 
between SEID and investment. 
The error term in Equation (4.1) is made up of five components. vi is a firm-
specific effect; vt, a time-specific effect, which we control for by including time 
dummies capturing, among other things, the variation in the user cost of capital and tax 
rates, as well as business cycle effects
53
; vj, an industry-specific effect, which we take 
into account by including industry dummies. vtj represents industry-year shocks to 
investment, which we account for by including time dummies at the industry level. 
Finally, it is an idiosyncratic component. 
4.4.2. Estimation methodology 
The primary estimation method we use is the two-step system GMM for dynamic panel 
models with lagged dependent variables. A similar approach has been used in a number 
of recent studies investigating the effects of ownership and governance on various 
aspects of firm behavior including investment decisions and firm performance (e.g. Lin 
and Bo, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012, among others).  Estimating our baseline model 
using an OLS technique would produce biased estimates of the coefficients, as the 
unobservable time-invariant determinants of investment/performance (i) are likely to 
                                                        
53 For example, Bo et al. (2014) show that recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) has negatively 
affected the investment of Chinese firms especially through the demand channel (i.e., contraction of 
demand). Our dataset includes the Global Financial Crisis years. The effects of the Crisis are taken into 
account in our analysis through the inclusion of time dummies, which account for all business cycle 
effects. For instance, the fact that exports and/or investment were reduced during the Crisis would be 
picked by the time dummies. Furthermore, since corporate governance, in particular ownership structure 
variables are mostly persistent overtime and can well be described as cross sectional or between-firms‟ 
phenomena (Zhou, 2001), we do not expect the effects of managerial ownership on investment to change 
over the crisis years. We believe therefore that the different results obtained for the pre- and post-2006 
period are more likely to be due to the split-share structure reform than to the financial crisis.   
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be correlated with other regressors in the model (Wooldridge, 2002). It is possible to 
take into account the i component of the error term by using a panel data fixed effect 
model or by estimating the equation in first-differences. Yet, because our structural 
investment Euler equation is dynamic, the lagged dependent variable will be correlated 
with the firm-specific effect, creating bias in the simple fixed effects estimates (Nickell, 
1981).  
Furthermore, the OLS and fixed model assume that all the explanatory variables 
are strictly exogenous, which may not be the case when studying the relationship 
between ownership and investment decisions and performance. The level of investment 
or performance may in fact affect the firm‟s ownership structure, and the random events 
affecting the level of investment or firm performance are also likely to influence 
ownership and firm characteristics.
54
  
3.2.1 The System GMM 
To overcome these problems and to estimate our dynamic models consistently on a 
short unbalanced panel, we use the system GMM estimator developed by Holtz-Eakin, 
et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). This method estimates the relevant equation in a system, i.e. the equation 
is estimated both in first-differences and in levels. The use of first-differencing 
eliminates firm-specific, time-invariant effects. Additionally, the system GMM 
estimator uses lagged values of the regressors as internal instruments to control for the 
possible endogeneity of regressors. 
It is documented that the system GMM estimator performs well with highly 
persistent or slowly moving phenomena such as ownership structure and performance 
(Bond, 2002). In this way, the use of the system GMM alleviates the concerns raised by  
Zhou (2001), who argue that since ownership structure variables are mostly persistent 
overtime and can well be described as cross sectional or between-firms‟ phenomena, the 
fixed effects model is problematic, as it  essentially eliminates all between-variations in 
firms‟ characteristics.  Moreover, the use of a first-differencing approach in the GMM 
estimator also leads to more efficient estimates since it mitigates the possibility of 
                                                        
54 See Hadlock (1998) for a detailed discussion on the endogeneity concern in the case of ownership and 
investment decisions. 
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collinearity among the explanatory variables. In the system GMM, we use the two-step 
robust option to get a robust (to panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity) 
and finite-sample corrected covariance matrix. 
3.2.2 Validity of instruments 
We use several tests to assess whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is 
correctly specified. The first is the Sargan/ Hansen test (also known as J test) for 
overidentifying restrictions. This test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters 
estimated under the null of instrument validity. 
Next, we note that if the error term (εit) in the original (untransformed) specification 
(equation 4.1) is i.i.d, lagged levels of the explanatory variables dated t-2 are potentially 
valid internal instruments. However, if the random error (εit) follows an MA(q) process, 
rather than being serially uncorrelated, the differenced disturbances follow an MA(q+1) 
process. In this case, the first valid instruments start from 2+q (Bond, 2002; Bond et al., 
2003). For example, if εit is MA(1), then valid instruments include lag 3 and deeper 
values. Consequently, to have a valid set of instruments independent of the residuals, it 
is crucial to ensure that there is no higher order serial correlation. The AR(n) test check 
for the presence of n
th
-order auto-correlation in the differenced residuals. It is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no n
th
-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals  
To sum up, the system GMM estimator potentially deals with most of the estimation 
problems in our study of the dynamic relationship between ownership and investment 
i.e. (1) the dynamic fixed effects bias arising from OLS and within-firm group estimates 
in panels with relatively few time periods (Nickell, 1981); (2) the potential endogeneity 
arising from simultaneity and measurement error; and (3) the high level of persistency 
in governance and performance variables. We estimate our equations using the two-step 
System GMM (with Windmeijer corrected standard errors) using the xtabond2 package 
for STATA. 
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4.5.  Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used for the analysis are obtained from two Chinese databases namely, the 
China Stock Market Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin for the period 2003-
2010. Our data set is composed of publicly listed non-financial firms traded either on 
the Shanghai or the Shenzhen stock exchanges. Firms in the financial sector are 
excluded in our empirical analysis of investment decisions since they have rather 
different investment behaviors. To reduce the impact of possible outliers, we exclude 
observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. Firms with only 
three years or less of time-series data are dropped, as sufficient observations over time 
are required for the system GMM estimation. Finally, since we lag all our independent 
variables once and use variables lagged twice or more as instruments, we end up with a 
panel of 5347 firm-year observations on 1420 companies over the period 2006-2010 for 
our actual empirical analysis. The panel has an unbalanced structure.  
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study for the full 
sample firms as well as for state- and privately-controlled firms. The average (median) 
ratio of investment to total assets (I/K) of the full sample firms is 6% (3.3%). The 
average ratio of cash flow to total assets (CF/K) is 5.7% (5.5%). The average (median) 
percentage of managerial ownership (DOS) is 2.1% (0) with a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of 63%. The average (median) real sales growth rate (SALGRTH) is 13.5% 
(10%) while the average Tobin‟s Q (Q) is 1.83 (1.143). These two variables indicate 
that there are strong growth opportunities in China during the sample period. The 
average (median) leverage measured by total debt to total assets ratio (D/K) is 52% 
(52%), suggesting that more than 50% of Chinese listed firms‟ assets is financed with 
loans. The seasonal equity financing dummy (SEID = 1) is 0.526, implying that the 
majority of the firms in our sample have used equity financing during the sample 
period. The average (median) firm size measured by the real value of total assets 
(FIRSIZE) is about 2 billion RMB (0.966).  
As we discussed earlier, non-sate controlled firms have greater a percentage of 
managerial ownership (DOS) than state-controlled firms. The mean value of managerial 
ownership is in fact 6% for the former, and 0.2%, for the latter. Furthermore, compared 
to firms controlled by the state, privately-controlled firms are smaller (FIRSIZE), but 
exhibit higher real sale growth rate (SALGRTH) and Tobin‟s Q (Q), suggesting that they 
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have higher growth opportunities. This is consistent with Hovakimian, (2009) who 
show that smaller firms are more likely to be in the expansion stage and typically have 
high growth potential. Finally, compared with privately-controlled firms, state-
controlled firms use more leverage (D/K) and seasonal equity financing (SEID). 
These summary statistics indicate that the sample employed in this study is 
comparable to others used in prior research on investment decisions. For instance, the 
average ratios of investment to total assets and of cash flow to total assets in our sample 
are very similar to those reported by Tsai et al. (2014), who use similar data from the  
period 2001-2010.     
 
4.6.  Empirical results 
4.6.1. Results from the investment Euler equation estimation 
In this section, we discuss the main results from the estimation of our structural 
investment Euler equation. The System GMM estimation results of a standard 
investment Euler equation with only control variables are shown in the first column of 
Table 4.2. The estimation results from the models augmented with managerial 
ownership variables are presented in columns (2) and (3).  
The estimated coefficients associated with the cash flow to total assets ratio 
(CF/K) are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in all the 
specifications in Table 4.2. In column 1, the coefficient on CF/K is 0.423. Considering 
that the mean value of investment is 0.060, and the standard deviation of CF/K is 0.057 
(as shown in Table 4.1), a one-standard-deviation increase in CF/K yields on average a 
40.19% increase in the investment of the firm. This figure is comparable with the 
average value of 33%
55
 reported in McLean et al. (2012) in their cross-country study
56
. 
If we follow the interpretations of investment-cash flow sensitivities in Fazzari, et al. 
(1988, 2000), this finding implies that our sample of Chinese listed firms experience a 
certain degree of financial constraints on investment. This result is consistent with those 
                                                        
55 The estimated coefficient on cash flow (0.423) times its standard deviation (0.057) divided by the mean 
value of investment (0.060). 
56 See Table II of McLean (2012, p.323) for the list of countries included in the Worldscope which 
include several developed and developing countries excluding China. 
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reported in previous studies on financing constraints of Chinese listed companies (Firth 
et al., 2012; Lin and Bo, 2012). 
4.6.2. The direct and indirect effects of managerial ownership on investment 
Our main interest is centred on coefficient estimates for managerial ownership and its 
interaction with cash flow in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.2. Note that in these 
regressions, the coefficients on CF/K are still positive and significant at the 1% level, 
which means that for firms without managerial ownership, investment is highly 
dependent on internally generated cash flows.  
Focusing on the regression in column 2, we observe that the estimated 
coefficient on managerial ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that by better aligning the incentive of managers with outside 
shareholders‟ interest, a higher ownership by insiders in the firms increases the firms‟ 
investment. This result is in line with our hypothesis H1 and also consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Jensen and Meckling, (1976) and Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2006), among others, and with the empirical findings of Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2006) and Kang et al. (2006) for US firms. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates 
that the effects are economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase in 
managerial ownership yields on average a 64%
57
 increase in investment. This large 
increase in investment is also consistent with the prediction of Chow (1997, p. 321) that 
“providing incentives for the management of publicly owned assets is a key to China‟s 
success” and with the empirical finding in Lin et al. (2009) who report a largest increase 
in efficiency of firms with insiders‟ ownership. 
Coming to the indirect effects of managerial ownership, consistent with our 
prediction, we find that the estimated coefficient on cash flow interacted with 
managerial ownership (DOS) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that managerial ownership helps reduce information asymmetries and thus, 
the financial constraints faced by firms. This result thus supports our hypothesis H2. It 
is also consistent with the recent empirical evidence presented in Anderson et al. (2006) 
                                                        
57 The estimated coefficient on managerial ownership (0.473) times its standard deviation (0.081) divided 
by the mean value of investment (0.060). 
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for US firms and Firth et al. (2009) for Chinese firms, who show that managerial 
ownership acts as a form of collateral to bank financing
58
. 
It should be noted, however, that the negative coefficient on the cash flow 
interacted with DOS could also be attributed to the alleviation of free cash flow 
problems (Jensen, 1986). Yet, if the firm faced free cash flow problems (which typically 
lead to overinvestment), and if the alignment of managers‟ incentives through equity 
ownership reduced these problems, then in addition to the negative coefficient on the 
interaction between cash flow and managerial ownership, we would also expect to 
observe a negative relationship between managerial ownership and investment. The 
positive and highly statistically significant coefficient estimate on managerial ownership 
that we find here is inconsistent with the free-cash flow theory of investment. Therefore, 
our findings of a positive association between managerial ownership and investment, 
coupled with the negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity are consistent with the ideas that managerial ownership 
reduces both managers‟ tendency to shirk (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2006) and the degree of financing constraints faced by firms ( Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Stiglitz and Weiss,1981; Fazarri et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Whited, 
1992), which both typically lead to underinvestment.  
4.6.3. The effects of ownership reform on the interaction among managerial 
ownership, financial constraints and investment 
We further test whether the impact of managerial ownership on investment and the 
investment–cash flow sensitivity differs between pre- and post-reform periods. As we 
discussed earlier, in order to fully understand the impact of managerial ownership on 
firms‟ investment behaviour, it is important to take into account differences in our 
results before and after the 2005 split share structure reform. To take this into account, 
we estimate equation (4.1) by incorporating interaction terms of both DOS it-1 and CF it-
1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 with dummies for the pre- and post-2006 period.
59
 This formulation 
allows the parameters of DOS it-1 and CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 to differ across observations 
in the two sub-sample periods. If managerial ownership has mainly emerged as an 
                                                        
58  By contrast this result is inconsistent with Hadlock (1998) who argue that managerial ownership 
increases investment sensitivity to cash flow (financial constraints) since aligning managers‟ incentives 
with the interest of owners causes them to avoid costly external financing.  
59 Reform is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the sample year is greater than 2006, and 0 otherwise. 
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important governance mechanism  only following the  reform, then one would expect 
DOS and CF/K*DOS to have significant effects on investment only in the post reform 
period.
 
 
The results are reported in column 3 of Table 4.2. We observe that the estimated 
coefficient on managerial ownership is positive and statistically significant only in the 
post-reform period. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between 
managerial ownership and investment-cash flow sensitivities is negative and statistically 
significant only in the post-reform period. The Table reports the p-value associated with 
an F-test aimed at assessing whether the impact of DOS and CF/K*DOS on investment 
is the same for the pre- and post-2006 periods. Although, according to our F-test, the 
difference in magnitude of the coefficient estimates of DOS and CF/K*DOS between 
the pre- and post-2006 firm-years is not statistically significant, the former coefficients 
are never precisely determined.  
These findings support our hypothesis H3, according to which managerial 
ownership in the Chinese listed firms has worked as an effective governance 
mechanism only in the post reform period, and suggest that, by removing restrictions on 
managerial stock ownership, the reform played a significant role in achieving a more 
efficient allocation of resources for investment by corporations. 
Focusing on the control variables, the estimated coefficients on sales growth 
(SALGRTH) are significantly positive in all the regressions in Table 4.2. This implies 
that the accelerator effects from sales also bear an important role on the corporate 
investment decisions. This finding is consistent with Lin and Bo (2012). Except in 
column (1), the estimated coefficients on the total debt ratio (D/K) are positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that gaining more debt financing enables firms to 
invest more. This can also be explained in the light of the fact that firms with high 
leverage have more resources at hand, which they can use to make new investments. In 
addition, these firms may be considered more creditworthy by banks having obtained 
debt in previous years, and may consequently obtain more loans in the present.
60
  Lin 
                                                        
60 This result is inconsistent with free cash flow hypothesis which predict that investment will decrease 
with leverage, because high levels of current debt service payments force managers to disgorge cash out 
of the firm, thereby reducing managers‟ discretionary expenses.  
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and Bo (2012), also find a positive relation between investment and leverage in their 
Euler investment equation estimation though it is insignificant.  
 Consistent with Fazzari and Petersen (1993), the coefficient on working capital 
investment (∆WC/K) is negative and significant at the 10% level in all specifications, 
suggesting that firms use the working capital to smooth fixed investment. The estimated 
coefficients for the equity financing dummy (SEID) variable bear a positive sign and are 
statistically significant in all the models except the one in column 3, suggesting that 
equity financing is also important to fund investment projects. Finally, the coefficient of 
firm size (FIRMSIZE) is negative and insignificant in all the regressions. Again, these 
findings are in line with those reported by Lin and Bo (2012).  
As for the validity of the instruments, the AR(2) and Sargan tests generally 
indicate that our models are correctly specified and that the instruments are generally 
valid. 
4.6.4. Differentiating firms into state- and privately-controlled 
As we argued earlier, state-controlled and privately controlled-firms may exhibit 
different investment behavior. In the light of this consideration, in Table 4.3, we provide 
separate GMM estimates of the Euler equation (Equation 4.1) for state- and privately-
controlled firms.  
Once again, the estimated coefficients on the cash flow to total assets ratio 
(CF/K) are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in all the 
specifications in Table 4.3. This result suggests that all the listed firms are, on average, 
finically constrained regardless of their ownership. This finding is consistent with  Firth 
et al. (2012), Lin and Bo (2012), but inconsistent with Chow and Fung (1998), 
Héricourt and Poncet (2009), Poncet et al. (2010), Guariglia et al. (2011), Ding et al. 
(2013). The latter group of studies argues that the existence of soft-budget constraints 
and easy access to bank financing from state-controlled banks, make state-owned firms 
less financially constrained or not financially constrained at all. Yet, contrary to us, they 
focus on unlisted companies.   
Interestingly, in Table 4.3, we also observe that in sharp contrast to the soft 
budget constraint arguments, the coefficients on cash flow for state-controlled firms are 
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much larger than those for privately-controlled firms, suggesting that the former firms 
face more financing constraints than the latter. This finding is consistent with Firth et al 
(2012), and Tsai et al. (2014) who argue that financial liberalization and the banking 
system reform have gradually eliminated preferential treatments given to SOEs, and that 
these firms‟ investment decisions now face a  stricter scrutiny by suppliers of finance ( 
e.g. banks).  
 As shown in column 1 of Table 4.3, consistent with our prediction while the 
coefficient of DOS is positive, the coefficient on its interaction with cash flow is 
negative and both of these coefficients are precisely determined for privately-controlled 
firms. By contrast, the coefficients of both of these variables are poorly determined for 
state-controlled firms (column 3). Similarly, the estimated coefficients of DOS and its 
interaction with cash flow are only precisely determined with their expected signs in the 
post-reform period for privately controlled firms (column 2). By contrast, again, the 
coefficients of both of these variables are poorly determined both in pre- and post – 
reform period for state- controlled firms (column 4.) These results provide support for 
our hypothesis (H4) and imply that managerial ownership is only effective in reducing 
agency and information problem and hence financial constraints at non-state firms. 
These findings can be explained considering the higher level of managerial ownership 
characterizing private firms relative to their state-controlled counterparts. 
The coefficients of the control variables reported in Table 4.3 were generally similar 
to those reported in Table 4.2, and the tests for instrument validity did not indicate 
significant problems. In sum, our results from the Euler-equation estimation suggest 
that managerial ownership is an important factor that affects investment, both directly 
and indirectly by alleviating the effects of the capital market imperfections faced by 
non-state-controlled firms, especially in the post reform period.   
4.4.7. Further tests 
In this section, we verify whether our results are robust to using an alternative 
investment model, namely the Q model, which has been widely used in the literature as 
an alternative to the Euler equation (Fazzari et al., 1988; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; 
Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008; McLean et al., 2012). The structural Euler equation 
models controls for the influence of expected future profitability on current investment 
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decisions, albeit under a restrictive assumption about the form of adjustment costs. 
Unlike the more structural Euler equation, the reduced form investment equation can be 
regarded as an empirical approximation to some more general adjustment process. 
Although the Q model does not appear to completely explain investment spending, a 
huge literature has used it to assess the effects of financing constraints on investment 
(see Bond and Van Reenen, 2007 for a survey). We therefore verify whether our results 
are robust to estimating a reduced form investment equation where we augment the 
traditional Q model with our variables of interest, namely managerial ownership and its 
iteration with cash flow.  Our investment model takes the following form: 
(I it /K it-1)  = β0  + β1 (I it-1 /K it-2)  +  β2 (CF it-1 /K it-1)  + β3 DOSit-1  +                   
β4 (CFit-1 /Kit-1 * DOS it-1)  + β5 Qit-1  +   vi  +  vt   + vj   +  vtj +   it                                   (4.2)  
All notations are the same as in Equation (4.1). Table 4.4 presents the System 
GMM estimates of Equation (4.2). The results are generally consistent with those 
obtained using the Euler equation in Table 4.2. Specifically, we observe that the 
estimated coefficient on cash flow remains positive and precisely determined in all 
regressions. Furthermore, in both columns 2 and 3, we observe that the coefficient on 
managerial ownership remains positive and significant, and that the interaction between 
cash flow and managerial ownership attracts a negative and significant coefficient. As 
shown in column 3, we observe, once again, that our findings are driven by the post-
reform period. These results support our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. The coefficients on 
Tobin‟s Q are generally poorly determined. This suggests that in the Chinese context, 
Tobin’s Q does not reflect firms‟ real growth potential. (Wang et al., 2009; Xu et al, 
2013) 
We also provide separate GMM estimates of the Q model (Equation 4.2) for 
state- and privately -controlled firms in Table 4.5. Again, the estimated coefficients on 
the cash flow to total assets ratio (CF/K) are positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels in all the specifications. Further, consistent with our the findings in 
Table 4.3, the coefficients of cash flow for state-controlled firms are much larger than 
those for privately controlled firms, suggesting that the former group of firms face more 
financing constraints than the latter group of firms.  
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Coming to managerial ownership, consistent with our prediction, the 
coefficients on DOS and its interaction with cash flow are respectively negative and 
positive, and in both cases precisely determined, for the privately-controlled firms in the 
post reform period. DOS is also positively associated with investment in the pre-reform 
period, but it is only marginally significant. By contrast, the coefficients associated with 
managerial ownership are poorly determined for state- controlled, regardless of the 
period analyzed. These results provide additional support for our hypothesis H4. 
It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficients on Tobin‟s Q are positive 
and significant at the 10 % level for privately controlled firms. In contrast, they are 
negative and significant at the 1 % level for state-controlled firms. This finding is 
consistent with Chen et al. (2011) who show that state ownership in Chinese listed firms 
negatively affects the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities, negatively 
affecting investment efficiency. As with the Euler equation, the AR(2) and Sargan tests 
generally indicate that our models are correctly specified and that the instruments are 
generally valid. 
4.7. Conclusions 
In the this study, we have used a panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-
2010 to analyze the extent to which  managerial ownership, which is considered as an 
important governance mechanism, affects investment both directly, and indirectly by 
mitigating  the effects of financing constraints. This study thus fits into the vast 
literature that shows that managerial incentives can have a real impact on both corporate 
financial structure and investment. Although limited evidence is available from 
developed countries, no study has examined the impact of managerial ownership on the 
investment and financial constraints in the context of China. This study fills this gap.  
Using the system GMM estimator to estimate Euler investment equations, which 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, we find that investment 
decisions are systematically related to managerial ownership in two ways. Firstly, by 
aligning management‟s incentives with the interests of shareholders, managerial 
ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions.  Secondly, 
we document that, by acting as a form of credible guarantee to lenders and signaling the 
quality of information in the capital markets, managerial ownership helps to reduce the 
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degree of financial constraints faced by firms (which we measure by the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow). These results are consistent with theoretical predictions 
according to which by lowering agency and information costs, insider ownership stakes 
in the firm reduce the cost of external finance, relax liquidity constraints, and, hence, 
promote optimal investment decisions. These results are inconsistent with free cash 
flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1996 & 1993) which predicts a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and investment (i.e., aligning managers‟ incentives with the 
interests of shareholders should reduce overinvestment) and a negative effect of 
managerial ownership on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Although our 
analysis is mainly based on Euler investment equation, our results are robust to 
estimating a reduced form investment equation.  
 Managerial ownership exerts a positive direct and indirect effect on corporate 
investment as it provides managers with residual rights and incentives to mitigate the 
agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control which characterizes 
Chinese listed firms (Lin et al., 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c). Furthermore, in an 
environment with severe information asymmetries such as the Chinese one (Morck et 
al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009; Gul et al., 2010), increasing managerial ownership further 
help to pass the information that managers are committed to reduce agency costs and 
make value enhancing investment decisions (the quality of the firm) on to the capital 
market, which helps to reduce costs of adverse selection resulting from the asymmetric 
information between the firm and outside investors/lenders. 
When distinguishing the effects of managerial ownership on investment between 
state- and privately controlled firms as well as pre- and post-reform period, we find that 
managerial ownership works as an effective governance device influencing investment 
and financial constraints only in the post-reform period for privately controlled-firms. 
Moreover, we provide additional evidence that state ownership lowers the sensitivity of 
investment to investment opportunities (Chen et al., 2011). 
In line with the vast majority of studies on Western countries, we confirm that 
Chinese listed firms face financial constraints, and that privately-controlled firms tend, 
as a consequence, to underinvest. This finding is consistent with recent literature on 
China (Xu et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2014).     
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Our study has policy implications. First, the Chinese government‟s recent 
policies to reform firms‟ ownership structure and encourage managerial ownership in 
listed firms have been successful and have helped to reduce agency problems and 
improve the informational environment in the capital markets. Yet, they have induced 
more efficient investment decisions only in the non-state firms. This would suggest that 
managerial ownership should be further encouraged in the state-controlled firm. This 
can be addressed through optimal incentive contract systems. Second, the considerable 
government ownership which is still characterizing the majority of Chinese listed firms 
should be further reduced so as to further enhance efficient resource allocation.   
 
 Appendix 
 
Appendix: Table A4.1 Relationship between managerial ownership and investment 
Authors Under/Overinvestment 
models 
Relationship between 
managerial ownership and 
investment 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) 
Under-investment Positive: The alignment of the 
interest of managers with the  
interest of shareholders 
increases investment 
Aggrawal and Samwick 
(2006) 
Under-investment Positive: The alignment of the 
interest of managers with the  
interest of shareholders 
increases investment 
Jensen (1986 and 1993) Free Cash flow/over-
investment 
Negative: The alignment of the 
interest of managers with the  
interest of shareholders 
decreases (over) investment 
 
Appendix: Table A4.2 Relationship between managerial ownership and the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
Authors Under/Overinvestment 
models 
Relationship between 
managerial ownership and the 
sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow.  
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Anderson et al. 
(2006) 
Under-investment Negative:Managerial ownership 
serves as credible guarantee to 
obtain financing for investment 
at lower costs from suppliers of 
finance. 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Under-investment Negative:Managerial ownership 
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Gertler (1988), Gertler 
and Hubbard (1988), Firth 
et al., (2009) 
signals the quality of the firm‟s 
future investment projects and 
thus reduces financing 
constraints (by reducing the 
costs of external capital) 
Hadlock (1998) Under-investment Positive: The alignment of 
interests between managers and 
shareholders intensifies 
asymmetric information 
problems and thus, increases the 
investment-cash flow 
sensitivities (i.e. the financial 
constraints faced by firms).
61
 
Jensen (1986, 1993) and 
Hadlock (1998) 
Free Cash flow/over-
investment 
Negative: The alignment of the 
interest of managers with the 
interest of shareholders 
decreases (over) investment and 
thus reduces the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. 
 
                                                        
61  The idea behind his argument is that when managers‟ ownership stakes in the firm increase, the 
managers should also bear more of the mispricing of external funds (i.e., the wedge between the cost of 
funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds) arising from the information 
asymmetry and consequently, will be unwilling to seek external funds, leading to underinvestment 
problem. This suggests that a firm‟s reliance on internal funds should increase with the increase in 
managerial ownership in the firm when making investment decisions (leading to  an increased sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow) (Hadlock, 1998) 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
Variables Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Media
n Min Max 
Panel A : full sample        
(Iit /Kit-1) 5347 0.060 0.091 0.033 -0.186 0.578 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 5347 0.057 0.057 0.055 -0.251 0.227 
DOSit-1 5347 0.021 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.630 
SALGRTHit-1 5345 0.135 0.316 0.100 -0.631 2.339 
Q it-1  5345 1.830 1.099 1.449 0.816 8.491 
(D it-1/K it-1) 5346 0.520 0.183 0.529 0.062 1.475 
(∆WC it-1/K it-1) 5347 0.006 0.105 0.004 -0.514 1.242 
SEIDit-1 4782 0.527 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRSIZEit-1 (billion RMB) 5347 1.971 3.056 0.966 0.083 25.953 
       
Panel B : state-controlled firms        
(Iit /Kit-1) 3280 0.063 0.091 0.034 -0.184 0.562 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 3280 0.055 0.056 0.053 -0.237 0.227 
DOSit-1 3280 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.323 
SALGRTHit-1 3280 0.133 0.303 0.102 -0.609 2.339 
Q it-1  3280 1.731 1.001 1.381 0.816 8.491 
(D it-1/K it-1) 3280 0.529 0.178 0.544 0.062 1.281 
(∆WC it-1/K it-1) 3280 0.002 0.099 0.003 -0.379 1.242 
SEIDit-1 2916 0.535 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRSIZEit-1 (billion RMB) 3280 2.252 3.373 1.083 0.093 25.953 
       
Panel B : non-state-controlled firms  
      
(Iit /Kit-1) 1706 0.057 0.090 0.030 -0.186 0.578 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 1706 0.062 0.058 0.061 -0.240 0.224 
DOSit-1 1706 0.060 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.630 
SALGRTHit-1 1706 0.149 0.334 0.103 -0.631 2.288 
Q it-1  1706 2.094 1.258 1.689 0.844 8.411 
(D it-1/K it-1) 1706 0.495 0.187 0.501 0.070 1.381 
(∆WC it-1/K it-1) 1706 0.014 0.116 0.007 -0.514 0.711 
SEIDit-1 1548 0.505 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRSIZEit-1 (billion RMB) 1706 1.188 1.684 0.659 0.083 18.988 
Note: Definition of variables: (I/K) where I= change in total assets plus depreciation; K= capital stock 
(total assets) at the beginning of the period; CF/K= ratio of cash flow to total assets; DOS = percentage of 
shares owned by directors and officers; SALGRTH =  real annual sales growth rate; Q =  Tobin‟s q; (D/K) 
= ratio of total debt to total net fixed assets; (∆WC/K) = change in working capital as a proportion of 
capital stock; FIRSIZE =  natural logarithm of the firm‟s total real sales; SEID =  dummy variable that 
takes 4.1 if  the firm has raised additional equity capital by making seasonal equity offerings (SEOs) 
during the sample period, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 4.2 Managerial ownership and investment-cash flow sensitivities: Euler 
equation model 
Variables 1 2 3 
(Iit /Kit-1) 0.885
***
 0.496
*
 0.826
***
 
 (0.255) (0.253) (0.254) 
(I it-1/K it-2)
2
 -1.994
***
 -1.207
**
 -1.918
***
 
 (0.563) (0.580) (0.588) 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 0.423
**
 0.692
***
 0.735
***
 
 (0.199) (0.213) (0.261) 
DOSit-1  0.473
***
  
  (0.123)  
(CF it-1/K it-1* DOSit-1)  -4.245
***
  
  (1.334)  
[DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]   1.096 
   (2.207) 
(DOS it-1* REFORM)   0.409
**
 
   (0.189) 
[CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]   -5.684 
   (23.587) 
(CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1* REFORM)   -4.253
**
 
   (1.856) 
REFORM   0.009 
   (0.027) 
SALGRTH it-1 0.021
**
 0.035
**
 0.029
*
 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) 
(Dit-1/K it-1)
2
  -0.043 0.155
**
 0.162
**
 
 (0.043) (0.066) (0.081) 
(∆WCit-1/K it-1) -0.085
***
 -0.119
***
 -0.104
***
 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.035) 
SEIDit-1 0.014
**
 0.012
*
 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.033) 
FIRSIZEit-1 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5347 4933 4810 
Sagan test of over-identification  (p values) 45.96 (0.351) 66.25(0.162) 45.31(0.260) 
AR(1) test (p values) -7.24( 0.000) -6.72 (0.000) -6.64 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p values) 1.54(0.124) 0.89(0.374) 1.16(0.247) 
H0: Impact of DOS it-1 same before and after the 
reform (p-value) 
  
0.768 
H0: Impact of CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 same  before 
and after the reform (p-value) 
  
0.954 
Note: The system GMM estimator is used in estimation. AR1(AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null 
of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous: levels of these 
variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-
differences of these same variables lagged once are used as additional instruments in the level equations. 
The numbers in the rows testing whether the impact of DOS it-1 and CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1   on  Iit/Ki(t-1) is the 
same before and after the reform are the p-values associated with F-tests for general restrictions. Time 
dummies, industry dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are always included in 
the specifications and the instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  See note to the Table 4.1 for definitions of the 
variables. 
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Table 4.3 Managerial ownership and the investment-cash flow sensitivities of state- 
and non-state-controlled firms: Euler equation model 
Variables Non state-controlled 
firms 
State-controlled firms 
(I/K)it-1 0.356
*
 0.253
*
 0.542
**
 0.898
***
 
 (0.213) (0.148) (0.259) (0.235) 
(I/K)
2
it-1   -0.776 -0.541
*
 -1.370
**
 -2.110
***
 
 (0.551) (0.301) (0.588) (0.545) 
(CF/K)it-1 0.587
**
 0.564
*
 0.802
***
 0.681
**
 
 (0.287) (0.301) (0.220) (0.288) 
DOSit-1 0.485
***
  0.953  
 (0.131)  (0.877)  
[DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]  -0.149  -0.981 
  (1.535)  (3.932) 
 (DOS it-1* REFORM)  0.457
***
  1.447 
  (0.159)  (1.580) 
(CF/K* DOS)it-1 -3.552
**
  -9.266  
 (1.632)  (7.383)  
[CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]  4.740  -2.046 
  (15.672)  (30.721) 
(CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1* REFORM)  -3.109
**
  -15.103 
  (1.542)  (11.753) 
REFORM  0.044  -0.012 
  (0.049)  (0.031) 
SALGRTH it-1 0.025
*
 0.019 0.024 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.048) (0.015) (0.033) 
(D it-1/K it-1)
2
 0.136 0.153 0.072 0.152
**
 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.050) (0.077) 
(∆WC it-1/K it-1) -0.119
***
 -0.110
**
 -0.126
***
 -0.085
*
 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.033) (0.046) 
SEIDit-1 0.012 0.010 0.010 -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.043) 
FIRSIZEit-1 -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1647 1647 3190 3134 
Sagan test of over-identification  (p values) 39.54 
(0.169) 
36.48 
(0.268) 
36.05 
(0.560) 
44.03 
(0.386) 
AR(1) test (p values) -3.88 
(0.000) 
-3.50 
(0.000) 
-6.36 
(0.000) 
-6.86 
(0.000) 
AR(2) test (p values) -0.56 
(0.573) 
-0.82 
(0.412) 
1.08 
(0.279) 
1.40 
(0.163) 
H0: Impact of DOS it-1 before and after the 
reform (p-value)  
 0.7031  0.6377 
H0: Impact of CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 same before 
and after the reform (p-value)  
 0.6254  0.6460 
Note: The system GMM estimator is used in estimation. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous: levels of these variables dated t-2 and further are 
used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged once are 
used as additional instruments in the level equations. The numbers in the rows testing whether the impact of DOS it-1 
and CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1   on  Iit/Ki(t-1) is the same before and after the reform are the p-values associated with F-tests 
for general restrictions. Time dummies, industry dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are 
always included in the specifications and the instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  See note to the Table 4.1 for definitions of the variables. 
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Table 4.4 Managerial ownership and investment-cash flow sensitivities: Q model  
Variables 1 2 3 
(I it-1/Kit-2) 0.711
***
 0.016 0.015 
 (0.204) (0.019) (0.019) 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 0.360
**
 0.402
***
 0.428
***
 
 (0.142) (0.127) (0.114) 
DOSit-1  1.075
***
  
  (0.387)  
(CF it-1/K it-1* DOSit-1)  -9.253
**
  
  (4.081)  
[DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]   0.554
*
 
   (0.286) 
(DOS it-1* REFORM)   0.813
**
 
   (0.361) 
[CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]   -1.974 
   (4.185) 
(CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1* REFORM)   -7.045
**
 
   (3.551) 
REFORM  -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.012) (0.011) 
Q it-1 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007
*
 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7780 7234 7234 
Sagan test of over-identification  (p values) 6.66 (0.966) 26.33 (0.155) 23.76 (0.590) 
AR(1) test (p values) -4.88 (0.000) -13.08 (0.000) -14.70 (0.000) 
AR(n) test (p values) 1.07 (0.286) -0.50 (0.615) -0.64 (0.519) 
H0: Impact of DOS it-1 before and after the 
reform (p-value)  
 
 
0.585 
H0: Impact of CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 same 
before and after the reform (p-value)  
 
 
0.398 
Note: The system GMM estimator is used in estimation. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous: levels of 
these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-
differences of these same variables lagged once are used as additional instruments in the level equations. 
The numbers in the rows testing whether the impact of DOS it-1 and CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1   on  Iit/Ki(t-1) is the 
same before and after the reform are the p-values associated with F-tests for general restrictions. Time 
dummies, industry dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are always included in 
the specifications and the instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  See note to the Table 4.1 for definitions of the 
variables. 
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Table 4.5 Managerial ownership and the investment-cash flow sensitivities of state 
and non-state controlled firms: Q model 
Variables 
Non-state-controlled 
firms 
State-controlled firms 
 1 2 3 4 
(I it-1/Kit-2) 0.035 0.026 -0.013 -0.005 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) 
(CF it-1/K it-1) 0.315
*
 0.352
**
 0.676
***
 0.652
***
 
 (0.181) (0.151) (0.204) (0.175) 
DOSit-1 1.157
***
  1.067  
 (0.284)  (1.818)  
(CF it-1/K it-1* DOSit-1) -10.068
***
  -7.995  
 (3.014)  (12.019)  
[DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]  0.621  1.922 
  (0.485)  (3.121) 
(DOS it-1* REFORM)  0.968
***
  0.742 
  (0.348)  (1.131) 
[CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1*(1-REFORM)]  -3.224  -17.406 
  (5.842)  (31.335) 
(CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1* REFORM)  -8.429
**
  -0.831 
  (3.507)  (7.662) 
REFORM  -0.027  -0.008 
  (0.021)  (0.014) 
Q it-1 0.011
*
 0.012
*
 -0.014
***
 -0.013
***
 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Industry interaction dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2322 2322 4791 4791 
Sagan test of over-identification               
(p- values) 
20.98 (0.398) 19.21   
(0.787) 
28.45 
(0.441) 
26.49 
(0.437) 
AR(1) test (p values) -5.40  
(0.000) 
-6.44 
(0.000) 
-11.61 
(0.000) 
-11.85 
(0.000) 
AR(2) test (p values) -0.38  
(0.707) 
-0.65 
(0.518) 
-0.87 
(0.382) 
-0.75 
(0.452) 
H0: Impact of DOS it-1 before and after the 
reform (p-value)  
 0.552  
0.712 
H0: Impact of CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1 same 
before and after the reform (p-value)  
 0.458  
0.650 
Note: The system GMM estimator is used in estimation. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous: levels of 
these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-
differences of these same variables lagged once are used as additional instruments in the level equations. 
The numbers in the rows testing whether the impact of DOS it-1 and CF it-1/Kit-1* DOS it-1   on  Iit/Ki(t-1) is the 
same before and after the reform are the p-values associated with F-tests for general restrictions. Time 
dummies, industry dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are always included in 
the specifications and the instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  See note to the Table 4.1 for definitions of the 
variables. 
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Chapter 5 
Agency costs, ownership, and internal governance mechanisms: 
Evidence from Chinese listed companies 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Agency costs represent one of the central aspects of the linkages between corporate 
governance and corporate finance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Williamson, 1988). 
For a 100% owner-managed firm, agency costs of equity are zero (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Yet, when ownership and management (or control) of a firm are 
separated, as happens in modern corporations, the divergence of interest between 
owners and managers results in considerable agency costs for the owners (Berle and 
Means, 1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency problem and the resultant 
agency costs cause significant losses to the economy as a whole (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In their influential empirical contribution to the analysis of agency costs, Ang et 
al. (2000) suggest empirical proxies to measure agency costs, namely the asset 
utilization ratio and the operating expenses ratio. They then provide direct tests of the 
theoretical predictions made by Jensen and Meckling (1976), according to which agency 
costs are higher for firms whose managers have less than a 100 percent ownership stake, 
and should decrease as the equity shareholdings of the owner-manager increase. In line 
with these predictions, they find an inverse relationship between inside ownership and 
agency costs.
62
  
In the context of China, Firth et al. (2008) suggest that the ownership and 
governance reforms which Chinese SOEs have undergone before 2000
63
, have not been 
effective in reducing the agency costs experienced by these firms. They attribute this 
                                                        
62
 Singh and Davidson (2003) extend the work of Ang et al. (2000) to a sample of large listed US-
corporations, and others researchers,  to other economic settings such as the UK and Australia (e.g., Singh 
and Davidson, 2003; Fleming et al., 2005; Florakis, 2008; McKnight and Weir, 2009). We discuss those 
papers in detail in the literature review section.   
63 Examples of these reforms are the partial privatization of companies via initial public offering in the 
stock exchange, and the introduction of the company law in 1994. 
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finding to the fact that the Chinese government often retains a considerable ownership 
stake in privatised SOEs. Similarly, Tian and Estrin (2007) provide evidence suggesting 
that the Chinese government‟s ownership of both banks and firms, and the resultant soft 
budget constraints make debt an ineffective governance mechanism in reducing agency 
costs for Chinese listed firms.  
In this paper, we build on this literature to examine the linkages between 
managerial ownership and other internal corporate governance mechanisms, on the one 
hand; and agency costs, on the other, focusing on the Chinese economy in more recent 
years. We believe that China provides an excellent laboratory to study these linkages 
because its corporate governance has been evolving and improving rapidly so as to cope 
with its fast economic growth and the desire to integrate with the global economy. For 
instance, from June 2003 onwards, companies were required to appoint one third of 
independent directors to their boards. In addition, a crucial share ownership reform was 
successfully implemented in 2005-2006, following which (from January 2006) Chinese 
corporations have been allowed to incentivize their top-management with equity shares 
and share options. The main objective of these reforms was to improve the governance 
of listed firms, helping to solve the long standing agency conflicts characterizing these 
firms, and thereby enhancing corporate efficiency and performance.  
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in assessing the 
effectiveness of ownership in China (see for example, Kato and Long, 2006b,c and 
2011, Conyon and He (2012). In their survey article, Denis and McConell (2003) 
suggest that the context of privatization provides an interesting setting in which to 
investigate the effects of ownership structure on agency conflicts. Recent evidence 
suggests that managerial ownership has emerged as an important governance 
mechanism among Chinese listed firms (Lin et al. 2009; Walder, 2011; Liu et al., 2012). 
Additionally, following a series of reforms of the banking system
64
, the 
governance of the Chinese financial sector has significantly improved and banks now 
use more and more commercial judgment and prudence in their lending decisions (Cull 
and Xu, 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2008; Firth et al. 2009). In light of these developments, 
                                                        
64 For instance, these reforms involved the introduction of foreign ownership and management in 
Chinese banks and particularly, state owned commercial banks; as well as the listing of these banks in 
stock exchanges. See section 2.5 of Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of China’s banking sector 
reform. 
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recent studies using data on Chinese listed firms suggest that bank financing no longer 
facilitates unwise investment and the overconsumption of perquisites in SOEs. By 
contrast, it improves investment efficiency in both state controlled and privately 
controlled firms. The recent reforms have therefore paved the way for debt to now act as 
a governance mechanism that constrains managers‟ misconduct (Chan et al, 2012; Lin 
and Bo, 2012; Tsai et al. 2014), thus reducing agency costs in Chinese listed firms.  
It is therefore interesting to investigate the extent to which recent ownership and 
governance reforms in China have affected agency costs for listed firms. If governance 
mechanisms are effective in reducing agency costs, then this would imply that the 
ownership and governance reforms have been successful in providing the management 
with the necessary incentives to make optimal decisions and enhance corporate 
performance. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first direct study which uses data 
of Chinese listed firms after these reforms and particularly after the 2005 split share 
structure reform, to look at the impact of ownership and other corporate governance 
mechanisms on the agency costs of Chinese listed firms.  
Our study is based on a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-
2010. Controlling for unobserved firm characteristics and potential endogeneity, we 
find that increased managerial ownership and debt financing work as effective 
governance mechanisms in mitigating the costs of agency conflicts in Chinese listed 
firms. Specially, we find that higher managerial ownership and debt help the firms 
lower the agency costs they face. We also find evidence that legal person shareholders 
helps to mitigate agency costs in privately controlled firms in the post-split share 
structure reform period. Our results also suggest that board characteristics do not 
generally affect agency costs, with the exception of large boards which are associated 
with higher agency costs in government controlled firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews previous 
literature that focuses on the relationship between ownership and internal governance 
mechanisms, on the one hand; and agency costs, on the other. Section 5.3 presents our 
hypotheses. The model specifications and estimation method are described in Section 
5.4. In Section 5.5, we describe the data that we use in this study and provide basic 
descriptive statistics. Section 5.6 discusses our main empirical results, as well as some 
further tests. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.  
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5.2 Review of the Literature  
In this section, we discuss the literature that links agency costs and the corporate 
governance mechanisms including ownership structure, board structure and debt, by 
paying a particularly attention to the Chinese listed companies.  
For a 100% owner-managed firm, equity agency costs are zero (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Yet, when ownership and management (or control) of a firm are 
separated, as happens in modern corporations, the divergence of interest between 
owners and professional managers results in considerable agency costs for the owners 
(Berle and Means, 1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency costs can come in 
the form of managers‟ insufficient work effort (shirking), consumption of excessive 
perquisites, choice of inputs or outputs according to their own wishes, or other non-
value-maximizing conducts. Hence, the alignment of management‟s incentive with 
those of owners becomes critically important for firms. Following Jensen and 
Meckling‟s (1976) seminal work on agency costs, a vast body of theoretical and 
empirical literature has focused on the conflicts of interest between managers and equity 
owners and the resultant agency costs. This literature also suggests a number of 
governance mechanisms, which can mitigate agency conflicts in firms.  
To test the impact of agency conflicts on firms‟ outcomes, the empirical 
approach that has been commonly used in the literature has been to investigate the 
impact of governance mechanisms on various firm decisions, such as capital structure 
and investment decisions, and on firm value. Here, the basic idea is that the governance 
structure of a firm reflects the degree of agency problems it faces. Specifically, the 
weaker the governance structure, the higher the agency conflicts in the firm. Yet, only a 
limited number of studies have looked at the direct relationship between ownership and 
governance mechanisms, on the one hand, and the magnitude of agency costs, on the 
other. In what follows, we review this literature. 
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5.2.1. Evidence on the links between agency costs and ownership based on SMEs 
(Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) 
In their seminal empirical work, Ang et al. (2000) suggest empirical proxies to measure 
agency costs, namely, the assets utilization ratio (which is measured by the sales to 
assets ratio), and the expenses ratio (which is measured by the operating expenses 
scaled by assets). Using these measures, they provide direct tests of the theoretical 
predictions made by Jensen and Meckling (1976), according to which  agency costs are 
higher among firms that are not 100 percent owned by their managers, and these costs 
should decrease as the equity shareholdings of the owner-manager increase. They use a 
sample of 1,708 small corporations from the Federal Reserve Board‟s National Survey 
of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) database in their analysis. No publicly traded firm 
is entirely owned by management. By contrast, many of the small firms are owned 
solely by a single owner-manager, and, as such, the interest of the owner and the 
manager should be closely aligned, and therefore agency costs should be nil. Thus, 
small corporations provide an ideal setting for measuring agency costs for corporations 
under different ownership and management structures. Ang et al. (2000) analyse the 
impact of ownership structure and outside monitoring on measures of agency costs of 
firms. They find that agency costs are significantly higher in firms which are managed 
by an outsider rather than an insider, and are inversely associated with the manager‟s 
shareholdings in the firms. They further find that agency costs increase with the number 
of non-manager shareholders. Furthermore, they find some evidence that greater 
monitoring of small firms by banks helps to reduce agency costs. 
Similarly, Fleming et al. (2005) use a sample of approximately 3800 Australian 
small and medium enterprises for the periods 1996–1997 and 1997–1998 to examine the 
relationship between equity agency costs and ownership structure. Similar to Ang et al. 
(2000), they find that agency costs are lower in firms managed by equity-holders. 
However, as the authors point out, the magnitude of the agency costs are lower for 
Australian SMEs compared to their US counterparts. This may suggest that country-
specific factors may have a role on the agency costs incurred by the firms. Fleming et al. 
(2005) also find that the agency costs faced by firms are inversely related to managerial 
and employee equity holdings. This is consistent with the „convergence-of-interests‟ 
hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Furthermore, the authors report that the 
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agency costs of the firm decrease as the proportion of family ownership increases, 
suggesting that families have unique ability to undertake effective monitoring and thus 
discipline managers due to their special relationships with the firm. In addition, they 
find that the level of parent company ownership increases the agency costs in their 
sample of SMEs. They attribute this result to insufficient controls exercised by parent 
company on the management of subsidiaries. Finally, unlike Ang et al. (2000), Fleming 
et al. (2005) do not find any definite relationship between the debt-to-asset ratio (which 
they use as a proxy for bank‟s incentive to monitor borrowers) and agency costs. 
While both of these studies provide important insight into the impact of 
ownership and bank monitoring on the agency costs, they do not examine the impact of 
board of directors on the agency costs faced by SMEs. Yet, other studies suggest that 
boards of directors of SMEs play an important role in mitigating potential agency 
problem and hence in the development of SMEs (see Huse, 2000, for a review of this 
literature). 
5.2.2. Evidence on the links between agency costs, ownership, and internal 
governance mechanisms based on listed companies 
Adopting a similar approach, but using data from large listed US-firms, Singh and 
Davidson (2003) extend the work of Ang et al. (2000) by examining the effects of 
ownership and other internal governance mechanisms on agency costs. Unlike Ang et 
al. (2000), they also examine how firms‟ board structure affects agency costs. They use 
the sales and general and administrative expenses to total assets ratio, in addition to the 
asset utilization ratio to measure agency costs.
65
 Similar to the results of Ang et al. 
(2000), they find a positive relationship between managerial ownership and asset 
utilization efficiency, meaning that increasing managerial ownership helps to align the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders, to enhance the utilization of assets, 
thus reducing the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control in 
large corporations. However, their results show that managerial ownership cannot 
                                                        
65 Singh and Davidson (2003) argue that sales and general and administrative (SG&A) expenses are more 
likely to represent agency induced managerial excessive pay and perquisite consumption. The SG&A 
expenses includes salaries which are an important element of total benefits flowing to firm management 
and may reflect managerial discretion in spending company resources. Further, the authors suggest that 
management can easily use advertising and selling expenses to camouflage expenditures on their perks. 
Therefore, higher agency conflict would be reflected in higher managerial discretionary SG&A expenses.  
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reduce excessive discretionary expenses. Furthermore, Singh and Davidson (2003) 
report that smaller boards are effective in reducing agency costs, while outside block 
ownership and outside directors are ineffective mechanisms. Yet, although Singh and 
Davidson (2003) control for unobserved fixed effects using a fixed effects estimator, 
they do not control for the potential endogeneity of ownership and other governance 
variables.  
Florackis (2008) focuses on how choices of debt maturity structure affect the 
agency costs experienced by firms. Following Singh and Davidson (2003), he also 
examines the impact of several corporate governance mechanisms on two alternative 
proxies for agency costs: the asset utilization ratio (total sales to total assets ratio) and 
the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales. Based on a large 
panel of UK listed firms, he finds that the capital structure characteristics of firms 
including bank debt and debt maturity, especially short-term debt, play an important 
role in mitigating agency related problems for UK firms, and thus reducing agency 
costs. Furthermore, he reports that consistent with the findings in Ang et al. (2000), 
Singh and Davidson (2003), and Fleming et al. (2005), managerial ownership is an 
important governance mechanism to mitigate agency costs of UK firms. Additionally, 
the author finds that, managerial compensation and ownership concentration can help 
UK firms mitigate agency costs. His results also show that the impact exerted by 
specific internal governance mechanisms on agency costs varies with firms‟ growth 
opportunities. As in Singh and Davidson (2003), Florackis (2008) does not control for 
potential endogeneity of ownership and other governance variables. 
Improving on previous studies, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) use a GMM 
estimator to examine the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency 
costs in a panel of UK listed firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial 
entrenchment, they develop a managerial entrenchment index utilising detailed 
information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. The aim 
of this exercise is to capture the extent to which managers have the ability and 
incentives to expropriate wealth from other shareholders. They find that managerial 
entrenchment is negatively associated with their inverse proxy for agency costs (i.e. 
asset utilization ratio), meaning that firms with high levels of managerial entrenchment 
experience significantly higher agency costs. They also provide evidence that short-term 
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debt and dividend payments are important corporate governance mechanisms for UK 
firms, reducing the agency costs of manager-shareholder conflicts.  
Wellalage and Locke (2011) study the relationship between agency costs, 
ownership structure and corporate governance for 100 unlisted New Zealand firms over 
the eleven year- period 1998-2008. Like Florackis and Ozkan (2009), they also use a 
GMM estimation methodology to analyse the data. They find that insiders‟ ownership 
has the most significant governance effect on agency costs. More specially, they find a 
U-shaped relationship between insiders‟ ownership and agency costs consistent with the 
incentive alignment as well as entrenchment effects of managerial ownership.  
5.2.3 Studies focused on the changes to corporate governance structure 
Recent empirical work focuses on how changes to corporate governance structure, and 
especially the introduction of new corporate governance codes, and changes to  the 
board structure have affected the agency costs faced by firms. For example, using a 
panel of large UK listed companies, McKnight and Weir (2009) examine the impact of 
the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period on agency 
costs experienced by these firms. They find that there has been an increasing adoption 
of recommendations of the Combined Code related to board structures (such as setting 
up of nomination committees, appointing majority non-executive directors in the board, 
and separating CEO and chair position of the board). However, the changes to board 
structures of UK firms that have occurred following the recommendations of the 
Combined Code have had little impact on agency costs. The authors also find that 
having a nomination committee is associated with increased agency costs
66
, suggesting 
that firms incur additional costs when they adopt certain governance mechanisms.  This 
finding is at odds with the recommendation of the Combined Code. The authors 
therefore argue that for a firm that is adopting an optimal governance structure, the 
appointment of an additional sub-committee may represent a move away from its 
optimal governance structure, resulting in significant costs to the firm. Yet, consistent 
with findings of previous studies the authors find that increasing board ownership as 
well as debt help to reduces agency costs.  
                                                        
66 The main function of the nomination committee is to ensure that the board of directors (executive as 
well as non-executive) is appointed based on merit rather than by patronage. The Combined Code 
recommend that firms should setup sub-committees so as to ensure transparency within the process of 
appointing new directors 
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In a similar vein, Henry (2010) examines the expected impact of the Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations which were 
introduced by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) in 2003. In contrast to 
McKnight and Weir (2009) whose analysis is based on ex-post settings (i.e. after firms‟ 
adoption of the UK combined code), Henry (2010) develops a „structural‟ governance 
index which represents components of this code of governance practice now in force in 
Australia, and examines how firms‟ voluntary adoption of best corporate governance 
practices affects agency costs during the pre-adoption period from 1992 to 2002. His 
results suggest that although the adoption of individual „structural‟ governance practices 
does not greatly affect agency costs, greater voluntary compliance with the index that 
represents the code of governance practice (which was later formally introduced by 
ASX) indeed helps in significantly reducing the level of agency costs experienced by 
Australian listed firms. Therefore, they conclude that Australian listed firms‟ increasing 
post-introduction compliance with the ASX Corporate Governance Council code of 
practice would help to lower agency-costs.  
The contrasting findings of these two studies may suggest that impact of 
governance structure may vary depending on the institutional environment in which 
firms operate. This warrants additional research to assess the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms in a different institutional setting such as the Chinese one. 
5.2.4. Evidence on the links between agency costs, ownership, and internal 
governance mechanisms in China 
Only two papers consider the relationship between ownership structure and internal 
governance mechanisms, on the one hand, and agency costs, on the other, for Chinese 
listed firms. Tian and Estrin (2007) examine the governance role of debt in the context 
of Chinese firms. Focusing on a sample of 2660 firm–year observations pertaining to 
Chinese public listed companies over  the period 1994-1998, they  provide evidence 
suggesting that in contrast to the corporate governance literature, the use of debt capital 
among Chinese listed firms increases agency costs in the form of managerial perquisites 
(i.e. disguised income for management teams) and  discretionary expenses. This can be 
explained considering that the main source of debt capital for Chinese listed firms is 
bank loans, and an increase in bank lending increases the size of managerial perks and 
free cash flows, decreasing corporate efficiency. However, when the authors 
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differentiate the governance role of the debt between state- and privately-controlled 
firms, they find that while bank financing facilitates managerial exploitation of 
corporate wealth in the former, it is negatively but insignificantly associated with 
agency costs in the latter. This can be explained considering that government ownership 
of both banks and firms and the resultant soft budget constraints make debt an 
ineffective governance mechanism in state-controlled firms. Yet, they do not examine 
how other governance mechanisms affect agency costs that firm faces. 
Focusing on a sample of 1,647 firm-year observations for 549 non-financial 
listed companies over the period 1998-2000, Firth et al. (2008) examine the relationship 
between ownership structure and governance mechanisms, on the one hand; and agency 
costs, on the other, for Chinese listed firms. They find that firms with foreign 
shareholding experience higher levels of agency costs. This suggests that foreign 
investors do not closely monitor managers‟ non-value maximising behavior, and that 
foreign ownership is associated with increased managerial discretionary/non-necessary 
expenditures (i.e. agency costs). Furthermore, they find no evidence that government 
ownership and legal person shareholding exert influence on the level of agency costs. 
Consistent with the findings of Western studies such as, for example, Singh and 
Davidson, (2003) and McKnight and Weir (2009), they also report that the composition 
of the board of directors (proxied by the proportion of non-executive directors) is not 
effective in reducing agency costs. Overall, the findings in Firth et al.‟s (2008) study 
suggest that that ownership and governance reforms which Chinese listed firms had 
undergone before 2000 have not been largely effective in reducing agency costs 
incurred by these firms.  
Using data from earlier periods, these two studies provide valuable insight into 
the effectiveness of ownership and other internal governance mechanisms in mitigating 
agency costs in the early stage of the reform process of Chinese SOEs. Yet, as we 
discuss in the introduction, there has been significant changes to Chinese listed firms‟ 
ownership and governance structure in recent years. This creates an important research 
gap and provides an opportunity for assessing the successfulness of recent reforms for 
the firms.   
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5.2.5. Our contribution 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in many ways. First, it provides the first 
evidence from China on the direct relationship between managerial ownership and 
agency costs. Previous studies have in fact looked at the effects of government, legal 
person, and foreign shareholding, as well as the effects of debt on the agency costs 
faced by firms (Firth et al., 2008; Tian and Estrin, 2007). Yet, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no evidence on the direct effect of managerial ownership on agency 
costs in China. 
 Second, ours is the first study which provides empirical evidence on the agency 
costs for Chinese listed firms after the 2005-split-share-structure reform has been 
implemented, through which non-tradable shares were floated in the open markets and 
following which restrictions on managerial stock ownership were removed. This reform 
helped to align the interest of controlling shareholders with those of minority 
shareholders, thus significantly reducing agency costs, since following the reform, all 
the shareholders share not only the benefits from the market performance of companies‟ 
shares but also the idiosyncratic risk (Li et al., 2011).  
Third, we offer first evidence on the impact of (long term) debt financing on 
agency costs after the significant banking sector reform that have been implemented 
following China‟s accession to WTO in 2001. 
Fourth, like McKnight and Weir (2009) for UK firms, we provide evidence on 
the impact of the introduction of an independent director system on agency costs for 
Chinese listed firms, after the CSRC formally introduced the system as part of the 
corporate governance code in 2002. Although Firth et al. (2008) have examined the 
effects of the composition of the board of directors on the level of agency costs faced by 
firms, their study is based on data for the period of 1988 to 2000. Their study therefore 
only considers the reforms that had been implemented before 2000. Thus, Firth et al. 
(2008) test whether firms‟ voluntary appointment of outside directors on the board had 
any impact on agency costs.  
Fifth, for the first time, we analyze the impact of ownership and board 
characteristics on agency costs, differentiating between state-controlled and privately-
controlled firms.  
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Finally, unlike the study of Firth et al (2008), we properly address the 
endogeneity problem through the use of a system GMM estimator in our empirical 
analysis. This is important as endogeneity may be an important concern in our study for 
the following reasons. First, the observable and unobservable shocks which affect 
agency costs are also likely to affect governance and other firm characteristics used in 
the agency cost model. Second, it is likely that the observed relationship between 
governance structure and agency costs may reflect the effects of agency costs on the 
former rather than the other way around (Florakis and Ozkan, 2009). For example, firms 
facing higher agency costs may have provided their managers with equity stakes in 
them, so as to align the incentives of managers with those of owners. Similarly, banks 
may not be willing to lend to firms with potential for higher agency conflicts. Therefore, 
it is important to control for the endogeneity problem. 
 
5.3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss how specific internal governance mechanism which have 
been suggested in the literature (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and 
McKnight and Weir, 2009) are likely to affect agency costs of Chinese listed 
companies.
67
 
5.3.1. Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is considered as one of the core dimensions of governance of 
modern corporations. We focus in turn on managerial, state, legal person, and foreign 
ownership. 
5.3.1.1. Managerial ownership  
The separation of ownership and control and the resultant misaligned incentives of 
managers and owners in modern corporations generate agency costs, such as shirking, 
excessive consumption of perks, or other non-value maximising behavior by managers 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To solve this problem, the 
prescription of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is to give managers 
                                                        
67 Also see Denis and McConnell, (2003) and Brown et al., (2011) for detailed reviews on corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
 
127 
 
incentives in the form of equity ownership stakes in the firm. This helps to resolve 
managers‟ moral hazard problems by aligning their incentives with the interests of the 
shareholders. By strongly linking the future financial outcomes of the managers to 
shareholders‟ returns, equity ownership motivate managers to direct their commitment, 
preferences (e.g. risk taking) and efforts toward those actions and corporate policy 
choices that maximise shareholders‟ wealth. Further, providing managers with equity 
ownership in their firm is specially considered as an appropriate mechanism when it is 
difficult or costly to monitor managers‟ behavior due to information asymmetries 
between insiders and outside shareholders, or when it is difficult to make a priori 
judgments about the benefits and costs of specific actions taken by managers 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
In the light of these considerations, executives of US-corporations have 
increasingly received equity ownership in their firms and consequently, managerial 
ownership has become the dominant form of managerial incentives. As reported in Hall 
(2003), in US-based commercial corporations, by 2001, the median value of annual 
CEO equity-based pay has increased to about 66 percent from just about 1 percent prior 
to 1985. 
Although studies on the performance effect of managerial ownership provide 
mixed evidence (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et 
al., 1999; Demsetz and Vilollanga, 2001), studies on agency costs unanimously and 
consistently present strong evidence that managerial ownership is inversely associated 
with agency costs. This is consistent with the Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) 
convergence of interest hypothesis (e.g. Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson, 2003; 
Fleming et al., 2005; McKnight and Weir, 2009). 
In the context of China, from the early stages of the reform process, various 
incentive mechanisms have been used to align the incentives of managers with those of 
owners.
68
 In general, researchers find that whatever the managerial incentive system, it 
was associated with an improvement in the productivity and performance of firms, with 
limited effects in state controlled firms (Groves et al., 1994; Chow, 1997, Kato and 
Long, 2006 a, b, c). However, unlike the top managers of industrialised countries, due 
                                                        
68
 These mainly include managerial autonomy and a management responsibility system and 
corporatization and partial privatisation of former SOEs (Aivazian et al., 2005). 
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to the government policy and constrained personal wealth, managers of Chinese listed 
firms historically had very low equity ownership stakes in their firms. During the last 
decade there has been a considerable increase in the equity ownership of managers in 
China especially with the implementation of 2005 major ownership reform and the 
introduction of stock based incentive to top managers (Conyon and He, 2011 and 2012 
and  Walder, 2011).
69
  
In light of these developments, a handful of studies have examined the impact of 
managerial ownership on corporate decisions and performance indicators. For instance, 
using data from 779 listed Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 2002-2005, Lu 
et al. (2009) find that firms‟ export propensity and intensity are positively affected by 
CEO share ownership. In a similar vein, using World Bank survey data of 1088 private 
manufacturing firms over the period 2000–2002, Lin et al. (2011) report that those firms 
whose CEOs have significant shareholding in their firms, and firms who give 
performance-based compensations to their CEOs are more likely to undertake R&D 
investment, and to allocate more resources to R&D activities. Using a panel of 1648 
firm-year observations for Chinese listed firms over the period of 1999-2002, Lin et al. 
(2009) present evidence that the level of firm efficiency is positively associated with 
insiders‟ ownership. Similarly, using data from 970 Chinese listed firms over the period 
of 2007-2008, Liu et al. (2012) argue that managerial ownership is positively related to 
the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
no existing study has analysed the links between managerial ownership and agency 
costs in the Chinese context. In the present study, we fill this gap in the literature by 
examining for the first time the direct impact of increased incentive alignment achieved 
through the equity ownership of managers in their firm on agency costs. To this end, we 
measure agency costs using both the asset utilization ratio and the expense ratio.  
Consistent with the prediction of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managerial 
ownership reduces agency costs, we expect to observe a negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and agency costs for Chinese listed firms. Following the finance 
                                                        
69In January 2006, the CSRC issued “The Administrative Rules of Equity Compensation of Listed 
Companies” which allows the companies that have successfully completed their split-share-reforms to 
adopt equity based compensation plans for their managers. This also provided a strong incentive for the 
top managers of listed companies to complete the reform at the earliest possible in order to participate in 
the new compensation scheme. 
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literature (Berger et al., 1997; Anderson et al., 2000 and Yuan et al., 2008), we define 
managerial ownership as the percentage of shares owned by all directors and officers 
(including members of the supervisory board)
70
, and hypothesize that: 
H1: There is an inverse relationship between managerial ownership and agency 
costs. 
5.3.1.2. State ownership 
Research from developed countries as well as transitional and emerging economies 
(including China) often shows that state ownership in firms contributes to governance 
problems and thus, operational inefficiency, increased agency costs and poor 
performance in firms (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Megginson et al., 1994; Shleifer, 
1998; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Kato & Long, 2006a,b,c, & 2011; and Tian and 
Estrin, 2007). This is generally attributed to the following: first, weak incentives to the 
top management team; second, pursuit of multi-goals, namely social and political goals 
which leads excess labor and wages and appointment of people with political influence 
to the senior positions by government without considering their expertise; third, soft 
budget constraints and higher transaction costs; fourth, divergence between cash flow 
rights and control rights for the controlling shareholder: while government 
agents/bureaucrats have control over SOEs, the cash flow rights of SOEs belong to the 
state or the Treasury; fifth, there is an extra agency relationship in state-owned firms 
compared to privately-owned firms, as the government agents/bureaucrats are 
themselves agents of the true owners namely the state/ the general public.  
Substantial state ownership is observed in transformed SOEs in China. Prior 
studies on performance effects of state ownership among Chinese listed corporations 
argue that because of complex agency problems and soft budget constraints, state 
ownership leads to inefficiency and unsatisfactory firm performance (e.g., Xu and 
Wang, 1999; Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005). More recently, Chen et al. (2010) 
examine how transfers of controlling ownership from one state entity to another, as well 
as to a private entity affect performance of Chinese listed firms. They find that when 
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 Most of the studies based on U.S. data also investigate the effects of high powered incentives such as 
holding of common stocks and options on investment decisions. Given that in China stock options are 
still an underdeveloped incentive mechanism for managers, we consider stock holdings and not stock 
options as the main incentive mechanism for managers.   
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controlling ownership is transferred to the hands of a private entity, efficiency and 
performance significantly improve, mainly driven by the savings in costs and reduction 
in the labor force. In contrast, the transfer of control to other branches of the state results 
in small gains in performance. These findings lead the authors to conclude that the 
Chinese government should proceed to sell down its equity ownership stake in partially 
privatized listed firms.  
As for agency costs, Firth et al. (2008) do not find any relationship between state 
shareholding and agency costs. However, Tian and Estrin (2007) demonstrate that state 
controlled firms experience higher agency costs than privately controlled firms. 
Research on governance of Chinese listed firms suggests that government control over 
the firms weakens the efficacy of managerial incentives (Kato & Long, 2006a, b, c, and 
2011; Tian and Estrin, 2007). Thus, we to argue that state ownership should be 
associated with higher agency costs for firms. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H2: Firms with a high level of state-ownership are associated with a high level 
of agency costs. 
5.3.1.3. Legal person ownership 
Legal person shareholders in China are represented by domestic institutions such as 
domestic mutual funds, pension funds, brokerage firms, government agents, insurance 
companies and other corporate entities, which are similar to institutional investors in 
Western countries. Several studies suggest that this sort of shareholders have the 
opportunity, necessary capacity, and incentives (due to their large stake in a firm) to 
monitor managers‟ activities in order to enhance firm performance, and thus minimize 
agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990; Cornett, et al, 
2007).   
In the case of Chinese firms, some studies show that legal person shareholding is 
positively associated with firm performance since institutional shareholders have 
diverse professional background and are usually the largest shareholder of the firm (Xu 
and Wang, 1999; Sun and Tong, 2003). Using a sample of 1211 listed firms over the 
period of 2001-2005, Yuan et al. (2008) find that mutual funds‟ ownership in 
corporations enhances firm performance.  
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By contrast, researchers also point out that because many of these institutions 
are owned wholly or partially by different levels of government, it is also possible for 
agency problems to arise (Wei et al., 2005; Lin and Su, 2008)
 71
. After controlling for 
endogeneity, Wei et al. (2005) report a negative relationship between legal person 
shareholding and firm value measured using Tobin‟s Q. Firth et al.‟s (2008) study fails 
to find any significant association between legal person ownership and agency costs for 
their sample of firms. More recently, studies on the 2005 split share structure reform 
present evidence to suggest that mutual funds are associated with lower compensation 
for tradable shareholders, which suggests higher agency costs for the latter (Firth et al., 
2010). Given the contrasting findings in the literature, we make no ex-ante prediction on 
the effects of the legal persons‟ shareholding on agency costs.  
5.3.1.4. Foreign ownership 
The literature has traditionally argued that in emerging economies, the participation of 
foreign capital in domestic firms helps to adopt international standards of governance, 
as well as international business practices and technologies (Jackson and Strange, 
2008), which all help to closely monitor managers‟ self-interested behavior. Anderson 
et al. (2001) suggest that foreign investors are more likely to give pressure for the 
management to increase efficiency and the reduce agency costs faced by the firms 
which they invest in. By contrast, research also indicates that geographical distance, 
liability of foreignness, lack of knowledge about local conditions in the host country 
may often impede the governance role of foreign investors (Boardman et al., 1994).   
In the context of China, previous studies provide mixed results on the 
performance effects of foreign shareholders.
72
 Firth et al. (2008) provide evidence 
suggesting that in Chinese listed firms, foreign shareholders indeed do not provide 
effective monitoring of management, but, instead, encourage managers‟ consumption of 
perquisites, privileges, and “trappings of Western executives”. They conclude that 
because of this increased unnecessary expenditures, foreign ownership in Chinese listed 
                                                        
71
 Specifically, legal persons may expropriate assets or cash flows from the listed firms, harming the 
interest of minority shareholders. 
72
 See for example, Sun and Tong (2003), Bai et al. (2004), and Wei et al. (2005). Also, see the 
literature surveyed in Greenaway et al. (2013) for details. The latter authors show that there is an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and corporate performance in Chinese 
unlisted companies. 
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firms is associated with higher agency costs.  In line with their findings, we hypothesize 
that: 
H3: There is no association/ a negative association between foreign ownership 
and the level of agency costs. 
5.3.2. Board characteristics  
Agency costs arise mainly because of asymmetric information between managers and 
shareholders and shareholders‟ inability to directly monitor management. Therefore, 
board of directors are expected to align the interests of the management with those of 
the stockholders by monitoring the actions and decisions of management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Hence, by solving 
governance issues, boards of directors should help firms reduce the agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control. In this study, we consider two 
important variables related to board of directors, namely board independence and board 
size. 
5.3.2.1. Board independence 
Because of their independence and concern to maintain their reputation in the external 
labor market, non-executive directors will effectively monitor the actions of the 
executive directors and managers so as to ensure that they are pursuing policies 
congruent with the interests of shareholders and complement expert knowledge of top 
management (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Cadbury, 1992). Researchers also 
suggest that because of their education and broad knowledge, experience, reputation, 
and networks with other institutions, outside directors may play an information and 
service role, as well as a resource role, and also assist in making important strategic 
decisions (Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra, 2003). 
Yet, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, using event study analysis, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990, 1997) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) report 
evidence to support the view that the appointment of outside directors to the board is 
associated with increases in company value. By contrast, several empirical studies 
report evidence that the proportion of independent directors/outside directors negatively 
affects corporate performance (see, for example, Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
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1996; Weir and Laing, 1999). Singh and Devidson (2003) find direct evidence that the 
independent directors are not helpful in reducing agency costs for US listed firms. 
Researchers generally attribute these findings to the fact that outside directors do not 
have inside information about the firm, lack the required skills to attend their 
responsibilities, and are unwilling to play a confrontational monitoring role. 
Furthermore, some empirical studies fail to find any relationship between board 
composition and performance and argue that the proportion of independent directors is 
endogenously determined to the firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Wintoki et al., 2012). For example, poorly performing firms may appoint more 
independent directors who are expected to closely monitor managers‟ actions and thus 
help to improve performance. Yet, if one does not control for endogeneity properly, 
there could be a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
and firm performance.  
Since a conductive institutional environment for the effective functioning of 
outside directors has not yet been well established in China, some researchers cast doubt 
on the qualities and independence of outside directors. They also argue that outside 
directors are appointed merely to meet the requirements of the regulations and for the 
prestige of their value and, consequently, do not play their role as effectively as their 
counterparts in developed countries (Tenev and Chunlin, 2002, Clarke, 2003, 2006; Lau 
et al., 2007). They also point out that in China, independent directors are lacking 
necessary financial and practical business knowledge, or are too busy to care about the 
problems of listed companies to exert any substantial influence on important corporate 
decisions, other than ornamenting the board. Firth et al. (2008) present evidence that 
Chinese listed firms‟ voluntary appointment of outside directors, which was in place 
before the introduction of the independent director system in 2003, did not help to 
reduce agency costs.  We therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is no association/ a negative association between the proportion of 
independent directors in the board and agency costs. 
5.3.2.2. Board size 
Several papers provide evidence that the size of the board is an important governance 
mechanism as it affects its ability to be an effective monitor and guide. Monks and 
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Minow (2004) suggest that since larger boards are able to commit more time and effort 
to overseeing management, board monitoring can improve the quality of managerial 
decision-making and lead to better firm performance. Adams and Mehran (2003) 
provide evidence suggesting that larger boards increase monitoring effectiveness and 
guarantee greater board expertise. This evidence, thus, suggests that large boards can 
help to reduce agency costs. 
By contrast, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) theoretically argue that 
larger boards are less effective in group decision-making and strategy formulation, and 
help to entrench CEOs‟ power. The reason for this is that large boards hardly reach 
consensus on their decisions and agency problems such as directors‟ free-riding may 
increase within large boards. Prior studies also suggest that larger boards may lead to a 
low level of individual motivation and thus adversely affect its members‟ commitment 
and effective participation in decision making (Goodstein et al., 1994 and Dalton et al., 
1999). Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) support this argument by providing 
empirical evidence that firm performance is enhanced by smaller boards. Consistent 
with these arguments, Singh and Devidson (2003) report evidence suggesting that 
smaller boards are effective in reducing agency costs for US-listed firms. 
 In the Chinese context, Li et al. (2007a) and Conyon and He (2012) show that 
larger boards are inconsequential or less effective in specific actions such as the 
determination of CEO compensation. Huyghebaert and Wang (2012) provide empirical 
evidence to suggest that the board size does not influence related party transactions, but 
is associated with larger labor redundancies, thus resulting in higher agency costs in 
Chinese listed SOEs. They conclude that large board of directors might favor the 
expropriation of minority investors. In line with the above arguments, we hypothesize 
that:  
H5: There is a negative association between the size of the board of directors 
and agency costs. 
5.3.3. Debt financing 
Corporate finance theories and especially the agency literature show that debt financing 
can act as an important governance mechanism in aligning the incentives of corporate 
managers with those of shareholders, thus reducing agency costs of equity (e.g., Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; and 
Zwiebel,1996). This assertion mainly comes from the following benefits related to debt 
financing. First, the potential positive incentive effects of debt come from the discipline 
imposed by the obligation to continually earn sufficient cash to meet principal and 
interest payments. In other words, debt is a commitment device for executives (Zwiebel, 
1996). The greater probability of financial distress and the resultant potential for the 
threat of bankruptcy encourage managers to work hard and consume fewer perquisites 
by aligning their incentive with those of owners (Grossman and Hart, 1982 and Zwiebel, 
1996). As shown in Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Gilson (1990), financial distress or 
continuous low profits may lead to a shift of control to debt holders, resulting in the 
replacement of incumbent managers.  
Second, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that leverage reduces free cash 
flows available for managers‟ discretionary expenses (because of the legal requirement 
to pay interest and settle loans), and thereby helps to reduce managerial agency costs. 
Otherwise, managers who are often reluctant to distribute cash flows to owners have 
incentive to consume perks, or waste resources in unprofitable investments yielding 
sizable private benefits (i.e. empire building). Consistent with this view, McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) report evidence that leverage positively affects the value of those firms 
which have fewer growth opportunities.  
Third, higher leverage also provides incentives to lenders to monitor closely 
managers‟ actions. The increase in leverage is associated with the risk of bankruptcy 
(default). Further, McConnell and Servaes (1990) point out that when leverage increases, 
managers may invest in high-risk projects in order to meet interest payments. This 
suggests that the increase in leverage provides greater incentive for lenders to monitor 
more closely managers‟ actions and decisions, reducing agency costs. Moreover, the 
theory of financial intermediation suggests that bank loans have special advantages to 
the firms. The specialized knowledge of bankers enables them to gather necessary 
information, develop a detailed knowledge of the firms, and thus effectively monitor 
them so as to guarantee the returns to the depositors (Diamond, 1984;  Ang et al., 2000).   
In the context of China, using data for listed firms prior to 2000, Tian and Estrin, 
(2007) and Firth et al. (2008) argue and provide evidence that due mainly to soft budget 
constraints and the inefficient banking system, debt financing does not act as a 
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governance mechanism in reducing agency costs. Instead, the former authors further 
show that it facilitates increased managerial perks, mainly due to substantial 
government ownership and control in the firms.   
In contrast, recent research shows that following a series of reforms in the 
banking system and the resultant improvement in the governance of the Chinese 
financial sector
73
, banks now use more and more commercial judgment and prudence in 
their lending decisions (Cull and Xu, 2005, Ayyagari et al., 2008, Firth et al. 2009). 
Similarly, recent research on financing constraints of Chinese listed firms (Chan et al, 
2012; Lin and Bo, 2012; Tsai et al. 2014) provide evidence suggesting that state-
ownership does not necessarily reduce firms‟ financial constraints via soft budget 
constraints or easy access to finance. Tsai et al. (2014) further show that the banking 
system reforms helped not only to alleviate politically-oriented investment distortions 
(i.e. overinvestment) in SOEs, but also to alleviate under-investment problems in non-
state-controlled listed firms because of increased availability of bank loans to the private 
sector. This evidence suggests that bank financing no longer facilitates unwise 
investment and overconsumption of perquisites in SOEs, but tends instead to improve 
investment efficiency in both state-controlled and privately controlled firms.   
Thus, the recent banking system reforms can explain the contrasting findings 
obtained in older studies such as Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. (2008), and 
more recent ones such as Chan et al. (2012), Lin and Bo (2012) and Tsai et al. (2014). It 
is therefore reasonable to argue that the deregulated and reformed Chinese banks can 
now monitor corporate activities, thus improving the efficiency of firms. In other words, 
debt financing can now act as a governance mechanism in constraining managers‟ 
misuse of resources, thus reducing agency costs in Chinese listed firms. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H6: There is a negative association between the debt financing and agency costs. 
 
                                                        
73 See section 2.5 of Chapter 2 for detailed discussion on the China’s banking sector reform. 
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5.4. Base line specification and estimation methodology 
5.4.1. Base line specification 
Our baseline model links measures of agency costs with corporate governance factors 
and firm characteristics. Following previous studies (Ang et al., 2000; Singh and 
Davidson, 2003; McKnight and Weir, 2009), we initially estimate the following 
equation:  
ACit  =  β0 +  β1 DOS i(t-1) + β2SOSi(t-1) +  β3LPSi(t-1) +  β4FOWNSi(t-1)  +  β5INDIRi(t-1) +               
β6 BODSIZE(t-1)) + β7LEVi(t-1)  + β8 FIRSIZEi(t-1) + β9FAGEit + vi  +  vt   + vj   +  vr + it   (5.1) 
where i indexes firms and t, years. The error term in Equation (1) is made up of five 
components. vi is a firm-specific effect; vt, a time-specific effect, which we control for 
by including time dummies capturing business cycle effects; vj, an industry-specific 
effect, which we take into account by including industry dummies; and vr, a region-
specific effect, which we control for by including a full-set of regional dummies. 
Finally, it is an idiosyncratic component. 
ACit indicates alternative measures of agency costs. The independent variables 
include proxies aimed at testing the effects of ownership and corporate governance 
mechanisms and other control variables proved by previous studies to be influential 
determinants of agency costs. Table A5.1 in the Appendix provides definitions for all 
variables used in this paper.  
5.4.1.1 Agency costs 
Following Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Devidson (2003) among others, we measure 
agency costs in two ways, namely using the asset utilization ratio and the ratio of 
general, administrative and selling expenses to total sales (GA&S).  
It is argued that the asset utilization ratio, which is defined as the ratio of total 
sales to total assets, measures the efficiency with which management uses the firm‟s 
assets to generate sales. As inefficient assets utilization results in revenue loss to the 
firm, agency costs are inversely related to this ratio. A firm with higher turnover ratio 
indicates that the firm is generating significant sales out of its assets and thus facing low 
agency costs. In contrast, a firm with lower ratio indicates management‟s sub-optimal 
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behavior such as poor investment decisions (i.e. undertaking non-value maximising 
investment), insufficient effort/ shirking, or consumption of excessive perks. This would 
indicate conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, which in turn result in 
higher agency costs for shareholders. 
As discussed in McKnight and Weir (2009, p.141), this measure has a number of 
potential drawbacks. First, higher sales turnover may not always be synonymous with 
shareholder wealth because the sales may not actually come from profitable activities. 
For example a subsidiary may sell goods at lower price to the parent company. Second, 
the sales to assets ratio does not indicate how cash generated from sales is utilised: the 
management may expropriate the cash instead of distributing it to shareholders. Yet, as 
argued in previous studies (Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson, 2003; McKnight and 
Weir, 2009), this measure is widely used in the accounting and financial economics 
literature as a useful indicator of agency costs. 
Our second measure of agency costs is the expense ratio, which is defined as the 
sum of general, administration and selling expenses (GA&S) divided by total sales. The 
expenses in the numerator of this ratio are incurred by firms in relation to the 
organization and management of its production and operation, and to the sale of 
products. These expenses typically include those expenses incurred by the board of 
directors and the management in operating and managing the business, such as 
corporate cars, travelling expenses, entertainment expenses as well as other service bills. 
More importantly, much of these expenses are subject to managerial discretion, and, 
hence, a high expense ratio may indicate high agency costs for shareholders. The 
expense ratio is generally used as a measure of how effectively the firm‟s management 
controls expenses, including excessive perquisite consumption, and other direct agency 
costs.   
In the context of China, managerial perks are the main source of income for 
managers, as the average annual salary of Chinese general managers is much lower than 
that of their counterparts in Western countries (Kato and Long, 2006b and Conyon and 
He, 2011). For example, Chinese firms typically pay dining, communication, 
transportation, and entertainment bills for a senior manager‟s family. Most managerial 
perquisites are not explicitly reported in financial statements, but are included in the 
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administration costs. Therefore, Tian and Estrin (2007) suggest that the expense ratio is 
a good indicator of managerial perquisites. 
Finally, asset utilization ratio and the ratio of general, administrative and selling 
expenses to total sales (GA&S) are more commonly used as proxies for agency costs in 
various research settings including China. For example, Tian and Estrin (2007) and 
Firth et al. (2008) use these variables to measure agency costs for Chinese listed firms. 
From 1993 China started to adopt a new accounting system that is closer to international 
accounting standards and provides better information disclosure. Furthermore, from 
2000, all Chinese-listed firms have applied a consistent and unified set of accounting 
standards (Chen et al., 2012). Components of these two variables, namely general, 
administrative and selling expenses, total sales, total assets are measured in similar 
manner as in the Western countries. We believe therefore that asset utilization ratio and 
the ratio of general, administrative and selling expenses to total sales can also be used to 
measure agency costs for Chinese listed firms. 
5.4.1.2 Ownership and other internal governance mechanisms 
Focusing on corporate governance mechanisms, we include managerial shareholding 
(DOS) to represent the alignment of managerial interest with that of shareholders.
74
 
Following Firth et al (2008), we also include legal person shareholding (LPS), state 
shareholding (SOS), and foreign shareholding (FOWNS) to see the impact of other 
major shareholders. As for the board characteristics, we include the board size 
(BOARDSIZE); and the proportion of independent directors in the board (INDIR). 
Finally, following the governance literature (see for example, McKnight and Weir, 
2009) we include leverage as a governance mechanism which constrains managers‟ 
expropriation of free cash flow. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the percentage of total 
debt to total assets. We include these corporate governance variables first one by one 
and then all together. 
If the above corporate governance mechanisms are effective in reducing agency 
costs, as predicted by our hypotheses, we would expect the level of asset utilization to 
                                                        
74
 All shareholding variables are calculated as the percentage of shares owned by various agents. For 
instance, managerial shareholding (DOS) is defined as the percentage of shares owned by managers, 
directors, and supervisors. We also estimated alternative specifications, which included the squares of 
Managerial, state, legal person, and foreign ownership, but these quadratic terms were never statistically 
significant. The results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
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be positively associated with better governance, and the discretionary expenses to be 
negatively related with it. This is consistent with the notion that firms with strong 
governance structures show lower levels of discretionary expenses and greater levels of 
asset utilization. 
5.4.1.3 Control variables 
In line with previous studies, Equation (5.1) includes several additional variables to 
control for a set of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the 
agency costs faced by firms. These include firm size (FIRSIZE) and firm age and 
(FAGE). We also control for territory specific, industry-specific and time-specific 
effects by including dummies for regions, industries and sample years in all 
specifications.  
Firm size (FIRSIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total real sales at 
the firm level. A stylized fact in the corporate finance literature is that firm size is an 
important determinant of a firm‟s outcome such as investment and financing decisions, 
performance and agency costs.  The main reason is that the firm size is associated with 
the realization of economies of scale in terms of asset utilization, operations and 
expenses. Additionally, a larger firm size reflects firms‟ ability to attract and deploy 
resources (such as finance, expertise, and so on), and thus may lead the firm to adopt a 
better corporate governance system (Guillen (2000). Consequently, large firms are 
likely to operate at lower average cost and may display lower agency costs than smaller 
firms. Previous studies report a negative relationship between the firm size and agency 
costs (see, for example, Ang et al., 2000, and Singh and Davidson, 2003). By contrast, 
Doukas et al. (2000 and 2005) argue and present evidence that since large firms are 
associated with greater informational difficulties, as they are more diversified and 
complex, it is difficult for owners and security analysts to closely monitor managerial 
misconducts, leading to higher agency costs. It is therefore clearly important to control 
for the firm size in our agency costs regressions, but the literature does not provide a 
clear prediction of the sign it should have.  
The sign of firm age (FAGE) is also unclear. Ang et al. (2000) argue that 
because of the effects of learning and survival bias, mature firms are more efficient than 
younger firms. In addition, a firm with a long history can establish its reputation in the 
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debt market, and with banks, and, is thus likely to suffer less from asymmetric 
information problems, which may make it easier to obtain the debt financing. This in 
turn could be related to higher efficiency because the higher the leverage, the higher the 
potential for default risk, and the higher the incentive for banks to closely monitor these 
firms‟ operations (Ang et al., 2000). Conversely, in the context of China, older firms are 
more likely to be former SOEs and thus to face more severe governance problems (Lin 
et al., 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c). When compared to younger privately-
controlled enterprises, they are therefore likely to be less efficient and to face higher 
agency costs . Consistent with these arguments Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. 
(2008) find a negative relationship between agency costs and firm age.  
We control for differences in agency costs across industries in our analysis by 
including a set of dummy variables, one for each of the industries considered in the 
CSMAR B classification. We also control for any systematic differences in regional 
development by including regional dummies. Finally, time-specific effects are 
accounted for by including year dummies in all specifications. 
5.4.2. Estimation methodology 
To empirically analyze the relationship between ownership and other governance 
mechanisms and agency costs, we use the system Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995). This technique simultaneously controls for firm-specific fixed effects, and 
endogeneity problems, by using lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables 
as internal instruments. The system GMM estimator estimates the relevant equation 
both in levels and in first-differences. First-differencing is used to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. We use all right-hand side variables (except age and the 
dummies) lagged twice or more as instruments in the first-differenced equation, and 
first-differences of these same variables lagged once as instruments in the level 
equation. Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that the first-differenced GMM procedure 
may suffer from weak instrument problems and might produce biased results. 
Therefore, to reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the first-
differenced GMM estimator, we use the system GMM estimation. 
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We use the Sargan/Hansen test for over identifying restrictions, and the test for 
second order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals (AR (2)) to test the validity of 
our instruments. In the case of failure of the Sargan/Hanson test and/or AR (2) test
75
, 
regressors lagged three times or more are included in the instrument set (Bond, 2002)
76
.  
 
5.5.Data and descriptive statistics 
5.5.1. Sample and dataset 
The data used in this study are obtained from two Chinese databases, namely the China 
Stock Market Accounting Database (CSMAR) and Sino-fin for the period of 2003-
2010. The sample is composed of publicly listed non-financial firms traded on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Following the literature, we exclude financial 
firms from our analysis. To reduce the influence of potential outliers, we exclude 
observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables. Since we lag all 
our independent variables once, in our empirical analysis, we end up with a panel of 
9237 firm-year observations on 1420 companies over the period 2004-2010. The panel 
has an unbalanced structure, with an average of 6 observations per firm. 
5.5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. We observe 
that the pooled mean (median) value of managerial ownership is 2.3% (0%), with a 
minimum value of 0% and maximum value of 65.4%. The state and legal persons hold 
on average (at the median) 23.3% (17.3%) and 14% (1.2%) of the shares, respectively. 
Foreign shareholders, on average (at the median), hold 4 % (0%) of total issued shares. 
The average (median) board size is 9.360 (9.0), with an average (median) proportion of 
independent outside directors of 35.2% (33.3%). The average (median) debt to total 
asset ratio is 51.3% (51.6%). 
As for the control variables included in our baseline model, the average 
(median) firm size is just over 1 billion RMB (0.464), and the average (median) firm 
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 For example, this could happen due to measurement error. 
76
 See sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 of Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on the system GMM estimator 
and the tests for the validity of the instruments. 
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age measured by number of years from the establishment of firm is 11.41 (11)
77
. 
Average (median) productivity, measured as real sales per employee, is 0.55 million 
RMB (0.24).  
Table 5.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables. Since 
corporate governance mechanisms are highly likely to be endogenous, we do not 
concentrate much on the interpretation of correlation coefficients. Nonetheless, Table 
5.2 suggests that given that the observed correlation coefficients are relatively low, 
multicollinearity should not be a serious problem in our study. 
 
5.6. Empirical results 
5.6.1. Links between ownership, internal governance mechanisms, and agency 
costs measured by the asset utilization ratio 
Table 5.3 presents system GMM estimation results of our baseline model (1), where the 
dependent variable is the asset utilization ratio. This ratio varies inversely with agency 
costs. Thus, a negative sign of the estimated coefficient of our independent variables 
indicates higher agency costs for the firm.  
In column 1 of Table 5.3, we first estimate a naïve model in which we include 
managerial ownership and a set of control variables such as firm size, firm age, and 
regional, industry, and year dummies. In columns 2 through 4, we then separately 
include other ownership variables. In columns 5 and 6, we include our two board 
structure variables, and in column 7, leverage. In column 8, we estimate our baseline 
model with all the variables included at the same time.  
Focusing on column 1, we observe that the coefficient on managerial ownership 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. In line with hypothesis H1, this 
finding suggests that there is strong evidence in support of Jensen and Mackling‟s 
(1976) incentive alignment hypothesis. The alignment of managers‟ incentives with 
those of shareholders encourages managers to utilize a firm‟s assets effectively, thus 
                                                        
77
 It should be noted that although firm size is measured as the logarithm of total real sales in the 
regression analysis, the figures reported in the descriptive statistics Table are not in logarithms as actual 
values are easier to interpret. 
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reducing agency costs. This result is consistent with the findings of previous empirical 
studies such as Ang et al. (2000); Singh and Davidson (2003); Fleming et al. (2005); 
Florackis (2008); and McKnight and Weir (2009), who also report an inverse 
relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs. Furthermore, its 
magnitude also appears to be economically significant: incrementing managerial 
ownership by one-standard deviation reduces agency costs (increase assets utilization 
efficiency) by 6.53 % 
78
. 
From column 2 of Table 5.3, we observe that, in line with hypotheses H2, the 
estimated coefficient on state ownership is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
Focusing on economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in state 
shareholdings decreases asset utilization efficiency (i.e., an increase in agency costs) by 
approximately 2.5% in column 2
79
. This result is consistent with the view that state 
ownership in Chinese listed firms leads to governance problems and thus, operational 
inefficiency, increased agency costs and poor performance of the firms (Kato & Long, 
2006a,b,c, & 2011; Tian and Estrin, 2007). This result is inconsistent with Firth et al. 
(2008) who find insignificant effects of state ownership on agency costs using random-
effects and fixed-effects estimators. Yet, their results may be biased by the fact that they 
do not take endogeneity into account. After controlling for endogeneity, Wai et al. 
(2005) also document that increased state ownership in a firm results in poor 
performance (higher agency costs for the shareholders).  
Legal person ownership and foreign ownership are introduced respectively in 
columns 3 and 4. Yet, these variables do not exhibit significant coefficients, which 
supports our hypothesis H3. Firth et al. (2008) also report insignificant effects of legal 
person shareholding on agency costs. Yet, they find a significant negative relationship 
between foreign shareholdings and agency costs for Chinese listed firms. 
In column 5 and 6, the proportion of independent directors and board size are 
included in the model. The estimated coefficient on the proportion of independent 
directors is statistically insignificant, in line with our Hypothesis 4. This finding is 
consistent with the Singh and Davidson, (2003) and McKnight and Weir (2009), who 
                                                        
78 This number is obtained as the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership (0.494) times its 
standard deviation (0.090) divided by the mean value of the assets utilization ratio (0.680). 
79 This number is obtained as the estimated coefficient on state shareholdings (-0.075) times its standard 
deviation (0.233) divided by the mean value of the assets utilization ratio (0.680). 
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focused on US and UK, listed firms, respectively. As for the board size, it is negatively 
associated with the asset utilization ratio, but its coefficient is not significant, which 
contradicts Hypothesis 5. Taken together, these results lend support to the view that 
board of directors in Chinese listed firms are unable to contribute to the effective 
monitoring of top managers‟ non-value maximizing behavior. Our results are also 
consistent with Clarke (2003 and 2006), and Lau et al. (2007), who argue that 
independent directors in the Chinese market are just appointed to meet regulatory and 
legal requirements.  
In column 7, we examine the effects of leverage on agency costs. As discussed 
earlier, if the recent reforms in the Chinese banking system and the governance of banks 
have been increased banks‟ lending and monitoring efficiency as found in recent studies 
(Chan et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2014), we would expect positive effects of leverage on 
the asset utilization ratio, and hence lower agency costs for the firms.  The results 
support this conjecture and are therefore in line with Hypothesis 7. The estimated 
coefficient on leverage is in fact positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that the effects are economically meaningful: 
a one standard deviation increase in leverage increases asset utilization efficiency by 
6.66%
80
, on average.  
This result is inconsistent with the findings of Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth 
et al. (2008) who, focusing on the data from an earlier period, report evidence of an 
ineffective role of debt in mitigating agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders in Chinese listed firms. The difference between our findings and theirs can 
be explained considering that we use more recent data, and considering that, in recent 
years, China banks not only increased their lending and monitoring efficiency, but were 
no longer forced to lend unlimited amounts of money to SOEs. In fact, the Chinese 
government no longer provides guarantee for the borrowing of SOEs from the banks, 
resulting in the soft budget constraints which SOEs enjoyed for a long time being 
eliminated (Cull and Xu, 2005; Bhabra et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009 and Lin and Bo, 
2012, Chan et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2014). Leverage can therefore potentially act as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism in constraining managers from consuming 
                                                        
80 This number is obtained as the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership (0.473) times its 
standard deviation (0.081) divided by the mean value of investment (0.060). 
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excessive perks, and from spending corporate resources in wasteful investments (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990).  
Column 8 of Table 5.3 shows parameter estimates for our baseline model (1), 
when all the independent and control variables are include at the same time. We can see 
that the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership variable remains positive and 
precisely determined. The coefficient estimate on the leverage ratio also remains 
positive. Yet, the coefficient on state ownership is no longer significant at conventional 
levels, which may indicate that the result in column 2 was driven by omitted variable 
bias.  
As for the effects of the control variables, the results show that in all 
specifications, the estimated coefficient on firm size is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that larger firms are associated with lower agency costs. This is 
consistent with the prediction that large firms have more resources, experience 
economies of scale, and are able to effectively monitor managers‟ misconduct. This 
result is also consistent with Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson, (2003) and Firth et 
al. (2008) among others. The coefficient associated with firm age is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in five out of eight regressions in Table 5.3. This 
finding is consistent with our prediction that Chinese older firms  are more likely to be 
former SOEs with a long history of operation (which were then converted into listed 
companies), and as such face more agency problem leading to less efficient utilization 
of assets  and higher agency costs. This result is also consistent with the findings of 
Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. (2008).   
The AR2 and Sargan tests generally indicate that our models are correctly 
specified and that the instruments are generally valid.  
In summary, our results indicate that managerial ownership and debt financing 
are the main internal governance mechanisms that help mitigating agent costs among 
Chinese listed firms.  
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5.6.2. Links between ownership, internal governance mechanisms and agency costs 
measured by the expense ratio 
We now turn to results obtained when using the expense ratio as an alternative measure 
of agency costs. Table 5.4 present the system GMM estimation results. As shown in 
columns 1 and 8, consistent with our findings from Table 5.3, the coefficient on 
managerial ownership is negative and precisely determined, further supporting our 
incentive alignment hypothesis (H1) that increased managerial ownership help reduce 
agency costs among Chinese listed firms. Furthermore, its magnitude is also 
economically significant. Focusing on column 1, we find that incrementing managerial 
ownership by one-standard deviation decreases general, administration and selling 
expenses ratio by 24.68 %.  
Focusing on columns 2 to 8, we observe that other ownership variables do not 
have influence on agency costs, with the exception of state ownership, which, in 
accordance with our hypothesis H2, exhibits a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in column 2. Moving to board characteristics, we observe that, once again, 
board size and the proportion of independent directors do not influence agency costs. 
Finally, consistent with the findings in Table 5.3, we observe that leverage exhibits a 
positive and significant coefficient in both columns 7 and 8. This effect is economically 
meaningful: focusing on column 7, a one standard deviation increase in leverage 
decreases the expense ratio approximately by 16.4%
81
. 
The coefficients on the other control variables indicate that, consistent with 
previous findings, young and large firms, are more likely to have lower agency costs. 
The AR3 and Sargan tests generally indicate that our models are correctly specified and 
that the instruments are generally valid
82
. In summary, the results obtained using the 
expense ratio as a measure of agency costs are consistent with those obtained using the 
asset utilization ratio. 
                                                        
81  This number is obtained as the estimated coefficient on managerial ownership (0.42.5) times its 
standard deviation (0.081) divided by the mean value of investment (0.060).  
82 We report the AR(3) test instead of the AR(2) test because, contrary to Table 3, all instruments in 
this table are lagged three or more times. 
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5.6.3. Further tests 
In this section, to assess the robustness of our results, we re-estimate our baseline model 
(equation 5.1) separately for the pre- and post-2006 period, and for state-controlled and 
privately-controlled firms. In doing so, we use the asset utilization ratio to measure 
agency costs. All results were robust to using the expense ratio.   
5.6.3.1. Estimating separate regressions for the pre- and post-2005 period 
The results in the previous sub-sections establish that managerial ownership and debt 
financing are the two important governance devices that help mitigate agency conflicts 
in Chinese listed firms. As our data spans the 2005-2006 split share structure reform, we 
next analyze whether our results hold both before and after the reform. This exercise 
can be motivated considering that as a consequence of the reform; firms‟ ownership has 
changed tremendously. In particular, a large number of non-tradable shares which were 
mainly held the government and government related agents became tradable, increasing 
the liquidity in the capital markets. Further, as a result of the reform, government 
ownership has significantly declined in listed firms. This may have given banks 
incentives to consider commercial terms when issuing loans to firms, and to closely 
monitor the firms to which they have provided finance. Additionally, managerial 
ownership became more important in recent years, since, as a consequence of the 
reform, Chinese corporations have been allowed to incentivize their top management 
with stock and stock options. As a consequence of this, average managerial ownership 
rose from 0.5.% in 2003 to 8.2% in 2010, managers‟ interests became aligned with 
stock return performance, and their conflicts of interest with outsider investors were 
reduced.   
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.5 provide separate estimates of Equation (5.1) for 
the pre- and post-2006 period, respectively. Focusing on column 1, we observe that, in 
the pre-reform period, the coefficients on foreign ownership and debt financing are 
negative and significant at conventional levels, suggesting that both foreign ownership 
and leverage are associated with high levels of agency costs. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Firth et al. (2008) and Tian and Estrin (2007) respectively. The 
negative coefficient on leverage suggests that prior to the stock market and banking 
reforms, Chinese banks were less efficient in monitoring their borrowers, leading bank 
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debt to facilitate wasteful investment which increased agency costs. Similarly, before 
the reform, foreign shareholders were not effective in monitoring of management, but, 
instead, encouraged managers‟ consumption of perks. 
Column 2 of Table 5.5 shows that only the coefficients on managerial ownership 
and debt financing are positive and significant at conventional levels in the post-reform 
period. These results suggest that, in the post-reform period, managerial ownership and 
bank monitoring of borrowers through leverage work as effective governance devises, 
providing incentive to managers to refrain from non-value maximizing activities, 
reducing therefore agency costs. Similar findings are reported by Sarkar and Sakar 
(2007), who show that in the early period of institutional change in India, debt did not 
work as a disciplining device in either standalone or group affiliated firms, but became 
an important mechanism in constraining managers‟ opportunistic behavior in the later 
period when institutions had become more market oriented.  
Interestingly, in column 2 of Table 5.5, we also observe that the coefficient of 
legal person ownership, which was insignificant in the pre-reform period, becomes 
positive and significant at the 10% level after 2006. This suggests a monitoring role of 
legal person shareholders, and can be explained in the light of the alignment of the 
incentives of large shareholders with those of minority shareholders that followed the 
reform. This may have happened because, after the reform, non-tradable shares have 
become tradable in the two exchanges. This gave legal shareholders the incentive not 
only to stop expropriating corporate resources (Lin, 2009; Chen et al. 2012), but also to 
closely monitor managers‟ misconducts   
Another interesting finding from the post-reform period results is that the 
estimated coefficient on foreign shareholders becomes insignificant, though still 
negative. We do not have any convincing explanation for this result but this might be 
due to the fact that with the general improvement in the corporate governance of 
Chinese listed firms, foreign shareholders may have increased their monitoring 
incentives in line with the expectation of future growth potential of the firms.  
5.6.3.2. Estimating separate regressions for state and non-state firms  
We now turn to investigate how the impact of ownership and governance mechanisms 
on agency costs differs between the subsamples of state and non-state firms classified 
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based on controlling owner. This exercise is motivated considering that in the case of 
China, firms with larger state ownership and control are more likely to exhibit poor 
governance structure and high agency costs (Qian, 1996; Lin et al., 1998; Su, 2005). 
Consistent with this argument, current research on Chinese listed firms provide 
evidence that managerial ownership and other incentive mechanisms are negatively 
associated with state ownership (Conyon and He, 2011 and 2012; Kato and Long, 
2006a,b,c and 2011), and that government ownership is positively associated with fraud 
(Hou and Moore, 2010), but negatively related to the corporate governance quality 
index (CGI) constructed by Cheung et al. (2010). This suggests that agency costs are 
higher for state controlled firms compared to their privately controlled counterparts. 
Furthermore, according to Lin et al. (1998) and Chow et al. (2010), firms with 
larger state ownership and control typically benefit from soft budget constraints, as the 
government is both creditor and borrower. As the managers of SOEs believe that the 
government will bail them out in the event of financial difficulties, they have incentives 
to expropriate corporate resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In line with these 
arguments, Tian and Estrin (2007) provide evidence consistent with the view that debt 
financing increases managerial agency costs in state-controlled firms. Nonetheless, with 
the recent improvements in the governance of both firms and banks, and in the lending 
efficiency of banks (Firth et al., 2009; Tsai et al.,2014), we would expect that whilst 
debt financing plays a governance  role in privately controlled firms, it is not necessarily 
associated with high agency costs in state controlled firms (i.e. debt has ceased its 
facilitating role of managerial perks).   
 In columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.7, we provide separate GMM estimates of the 
equation (1) for non-state and state firms, respectively. The results show that managerial 
ownership and debt financing are only effective in reducing agency costs at non-state 
firms, whilst the coefficients on these two variables are poorly determined for state 
firms. Whilst the results concerning managerial ownership are consistent with Conyon 
and He (2011, 2012), and Kato and Long (2006 a,b,c and 2011), the results on debt 
financing are consistent with Ding et al., (2014a) who show that debt contributes 
positively to the investment efficiency of private firms, but not to that of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This implies that the preferential lending to the state sector by the 
banking system may still be problematic.  
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  Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of legal person shareholders is positive 
and significant at 10% level only for privately-controlled firms, suggesting that 
privately controlled institutional shareholders such as mutual funds in privately 
controlled firms closely monitor managers, thus reducing agency costs  This result is 
consistent with Bhabra et al. (2008), who show that legal person shareholders in 
privately controlled firms helps to improve corporate governance by encouraging 
managers to use more debt financing, which is an important device to constrain 
inappropriate use of free cash flow.  
 The estimated coefficient of board size is negative and significant at the 1% 
level only for state-controlled firms, suggesting that larger boards are associated with 
higher agency costs. This result is consistent with the findings with Huyghebaert and 
Wang (2012) for Chinese SOEs. The authors suggest that board size does not influence 
related party transactions, but is associated with larger labor redundancies in Chinese 
SOEs.
83 
 This result can also be explained considering that almost 90% of the board 
members of the state controlled listed firms are government officials who are likely to 
pursue social and political objectives, resulting in higher agency costs for minority 
shareholders (Su, 2005). 
  
5.7. Conclusions 
A vast number of empirical studies have analysed the impact of ownership and 
governance mechanisms on various firm decisions and performance indicators. In 
contrast, following Ang et al.‟s (2000) influential contribution to the empirical analysis 
of agency costs, which are measured by the asset utilization ratio and the expense ratio, 
only a limited number of studies have presented evidence on the direct effects of 
ownership and governance mechanisms on agency costs. In the context of China, early 
studies show that ownership and board structure do not generally affects agency costs, 
while debt financing facilitates managerial perquisites. During the last decade there 
have been significant changes in the ownership and governance structure of listed firms 
                                                        
83 This result is also consistent with the arguments and empirical evidence in Bai et al. (2000) and Bai 
and Xu (2002), who suggest that the chief executive officer of a SOE typically faces multiple tasks (i.e. 
profitability, political and social objectives). Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also note that maintaining 
employment is an important agenda for SOEs. 
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with a view to mitigate agency conflicts, and thereby enhance efficiency and 
profitability in these firms. 
 In this study, we use a large panel of listed Chinese firms over the period 2003-
2010 to examine the impact of ownership, other internal governance mechanisms, and 
debt financing on the agency costs that firms face. Using the system GMM estimator to 
control for unobserved firm characteristics and endogeneity, we find that managerial 
ownership and debt financing work as effective corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating agency costs for the firms. In particular, we find that high levels of 
managerial ownership and debt help the firms lower the agency costs. We also find 
some evidence that legal person shareholdings help to mitigate agency costs. 
We then distinguish the effects of governance mechanisms on agency costs 
between state-controlled and privately-controlled firms, as well as between the pre and 
post–2005 split share structure reform period. We find that the beneficial effects of 
managerial ownership and debt financing mainly operate in the latter part of the sample. 
We also find that that managerial ownership and debt financing are only effective in 
reducing agency costs at non-state firms. Furthermore, whilst the proportion of 
independent directors and board size generally do not affect agency costs in Chinese 
listed firms, larger boards are associated with higher agency costs in state-controlled 
firms. 
Our study has policy implications. First, the Chinese government‟s commitment 
to reform the previously segmented ownership structure of Chinese listed firms has 
been successful, which is evidenced by the fact that managerial ownership has emerged 
as an important governance mechanisms in the post-reform period. Second, China‟s 
banking sector reform has been successful in terms of improving lending and 
monitoring efficiency of the banks, especially after 2005. This suggests that the removal 
of much of the restriction on foreign banks as per WTO accession agenda
84
, and the 
listing of state owned banks have been positive developments.  
Although like Tian and Estrin (2007) and Firth et al. (2008), our study has 
focused on listed firms, it would be interesting to examine how ownership structure 
                                                        
84  See Lin, (2011) who suggests that profitable firms and private firms have much benefited from foreign 
bank entry, and use more long-term bank loans.  
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affects the agency costs of non-listed firms
85
. It would also be interesting to measure 
agency costs using relative as well as absolute measures of agency costs as in Ang et al. 
(2000) and Fleming et al. (2005). These issues are in the agenda for future research. 
 
Appendix 
  
                                                        
85 See, for example, Greenway et al. (2013) and Guariglia and Liu (2014) for an analysis of impact of 
ownership structure on these firms‟ performance and innovation activities, respectively. 
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Appendix: Table A5.1 Variables’ names and definitions 
Variables  Name Definition 
Dependent Variables   
Asset utilization ratio AC1 Ratio of total sales to total assets 
Expense ratio AC2 Sum of general, administration and selling 
expenses (GA&S) divided by total sales 
Corporate governance 
variables 
  
Managerial share ownership DOS Percentage of shares owned by managers, 
directors and supervisors 
State-owned shares 
 
SOS 
 
Percentage of shares owned by the central 
government, local governments, or any entity 
representing the central or local governments  
Legal person shares LPS Percentage of shares owned by non-individual 
legal entities or institutions 
Foreign share ownership FOWNS Percentage of shares owned by foreign investors 
Independent directors INDIR Proportion of independent directors on the board 
of directors. 
Board size BODSIZE Total number of directors on the board 
Leverage ratio LEV Ratio of total leverage to total assets 
 
Control Variables 
  
Firm size  FIRSIZE Natural logarithm of the firm‟s total real sales 
Firm age FAGE Logarithm of the number of years since the 
establishment of the firm 
Regional dummies  Dummies indicating whether the firm is located in 
the Coastal, Western, or Central region of China 
Year dummies  Year dummies for the years 2005 to 2010. 
Industry dummies  Dummies for the following four industrial groups 
based on the CSMAR B classification: Properties, 
Conglomerates, Industry, Commerce. Utilities and 
financial industries are excluded. 
Note: Real variables are derived from nominal ones using China‟s GDP deflator.  
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics of governance and firm characteristics for the pooled 
sample of companies 
variable N mean sd p50 min max 
Asset  utilization ratio (AC1) 9226 0.680 0.445 0.582 0.036 2.660 
Expense ratio ( AC2) 9062 0.155 0.132 0.119 0.016 1.285 
Managerial shareholding (DOS) 8142 0.023 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.654 
State shareholding (SOS) 8776 0.233 0.240 0.173 0.000 0.750 
Legal person shareholding (LPS) 8776 0.140 0.198 0.012 0.000 0.733 
Foreign shareholding (FOWNS) 8776 0.039 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.513 
Independent directors (INDIR) 8249 0.353 0.045 0.333 0.000 0.545 
Board size (BODSIZE) 8249 9.360 1.882 9 5 15 
Leverage to assets ratio (LEV) 9226 0.513 0.205 0.516 0.060 1.677 
Firm size  (billion RMB)(FIRSIZE) 9226 1.126 2.103 0.464 0.019 19.478 
Firm age (FAGE) 9226 11.407 4.045 11.000 1.000 28.000 
Notes:  This table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in our study. Sd indicates 
the standard deviation; N, the number of observations; p50, the median; min, the minimum 
value; and max, the maximum value. All variables are defined in Table A5.1 in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
AC1 1 1.00 
          
AC2 2 -0.29* 1.00 
         DOSi(t-1) 3 0.00 0.03* 1.00 
        SOSi(t-1) 4 0.01 -0.07* -0.26* 1.00 
       LPSi(t-1) 5 -0.06* 0.10* -0.02 -0.46* 1.00 
      FOWNSi(t-1) 6 0.04* 0.00 -0.06* 0.01 -0.03* 1.00 
     INDIRi(t-1) 7 0.01 -0.03* 0.09* -0.12* -0.01 0.00 1.00 
    BODSIZE(t-1) 8 0.02 -0.06* -0.09* 0.15* -0.08* 0.08* -0.28* 1.00 
   LEVi(t-1) 9 0.10* -0.04* -0.21* -0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.04* 1.00 
  FIRSIZEi(t-1) 10 0.52* -0.43* -0.13* 0.13* -0.21* 0.15* 0.00 0.21* 0.21* 1.00 
 AGE 11 0.00 0.01 -0.30* -0.21* -0.08* 0.05* 0.05* -0.05* 0.25* 0.11* 1.00 
 
Notes:  All variables are defined in Table A5.1 in the Appendix.  
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Table 5.3 Internal governance mechanisms, firm characteristics, and agency costs 
measured by the asset utilization ratio 
 System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance variables        
DOSi(t-1) 0.494
***       0.603*** 
 (0.146)       (0.181) 
SOSi(t-1)  -0.075
*      0.065 
  (0.044)      (0.056) 
LPSi(t-1)   -0.001     0.092 
   (0.046)     (0.059) 
FOWNSi(t-1)    -0.428    0.081 
    (0.355)    (0.292) 
INDIRi(t-1)     0.538   0.321 
     (0.399)   (0.380) 
BODSIZE(t-1)      -0.170  -0.160 
      (0.119)  (0.125) 
LEVi(t-1)       0.221
** 0.204* 
       (0.095) (0.108) 
Control 
variables 
        
FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.161
*** 0.167*** 0.172*** 0.162*** 0.171*** 0.177*** 0.157*** 0.173*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
AGEit -0.025 -0.064
*** 
-
0.046*** 
-0.038** 
-
0.050*** 
-
0.053*** 
-0.045 -0.032 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) (0.035) 
Regional 
dummies 
yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8564 8741 8741 8741 8688 8688 9237 8564 
Hansen test  (p 
values) 
7.84 
(0.347) 
1.54 
(0.462) 
3.87 
(0.144) 
1.80 
(0.407) 
2.35 
(0.142) 
2.31 
(0.140) 
2.05 
(0.153) 
13.45 
(0.414) 
AR1 (p values) 
-8.10 
(0.000) 
-7.99 
(0.000) 
-8.00 
(0.000) 
-7.55 
(0.000) 
-7.91 
(0.000) 
-7.96 
(0.000) 
-7.94 
(0.000) 
-7.93 
(0.000) 
AR2 (p values) 
1.42 
(0.157) 
1.01 
(0.314) 
-0.96 
(0.335) 
1.01 
(0.315) 
1.12 
(0.132) 
1.26 
(0.129) 
1.33 
(0.182) 
-1.39 
(0.166) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is agency costs measured using the asset utilization ratio. 
All equations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age as potentially 
endogenous: levels of these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-
differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged once are used as additional 
instruments in the level equations. Regional, industry, and time dummies are always included in the 
instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. See Table A5.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Table 5.4 Internal governance mechanisms, firm characteristics and agency costs 
measured by the expense ratio 
 System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Governance 
 Variables 
      
 
DOSi(t-1) -0.425
***
       -0.174
**
 
 (0.091)       (0.085) 
SOSi(t-1)  0.048
**
      -0.013 
  (0.019)      (0.017) 
LPSi(t-1)   -0.018     -0.017 
   (0.017)     (0.024) 
FOWNSi(t-1)    -0.082    0.114 
    (0.117)    (0.102) 
INDIRi(t-1)     -0.023   0.152 
     (0.149)   (0.157) 
BODSIZE(t-1)      0.010  0.044 
      (0.043)  (0.043) 
LEVi(t-1)       -0.124
**
 -0.087
*
 
       (0.049) (0.046) 
Control 
variables 
        
FIRSIZEi(t-1) -0.061
***
 -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.059*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
AGEit 0.018
*
 0.022
***
 0.011
*
 0.014
**
 0.014
**
 0.014
**
 0.029
***
 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
Regional 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Industry 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8413 8588 8588 8588 8537 8537 9064 8413 
Hansen test  (p 
values) 
8.01 
(0.156) 
0.72  
(0.697) 
7.37  
(0.117) 
2.75 
(0.431) 
3.00 
(0.223) 
0.95 
(0.621) 
0.721 
(0.110) 
7.48  
(0.126) 
AR1 (p values) -6.38 
(0.000) 
-6.47 
(0..000) 
-6.46 
(0.000) 
-6.49 
(0.000) 
-6.26 
(0.000) 
-6.28 
(0.000) 
-6.23 
(0.000) 
-6.04 
(0.000) 
AR3 (p values) -0.56   
(0.575) 
-0.11 
(0.914) 
-0.09 
(0.930) 
-0.08 
(0.933 
-0.04 
(0.969) 
0.-02 
(0.985) 
-0.66 
(0.510) 
-0.04 
(0.966) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is agency costs measured using the expense ratio. All 
equations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. AR1 (AR3) is a test for first- (third-) order serial 
correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of 
instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age as potentially endogenous: 
levels of these variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and 
first-differences of these same variables lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level 
equations. Regional, industry, and time dummies are always included in the instrument set. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. See 
Table A5.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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 Table 5.5 Further tests 
System GMM 
 
Pre-reform 
 (1) 
Post- reform 
 (2) 
Non-state 
(3) 
State 
(4) 
Governance  variables    
DOSi(t-1) 0.754 0.464
**
 0.639
***
 0.540 
 (0.507) (0.183) (0.190) (0.797) 
SOSi(t-1) -0.023 0.074 0.142 0.018 
 (0.373) (0.053) (0.099) (0.063) 
LPSi(t-1) -0.061 0.108
*
 0.112
*
 0.092 
 (0.202) (0.061) (0.062) (0.078) 
FOWNSi(t-1) -1.608
***
 -0.144 -0.315 0.394 
 (0.461) (0.281) (0.338) (0.368) 
INDIRi(t-1) -0.118 0.213 -0.031 -0.105 
 (0.718) (0.433) (0.675) (0.359) 
BODSIZE(t-1) -0.313 -0.144 -0.048 -0.413
***
 
 (0.273) (0.137) (0.199) (0.143) 
LEVi(t-1) -0.252
*
 0.224
*
 0.152
*
 0.168 
 (0.144) (0.123) (0.082) (0.153) 
Control variables     
FIRSIZEi(t-1) 0.309
***
 0.132
***
 0.189
***
 0.189
***
 
 (0.041) (0.019) (0.030) (0.025) 
AGEit -0.011 -0.024 0.031 -0.076
*
 
 (0.071) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) 
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3418 5037 2856 5448 
Hansen test  (p values) 16.59 9 0.121) 14.66 (0.329) 11.21 (0.426) 12.14(0.353) 
AR1 (p values) -3.99 (0.000) -7.77 (0.000) -6.48 (0.000) -6.32 (0.000) 
AR2 (p values) -0.84 (0.476) -0.62 (0.532) -1.27 (0.202) -1.47 (0.143) 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is agency costs measured using the asset utilization ratio. 
All equations are estimated using a system GMM estimator. AR1 (AR2) is a test for first- (second-) order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. We treat all right-hand side variables except firm age as potentially 
endogenous: levels of these variables dated t-2 and further are used as instruments in the first-
differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables lagged once are used as additional 
instruments in the level equations. Regional, industry, and time dummies are always included in the 
instrument set. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. See Table A5.1 in the Appendix for definitions of all variables. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
6.1. Background 
Corporate governance plays a central role in the direction and control of corporations in 
order to ensure the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders are met through 
efficient and effective use of resources. The main focus of corporate governance 
research is the establishment of mechanisms that can align the conflicting interest of 
shareholders and managers, on the one hand, as well as between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders, on the other, thereby mitigating agency costs. Agency theory 
is used as the dominant theoretical framework underlying corporate governance 
research.    
As part of China‟s wider economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, the 
government has adopted various strategies aimed at improving the corporate 
governance of former SOEs. In the 1990s, the Chinese government resorted to the 
corporatization and partial privatization of former SOEs, which are characterized by the 
separation of ownership and control. Yet, the Chinese government has often retained 
considerable ownership stakes in former SOEs. These features of China‟s modern 
corporations resulted in conflicts of interest not only between the managers and the 
owners, but also between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This 
was mainly due to weaker incentives for managers, and soft budget constraints, as well 
as from the fact that the government often tended to use firms to achieve its social and 
political objectives such as full employment (Lin et al., 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c 
and 2011). Additionally, since before the 2005 split-share-reform, the majority of shares 
were non-tradable, controlling shareholders could not benefit from share market 
performance, leading them often to reap private benefits via tunnelling at the expenses 
of minority shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010; Chen et al, 2012). Furthermore, external 
disciplining mechanisms such as the market for corporate control and managerial labour 
markets were not well developed.  
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In this study, we have investigated the impact of managerial ownership and 
other internal governance mechanisms on various aspects of Chinese listed firms‟ 
behavior. Making use of a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010, 
we have focused our investigation on three main themes.   
Our first empirical study (Chapter 3) uses a dataset made up of 1240 Chinese 
listed companies over the period 2004-2010
86
, to examine the effects of managerial 
ownership, other ownership types, and board characteristics on firms‟ exporting 
decisions, distinguishing firms into state- and privately-controlled. This study uses a 
variety of estimation methodologies such as the random effects probit and tobit, and the 
system generalized method of moment (system GMM) estimators to draw robust 
statistical inferences. 
Our second empirical study (Chapter 4) uses the same dataset  to examine, for 
the first time in the Chinese context, the extent to which managerial ownership affects 
investment both directly, and indirectly by mitigating the effects of financing 
constraints. This study thus fits into the vast literature that follows Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) to show that managerial incentives can have a real impact on both corporate 
financial structure and investment. Although limited evidence is available from 
developed countries on this topic, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined 
the impact of managerial ownership on the investment and financial constraints of 
Chinese firms. This study fills this gap. Our empirical analysis uses the Euler 
investment equation framework, which is explicitly derived from the dynamic 
optimization “Euler condition” for imperfectly competitive firms that accumulate 
productive assets under the assumption of symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs. 
The system GMM estimator is used to estimate investment equations, which control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
In contrast to a large body of empirical studies that have analysed the impact of 
ownership and governance mechanisms on various types of firm behavior and 
performance indicators, only a limited number of studies have presented evidence on 
the direct effects of ownership and governance mechanisms on agency costs. In China, 
during the last decade, there have been significant changes in the ownership and 
                                                        
86 Although we use data over the period from 2003 to 2010 in the other empirical chapters, in the first 
empirical study we start with 2004 since we were able to purchase export data from GCCET LTD. only 
from 2004 onwards. 
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governance structure of listed firms with a view to mitigate agency conflicts and thereby 
enhance efficiency and profitability in these firms. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no single study providing direct evidence on the relationship between agency 
costs and ownership and other governance mechanisms in China. Our third empirical 
chapter (Chapter5) is directed towards providing fresh and new evidence on this 
relationship using recent data over the period of 2003-2010.  
 
6.2. Summary of main findings 
The core hypothesis tested in our first empirical chapter is that there is a non-monotonic 
(inverted U-shaped) relationship between managerial ownership and firms‟ export 
propensity and intensity. Consistent with our prediction we find that increasing 
managerial ownership is associated with a higher probability to enter export markets, 
and higher export intensity. Yet, after a threshold level of ownership of 23%-27% is 
reached, managers‟ entrenchment tendencies become prominent, discouraging 
internationalization activities. We also observe that state ownership is negatively 
associated with export intensity; that the larger the board size, the lower the firm‟s 
export propensity and intensity; and that firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors in the board are generally less likely to export. Finally, larger, younger firms 
with higher liquidity are more likely to export and are also more likely to display higher 
export intensity. Our findings, which are robust to using different estimation methods, 
are mainly driven by non-state firms in the post-reform period. 
Based on the empirical investigation undertaken in Chapter 4, we document that 
investment decisions are systematically related to managerial ownership in two ways. 
Firstly, by aligning managers‟ incentives with the interests of shareholders, managerial 
ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions. Secondly, 
we document that, by acting as a form of credible guarantee to lenders and by signalling 
the quality of information in the capital markets, managerial ownership helps to reduce 
the degree of financial constraints faced by firms (which we measure by the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow). These results are consistent with theoretical predictions of 
agency and signalling arguments according to which by lowering agency and 
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information costs, insider ownership stakes in the firm reduce the cost of external 
finance, relax liquidity constraints, and, hence, promote optimal investment decisions.  
 Managerial ownership exerts a positive direct and indirect effect on corporate 
investment as it provides managers with residual claims on the firm and thus incentives 
to mitigate the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control which 
characterizes Chinese listed firms (Lin et al 1998; Kato and Long, 2006a,b,c). 
Furthermore, in an environment with severe information asymmetries such as the 
Chinese one (Morck et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2009; Gul et al., 2010), increasing 
managerial ownership further helps to pass to the capital market the information that 
managers are committed to reduce agency costs and make value enhancing investment 
decisions. This helps to reduce costs of adverse selection resulting from the asymmetric 
information between the firm and outside investors/lenders. These findings provide new 
insights into the mechanisms aimed at enhancing investment efficiency by alleviating 
agency and information problem for Chinese listed firms. 
When distinguishing the effects of managerial ownership on investment between 
state- and privately controlled firms as well as between the pre- and post-reform period, 
we find that managerial ownership works as an effective governance device influencing 
investment and financial constraints only in the post-reform period for privately 
controlled-firms. Moreover, we provide additional evidence that state ownership lowers 
the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities. 
Combining the direct and indirect effects of managerial ownership on corporate 
investment suggests that Chinese privately listed firms face underinvestment problem. 
Thus, in line with the vast majority of studies on Western countries, we confirm that 
Chinese listed firms face financial constraints, and that privately-controlled firms tend, 
as a consequence, to underinvest. This finding is consistent with recent literature on 
China (Xu et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2014). Although our analysis is mainly based on 
Euler investment equation, our results are robust to estimating a reduced form 
investment equation which has traditionally been used to estimate investment equations 
based on the Q theory of investment. 
 In our third chapter, controlling for unobserved firm characteristics and 
endogeneity, we document that managerial ownership and debt financing work as 
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effective corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating agency costs. In particular, we 
find that high levels of managerial ownership and debt help the firms to lower the 
agency costs they face. When distinguishing the effects of governance mechanisms on 
agency costs between state-controlled and private-controlled firms, as well as between 
the pre and post– split share structure reform period, we find that the internal 
governance mechanisms mainly affect agency costs in privately-controlled firms and in 
the post-reform period. Furthermore, whilst the proportion of independent directors and 
board size generally do not affect agency costs in Chinese listed firms, larger boards are 
associated with higher agency costs in state-controlled firms. By contrast, we also find 
some evidence that legal person shareholding helps to mitigate agency costs in the post 
reform period for private- controlled firms. 
 
6.3. Implications 
Our research has significant policy implications. First, the Chinese government‟s recent 
policies aimed to reform firms‟ ownership structure and encourage managerial 
ownership in listed firms have been successful. All three empirical chapters in this 
thesis consistently provide evidence suggesting that managerial ownership has emerged 
as an important governance mechanism in the post reform period, which influences 
firm‟s outcomes significantly. Managerial ownership helps to reduce agency problems 
and improve the informational environment in the capital markets. It also induces more 
efficient investment decisions and exporting activities. Yet, these positive effects of 
managerial ownership are mainly seen in non-state firms. This is consistent with our 
data which show that managerial ownership has increased significantly only in  private-
controlled firms, and suggests that managerial ownership should be further encouraged 
in the state-controlled sector. This can be addressed through optimal incentive contract 
systems. Furthermore, given the concave relationship between managerial ownership 
and risk taking activities such as international expansion, firms should decide the 
optimal level of managerial ownership depending on the nature of their business.
 87
  
                                                        
87 In this case, firms can also consider stock options, which other research based on US data shows to 
increase managers‟ risk aptitude. See, for example, Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) for a detailed 
discussion. 
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Our findings show that although managerial ownership has emerged as an 
important governance mechanism in the post reform period consistent with the 
prediction of Walder (2011), it does not work as a useful mechanism in state-controlled 
firms. While Martine and He (2011) show that managerial ownership is negatively 
associated with state ownership, Chen et al. (2011) and Kato and Long, (2006 a, b, c) 
provide evidence suggesting that  large government ownership and control weaken the 
positive effects of these managerial incentives in SOEs. Lin et al., (1998) argue that due 
to government‟s policy burdens and soft budget constraints, managerial incentive 
contracts may not work effectively in state controlled firms. Fan et al. (2011) suggest 
that top executives in SOEs are more concerned with satisfying politicians and political 
career advancement rather than maximising profit. These arguments suggest that 
managerial ownership may not work as an effective governance mechanism in 
mitigating agency problem.
88
 
Second, our study shows that state ownership is negatively associated with the 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities, and with exporting activities. 
Taken together, these pieces of evidence suggest that the considerable government 
ownership which still characterizes the majority of Chinese listed firms should be 
further reduced so as to increase operational efficiency (which reduce agency costs) and 
enhance efficient resource allocation.
89
   
In addition, our findings also suggest that companies should be encouraged to 
have smaller boards and to pay particular attention to the quality of the independent 
directors in their boards.  
Finally, consistent with recent empirical evidence, our study shows that state 
owned firms face financial constraints to an even greater extent than private-controlled 
firms. This suggests that the recent banking system reform has been successful in 
mitigating the soft budget constraints which had been for a long time enjoyed by the 
state controlled firms, and in reducing the long standing lending bias against the private 
sector.  
                                                        
88
 In contrast, using data from 970 Chinese listed firms over the period of 2007-2008, Liu et al. (2012) 
argue that managerial ownership is positively associated with the performance of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).  
89
 Also see Kato and Long (2006a,b,c and 2011) and Chen et al. (2008) who also reach a similar 
conclusion. 
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6.4. Limitations and suggestions for further research  
Whilst our research suffers from a number of limitations, these limitations stimulate a 
number of researchable ideas and open more avenues for future investigation.  
Firstly, since a limited number of firms have been involved in Outbound Foreign 
Direct Investment (OFDI) during our sample period (Morck et al., 2008), we only use 
exports as a measure of firms‟ degree of internationalization. In the future, we aim at 
complementing our study by also employing other measures of internationalization, 
such as OFDI. 
Secondly, we do not focus on the quality of the CEOs/top management team, 
such as their international experience and education. Yet, these may have an important 
bearing on firms‟ efforts in venturing abroad. As these data are not available in standard 
databases, a questionnaire-based survey would have to be conducted in order to 
complement this study. This is on the agenda for future research.  
           Third, in future research, we plan to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
effects of managerial ownership and other forms of corporate governance on a range of 
different corporate activities in China, other emerging economies, and developed 
countries. 
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